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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation
In the EU, public opinion on globalization and free trade is not very favorable.
The Eurobarometer1, a survey based on face-to-face interviews across all mem-
ber states of the European Union, assesses attitudes toward globalization and
shows three main findings.
• Amajority thinks that globalization promotes economic growth but ben-
efits only large companies and not citizens.
• 61% of respondents in the euro zone countries thinks that globalization
increases inequality.
• In twenty-three member states (of twenty-seven), the relocation of com-
panies to countries where labor is cheaper is the first thing that respon-
dents associate with globalization.
In a nutshell, globalization, generally, and the terms offshoring and outsourcing,
particularly, are associated with increasing inequality and the loss of jobs (Kir-
keegaard [1]).
To date, the question of whether this perception is primarily a product of me-
dia hysteria and populist politics or is justified by economic facts remains open
to debate. On the one hand, the first view is supported by authors who argue
1Eurobarometer Standard 69, Spring 2008
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that offshoring is more of a political than an economic issue (e.g., Mankiw and
Swagel [2]), while on the other hand, an alternate perspective (e.g., Krugman
[3], Blinder [4]) suggests that there are substantial economic impacts.
The phenomenon of offshoring, defined as the relocation abroad of parts of
the production process (either to an affiliated or unaffiliated firm), is clearly
only one thread of the whole globalization story. Due the public sensitivity to
foreign-induced job displacements, however, offshoring receives considerable
attention and will also be at the core of this dissertation.
In my opinion, an improved knowledge of the correlations between global-
ization and income inequality is crucial to understanding public opinion and,
consequently, the political response to globalization. Better empirical evidence
in particular can help to bridge the communication gap (Mankiw and Swagel
[2]) between economists and non-economists regarding the subsequent costs
and benefits of globalization.
As a first step in this procedure, I try to shed some light on the available
evidence about globalization, jobs and income distribution. The empirical evi-
dence can be divided into two categories of studies.
• The first category directly assesseswhether globalization has a significant
impact on income inequality across countries.
• The second category focuses on the impact of globalization on labor mar-
ket outcomes, largely by drawing conclusions based on industry-level
evidence.
I begin with a selective review of the second line of research because on the one
hand, evidence of the wage and employment effects of globalization are crucial
to understanding the effects on income inequality, and on the other hand, the
labor market implications dominate the thematic field.
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1.2 Literature Review
1.2.1 Globalization and the Labor Market
The impact of globalization2 on labor market outcomes has received a great
deal of attention. Many of the theoretical and empirical contributions on the
subject were motivated by the well-documented rise of wage inequality in the
US and the apparent increase of the wage premium for highly skilled workers
in most parts of the developed world (Katz and Autor [5], Acemoglu [6]).
Theoretical studies typically emphasize two closely related explanations of
how globalization affects wages and employment.
The first explanation - the classical textbook story - argues that trade in
countries with very low wages, such as China or India, worsens the labor
market outcomes of low-skilled workers in the first world. This argument,
in accordance with the Stolper-Samuelson theorem, predicts that if trade with
labor-abundant countries reduces the relative price of labor-intensive goods,
then this should reduce the real wages of less skilled workers, both in absolute
terms and relative to other workers.
The second line of argumentation claims - expressed here in somewhat
simplified terms - that the restructuring of production processes combined
with the offshoring of low-skilled, labor-intensive production shifts the rela-
tive skilled labor demand outward. This results in a rise in relative wages and
in the employment shares of highly skilled workers, which is identical to the
effect of skill-biased technological change.
This explanation (and especially, its focus on offshoring) aimed to address the
difficulty of using traditional trade theory to explain the simultaneous rise of
the relative wages of highly skilled workers in developed countries and less
developed countries, an outcome that stands in contrast with the prediction of
the Stolper-Samuelson theorem (Feenstra [7]).
2To clarify terminology: in the following, the term globalization refers to the trade-related com-
ponents (including offshoring) of the phenomenon and leaves aside any further financial, social
and cultural aspects. (See the introduction of chapter 3 for a more detailed discussion).
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Empirically, a widespread consensus holds that technological progress and,
to a lesser extent, the offshoring of low-skilled labor-intensive production were
responsible for the outward shift of the relative skilled labor demand that re-
sulted in a rise of the relative wages (and employment shares) of the skilled
workers. Several empirical studies based on industry-level panel data found
that offshoring and high-technology capital contributed significantly to the in-
crease of the highly skilled labor share of the total wage bill and total employ-
ment. The respective empirical inquiries were based mostly on the influential
contributions of Feenstra and Hanson [8] and [9]. For a detailed literature re-
view on the impact of offshoring and multinationals on the labor market, see
Crino [10].
As noted previously, most of these studies were driven by the empirical ev-
idence of rising wage inequality in the US, but with regard to Europe, the
data show a different picture. Most importantly, there is no evidence point-
ing to a systematic increase of wage inequality across Europe (Acemoglu [11]).
This seems puzzling, as skill-biased technological change did not stop at the
European borders; Berman et al. [12] documented the pervasiveness of skill-
biased technological change throughout most of the developed world. Al-
though differences in the behavior of relative supplies of skilled workers in the
U.S. and continental Europe can explain part of the disparity (see (Acemoglu
[11]), the most likely explanation is that the more rigid labor market and Eu-
ropean wage-setting institutions prevented wage inequality from increasing.
Krugman [13] made this point more than a decade ago:” The European unem-
ployment problem and the U.S. inequality problem are two sides of the same coin...”.
This argument gains support from a glance at the European unemployment
data. Unemployment rates in the EU-15 remained persistently high over the
’90s even though they were, on average, lower in 2000 than in 1990. The EU-15
standardized unemployment rate was 8.1% in 1990, rose to 10.1% in 1995 and
declined to 7.7% in 2000.3
Some attempts have been made to quantify the direct job losses due to the
offshoring of production. The problem with those measurement attempts is
that all the available data sources have significant shortcomings. That said,
3Source: OECD Employment Outlook - Boosting Jobs and Incomes OECD 2006
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the numbers provide evidence that offshoring plays only a minor role in job
displacement.
• The European Restructuring Monitor, a data source based on themedia-
coverage of job displacements, indicates that the number of job losses
through offshoring activities is small compared to overall job turnover
(Kirkegaard [1]).
• Kletzer [14] evaluated the displacement statistics for US manufacturing.
As a main conclusion, he stated: ”Import-related job loss is a sizeable share
of US manufacturing job loss, and a much smaller share of economy-wide job
loss. The probability of re-employment is low for import-competing displaced
workers (relative to non-manufacturing workers), with sizeable earnings losses
on average.”
Both studies on job displacement point to the same conclusion, i.e., off-
shoring is presumably only responsible for a very small proportion of all dis-
placed workers.
In summary, progress in information and communication technology and
offshoring activities has contributed to the shift of the relative skilled labor de-
mand in most parts of the developed world, but the outcome of this demand
shift varied strongly between countries because it depends on labor market
and wage-setting flexibility, which are both quite heterogeneously developed
across Europe. On average, the more rigid labor market in Europe prevented a
systematic increase in wage inequality compared to the US. As a consequence,
however, globalization and technological change were accompanied by an in-
crease in unemployment for the relatively unskilled population.
1.2.2 Globalization and Income Inequality
Given all of the industry-level evidence regarding globalization and the labor
market that led to the conclusions discussed above, was there any measurable
impact on income inequality? The following section reviews the available lit-
erature addressing that question.
Despite the fact that the time from the mid 80s to the end of the twentieth cen-
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tury has been a period of massive economic integration in Europe, the data4
This apparent lack of co-movement seems to be reflected in the literature. The
available empirical studies do not give satisfactory answers as to whether or
how globalization is correlated with income inequality.
Overall, only a surprisingly small number of econometric studies focused at all
on the core issue of whether globalization had a measurable effect on income
inequality. The explanation for this, presumably, is the complexity of the ques-
tion, which makes it difficult to identify robust correlations and to deliver clear
predictions. In particular, the identification of secondary effects (such as those
of offshoring or of technological progress) is challenging because inequality
measures like the Gini coefficient conceal divergent movements at different
points in the income distribution.
Despite these considerable difficulties, a review of the available evidence
may still shed some light on the issue. The main obstacle in the way of a com-
parison of the results is that the empirical specifications, the inequality and
globalization measures, the sample selection and also the chosen time periods
vary substantially between the available studies. Therefore, table 1.1 summa-
rizes several selected studies with common characteristics. All of these studies
include a trade-based globalization measure in their explanatory variables, al-
though their main research focus was not necessarily on globalization. The
sign of the respective globalization coefficient is indicated (if significant) in the
last column of table 1.1.
Alderson and Nielson [15] and Gustafsson and Johansson [16] both find a
positive effect of the southern import penetration ratio on inequality during a
similar time period. This is not confirmed by the studies of Mahler [17] and
Wallerstein [18], who find a negative sign for trade on inequality.
Studies that go beyond the OECD and include developing countries as well -
Dreher [19], Edwards [20] and Jaumotte et al. [21] - find either no impact or a
negative sign on trade variables. In addition, Jaumotte et al.[21], the most re-
cent study, included a measure of information and communication technology
4A detailed documentation of European household inequality will be given in chapter 2 shows
only very limited movement in inequality.
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(ICT) that was found to be positively related to inequality, consistent with the
predictions of skill-biased technological change.
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Table 1.1: Literature Review: Globalization and Household Income Inequality
Study Sample(1) Time Method(2) Inequality(3) Indicator(4) Sign(5)
Jaumotte et al. [21] Broad 1985 - 2000 FEM, IV Gini Export/Import (-)/(-)
Alderson & Nielson [15] OECD 1967 - 1992 REM Gini Import (+)
Dreher [19] OECD, Broad 1970 - 2000 GMM (LDV) Gini Glob. Index (ns)
Mahler [17] OECD 1980 - 1995 OLS (LDV) P90P10 / Wage Ineq. Trade (-) / (ns)
Gustafsson & Johansson [16] OECD 1966 - 1994 FEM, REM Gini, MLD, Theil Import (+)
Edwards [20] Broad 1970 - 1980 FD Gini Trade Reform (ns)
Wallerstein [18] OECD 1980 - 1992 GLS, FEM P90P10 Trade (-)
(1) Broad = OECD and developing countries
(2) FEM = Fixed Effect Method, IV = Instrumental Variable, REM = Random Effect Model, GMM = Generalized Method of Moments, FD = First Differences
OLS = Ordinary Least Squares, (LDV) = A lagged dependent variable was included
(3) Inequality measures are based on disposable household income with the exception of Mahler (2001), who applies as well wage income.
MLD =Mean Logarithmic Deviation, P90P10 = Ratio of the 90th to the 10th Percentile
(4) ”Export” = Exports to GDP, ”Import” = Imports to GDP, ”Trade” = Exports and Imports to GDP, ”Glob. Index” = Economic Globalization Index
”Trade Reform” = Dummy variable indicating a period of trade liberalization
(5) Refers to the sign of the coefficient of the respective indicator, i.e., (+) = significant positive sign, (-) = significant negative sign, (ns) = not significant
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Put gently, the available empirical evidence is not conclusive on the link
between globalization and income inequality. In other words, the results of the
studies point to diametrically divergent conclusions.
1.3 The Initial Situation
Most research has focused on identifying the various channels through which
globalization affects inequality but has neglected the core question: did glob-
alization make the income distribution more unequal?
The preceding literature review revealed severe discrepancies between the em-
pirical findings on the subject, and those discrepancies are difficult to explain.
I want to emphasize two important aspects of the relationship between global-
ization and the income distribution that were neglected in the studies outlined
above:
(i) the impact of the different welfare and redistribution systems and (ii) the
regional implications of globalization.
(i) The first issue concerns the fact that in a majority of studies, the applied
inequality measures were based on disposable household income. This
is not appropriate to identify the effects of globalization on the income
distribution because redistribution by transfers and taxes covers up un-
derlying impacts on the distribution of market income. Hence, we may
have a partial explanation of the unstable sign of globalization coeffi-
cients across studies. To substantiate this argument consider an exam-
ple given by Atkinson and Brandolini [22]: Imagine a simple (closed)
economy with skilled and unskilled workers, where globalization is ex-
pected to increase the relative demand for skilled labor. In such a setting,
globalization is expected to increase market income inequality due to un-
employment or rising wage dispersion. However, even in such a simple
world, the interaction with redistribution makes the impact of globaliza-
tion on disposable income inequality - measured by the Gini coefficient -
so complicated that predictions become very difficult.
To gain more reliable insights on the impact of globalization on inequal-
ity, the distribution of income before transfers and tax payments should
16 CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
be the starting point of any analysis based on household data.
(ii) Second, and presumably equally important to improving the empirical
results on the topic, in all of the cited studies, regional differences within
larger countries are neglected. Such intra-country disparities are sizable
in terms of both inequality and globalization. Intra-regional inequality
accounts for three quarters of the overall EU-25 inequality in 2000, while
the remaining part is mostly attributable to the gap between the EU-15
and the CEE (Central and Eastern Europe) countries (Hoffmeister [23]).
Similarly, Mahler [24]) documents substantial regional variation in in-
equality within countries for the year 1995.
The idea that globalization intensity in Europe is strongly region specific
is supported by manufacturing data. Throughout Europe, there is a sub-
stantial degree of regional economic specialization and concentration of
manufacturing industries (Hallet [25]). This, in turn, is relevant to glob-
alization intensities because trade and offshoring are closely interlinked
with the manufacturing sector. Expressed in simplified terms, a region
without car production is not directly affected by car imports or exports.
In other words, the degree of regional specialization in manufacturing in-
dustries is responsible for the degree of globalization variability between
regions within the same country. If globalization is analyzed on the level
of the nation state, these regional disparities will be averaged out and
lost.
In a nutshell, an analysis of the effects of globalization on inequality in Europe
with consideration of the different transfer and tax regimes and of the regional
disparities may result in substantial gains in accuracy.
1.4 Aim of the Analysis
The available empirical evidence on the link between globalization, technology
and income inequality is unsatisfactory. This dissertation aims to improve the
understanding of the relationship between those phenomena by reassessing
the impact of globalization on income inequality. The scope of the analysis will
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be narrowed down to Western Europe, a reasonably homogeneous area that
has undergone massive economic integration during the last twenty years.
The main unit of analysis will be European regions, with the regional bound-
aries following the official ”nomenclature of the unite´s territoires statistiques”
(NUTS) of the European Union. Such an approach, however, postulates the
availability of consistent regional data including inequality and globalization
measures. The Eurostat Regio-Database provides a good deal of regional data
across western European countries, but there are neither data on intra-regional
inequality nor on regional globalization intensities available.
As a first step, one of the goals and main contributions of this dissertation,
then, will be to resolve this deficit, i.e., to compile a database of intra-regional
inequality measures and feasible indicators of regional globalization intensity.
In a second step, this study aims to do a thorough econometric assessment
of the relationship between globalization and inequality. The goal is to show
if and how model specifications (like the selection of the dependent and inde-
pendent variables) influence the empirical findings. Given the negative pub-
lic perception, special attention will be paid to the phenomenon of offshoring
with respect to manufacturing and, within the limits of the available data, to
services.
A further aim of the analysis is to improve the reliability of the findings by
applying inequality measures based on income before transfer payments.5 Thereby,
it is possible to analyze the extent to which the social state mitigates the impact
of globalization on income distribution.
In view of the unstable results of previous empirical contributions, this
study proposes the use of meta-analysis techniques as a tool to do a more
systematic econometric evaluation. A meta-analysis of a great deal of (self-
generated) regression results for several globalization indicators, inequality
measures and other model specifications will be conducted. In face of con-
cerns about the reliability of the regional data and possible spurious findings,
the meta-analysis will be the principal component of the econometric evalua-
tion and serves as well to specify a regressionmodel as a benchmark for further
estimations.
5Note that tax effects will not be taken into account due to missing data.
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In my opinion, the proposed procedure can contribute significantly to the
search for better answers to one of the core questions of the globalization dis-
cussion.
1.5 Structure of the Dissertation
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows.
PART II discusses the main data - intra-regional inequality and regional
globalization and technology measures - for the econometric analysis.
Chapter 2 documents the evaluation of the LIS regarding intra-regional in-
equalitymeasures and gives a descriptive evaluation of income inequality within
European NUTS-1 regions.
Chapter 3 describes the construction of regional globalization and technology
indicators using a top-down approach. Four differential measures of regional
trade and offshoring and a measure for progress in ICT are calculated. Levels
and trends of these indicators are described for the period 1985 - 2000.
PART III presents the econometric investigation.
Chapter 4 describes and motivates the econometric procedure and documents
the construction of the meta-database. The database is specified based on a
broad spectrum of possible test equations to subsequently analyze most thor-
oughly the relationship between globalization and inequality and to identify
robust model specifications.
Chapter 5 first reports the findings of the meta-analysis based on the descrip-
tive evaluation of the coefficients of interest and on meta-regressions. In the
second part of the chapter, a regression model is specified (based on the previ-
ous findings) as a benchmark to conduct several robustness tests and to shed
some light on the interaction between structural change and offshoring.
Chapter 6 complements the discussion by showing some preliminary evidence
on the relationship between service offshoring and regional unemployment
rates.
Chapter 7 summarizes and concludes.
Part II
Main Data
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Chapter 2
Intra-Regional Inequality
2.1 Introduction
As outlined in the previous chapter, the impact of globalization on income dis-
tribution will be analyzed on a regional level, but this presupposes consistent
data of intra-regional inequality measures across regions and time.
This chapter describes the availability of regional inequality measures and
documents the development of household income inequality within European
NUTS-1 regions. All measures are calculated for disposable as well as net
(after-tax) market income to document the effect of transfer-based redistribu-
tion on inequality. The data source for this project is the Luxembourg Income
Study database (LIS). The LIS is a collection of various household surveys that
are harmonized ex post to create an internationally comparable data set (see
Gottschalk and Smeeding [26] for a detailed description of the LIS). The earli-
est data available are from the late 1970s. The LIS allows a spatial exploitation
of inequality within countries over time for many European countries (Mahler
[24], Jesuit [27]). Regional evaluation of the surveys is possible consistently
from the mid-eighties for the EU-4 countries Germany, the UK, France and
Italy.
The chapter is structured as follows.
• The first part presents some stylized facts about inequality in Europe and
documents what is known about inequality within and between Euro-
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pean regions.
• The second part focuses on technical and methodological measurement
aspects and discusses the availability and quality of regional data.
• The third part describes intra-regional inequality levels and subsequent
change over time for the period 1985 to 2000 on NUTS level 1
• The final part briefly documents the decomposition into within/between
inequality components for the EU-12 regions and describes how median
income developed relative to GDP per capita.
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2.2 Did Inequality Increase? A Review
Household Inequality in Europe since 1985
What are the stylized facts about income inequality in Europe? The pattern of
European household income inequality has been described in various empiri-
cal papers. The following is based primarily on a comprehensive review defin-
ing stylized facts for the period of the 1980s and early 1990s given in Gottschalk
and Smeeding [26] for earning1 and disposable income inequality. An exten-
sion of the description to the end of the century can be found in a more recent
contribution of Foerster and d’Ercole [28].
The main facts about inequality levels are the following.
• There are wide differences across European countries in the level of mar-
ket and disposable income inequality, but disposable income is more
equally distributed than market income.
• The inequality level of disposable income is highly correlatedwith spend-
ing on social security, with Britain and theMediterranean states at the top
of inequality rankings and France and the Nordic states at the bottom.
The main facts about inequality trends are the following.
• There was no common trend apparent across Europe.
• From the mid-80s to the mid-90s, inequality and, especially, inequality
in the upper part of the income distribution increased in most OECD
countries. In the late, however, ’90s inequality remained constant!
• The rise in income inequality during the early ’90s was less pronounced
for disposable than for market income.
Some key figures2, including disposable income Gini coefficients for all coun-
tries and surveys, are summarized in table 2.1. The data are sorted by year
to allow a quick overview. An increase of the Gini is observable for Belgium,
Finland and United Kingdom, while France, Austria and Denmark show de-
creasing Gini coefficients over time. In Germany and Italy, inequality evolved
less uniformly over time.
1Earnings and self-employment income
2available on the LIS homepage www.lisproject.org
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Table 2.1: LIS Key Figures: Disposable Income Gini Coefficients
Survey Year(1)
COUNTRIES 1985 1990 1995 2000
United Kingdom 0.303 0.336 0.339 0.343
Germany 0.268 0.257 0.273 0.275
France 0.292 0.287 0.288 0.278
Italy 0.332 0.29 0.338 0.333
Belgium 0.227 0.232 0.266 0.28
Finland 0.209 0.21 0.217 0.247
Greece * * 0.349 0.333
Sweden 0.218 0.229 0.221 0.252
Spain * 0.303 0.353 0.336
Denmark 0.254 0.236 0.218 0.225
Luxembourg 0.237 0.239 0.235 0.26
Austria 0.28 * 0.277 0.257
Ireland 0.313 0.336 * 0.328
* no data available, (1) for the exact survey years see table 2.2
In addition, some papers have estimated inequality in Europe on the suprana-
tional European level. The first attempt to calculate overall inequality in Eu-
rope (more precisely for the eleven founding members of the monetary union)
was done by Beblo and Knaus [29]. They estimated a Theil index for Eu-
roland and calculated the within- and between-country components. The over-
all Theil index was about 0.18 in 1995 (approximately the level of Italy), and
between-country inequality contributed around 10 percent to disposable in-
come inequality. However, for net-market income inequality the between-
country components contributed only around 3.5 percent to overall inequality
because the rich countries redistribute more than poorer countries and thereby,
increased between inequality.
Brandolini [30] extended the focus to the enlarged European Union by includ-
ing data from newly joined member states. He found that the Gini coefficient
for purchasing power parity adjusted income in the EU-25 is around 0.32, while
for the EU-15 and the Euro area, it is around 0.29. In his article, there is no de-
composition done into within and between components.
With regard to the regional level - i.e., analyzing intra- or interregional in-
equality, the available data are less systematically evaluated.
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Mahler [24] calculated subnational inequality measures for the LIS waves three
and four (to the mid-90s). He found substantial regional variation in within-
country inequality. Similarly, Hoffmeister [23] decomposed the inequality of
the EU-25 to the regional level. He showed that the intra-regional inequality
accounts for three quarters of the overall inequality, while the remaining part is
mostly attributable to the gap between the EU-15 and the CEE (Central Eastern
Europe) countries. Both between-regional and between-country inequality are
found to be only marginal important in determining overall inequality.
In summary, the main findings of this review are the following.
• Disposable income inequality was - with some exceptions - rather stable
over time.
• Social security spending compensated for a rise in market income in-
equality.
• In the EU-15, the main part of inequality comes from within-regional in-
equality, whereas between-regional and between-country inequality are
less important.
2.3 Data and Methods
2.3.1 Availability
The evidence in the preceding section comes mostly from two sources. The
data are either drawn from the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) or from the
European Community Household Panel (ECHP). While in the ECHP, surveys
are more comparable and availability is more limited than is the case for the
LIS, which provides a comparable database across Europe. As mentioned in
the introduction, the LIS is a database that consists of surveys that are ex post
harmonized to improve comparability (see Atkinson [31]) Table 2.2 lists the
year of the applied surveys and the availability of NUTS level 1 data for se-
lected countries. Following the LIS terminology, the surveys correspond to
four waves:3 Wave II corresponds roughly to the year 1985, wave III to the year
3Wave I does not contain information on the regional composition.
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1990, wave IV to 1995 and finally, wave V to the year 2000. For about half of
the countries, data are only available since wave IV. Therefore, I distinguish
in the data documentation and the remaining part of this dissertation between
the full and the ’EU-4’ (balanced) subsample including western Germany, the
United Kingdom, France and Italy.
Table 2.2: Exact Survey Years by Country and Wave and Number of Available
NUTS-1 Regions
Wave No. of NUTS1
II III IV V Regions
Germany (West) 1984 1989 1994 2000 10 (1)
Germany (East) 1994 2000 6 (2)
United Kingdom 1986 1991 1994(3) 1999 12 (4)
France 1984 1989 1994 2000 7
Italy 1987 1991 1995 2000 5
Belgium 1985 1988 1995 2000 3
Sweden 1995 2000 1
Finland 1987 1991 1995 2000 2 (5)
Spain 1995 2000 7
Greece 1995 2000 4
Austria 1995 2000 3
Luxembourg 1985 1991 1995 2000 1
Ireland 1995 2000 1
Denmark 1987 1992 1995 2000 1
(1) Rhineland-Pfalz and Saarland together
(2) Including East Berlin
(3) The UK data come from two different surveys: the Family Expenditure Survey (FES) (UK86,
UK91, UK95) and the Family Resources Survey (FRS) (UK94, UK99). I use the UK94 survey
(FRS) because it relies on much higher number of observations and seems to be more reliable
on the regional level.
(4) Classification is based on NUTS 95.
(5) NUTS 1 region ”Aland” is excluded in the following.
Many LIS surveys have a sub-national dimension. The regional decompo-
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sition in most cases follows the NUTS4 classification.6 In several surveys, data
on NUTS level 2 or even on level 3 are also available. Nevertheless, the regional
analysis is done on level 1. NUTS 2 data are aggregated when necessary to the
corresponding NUTS 1 units.
The restriction on NUTS 1 and the decision not to entangle the two regional
classifications has two advantages.
• First, the sample becomes more homogeneous in terms of economic and
population size, and the economic size of the region is much bigger on
average. This reduces the possible problem of inter-linkages between
neighboring regions. In small regions, problems arise from commuting
- which can have a substantial impact on the average income - and from
industry inter-linkages across regional borders. OnNUTS level 1, at least,
the problems of commuting will be reduced, even though they may re-
main an issue in city7 regions (Boldrin and Canova [32])
• Secondly, the reliability of the inequality measures will improve because
of the increase in the number of observations per region, as will be dis-
cussed in the next section.
In summary, the sample gets smaller but more homogeneous, and the reliabil-
ity of the estimated inequality measures increases.
It is important to note that some of the smaller (or less populated) countries are
counted as one NUTS 1 region. Hence, I am in fact using country level data for
Luxembourg, Finland, Sweden, Denmark and Ireland. The Netherlands, for
which there is only a spatial differentiation in wave four, and Portugal, which
lacks regional data, are excluded from the analysis.
4The economic territory of the EU is divided into 271NUTS 2 and 97NUTS 1 regions. TheNUTS
nomenclature is based primarily on the institutional divisions currently in force in the member
states (normative criteria) but does not necessarily correspond to the administrative units. The
regions differ strongly in terms of economic size, area and population 5. The average size of a
NUTS 1 region is between three and seven million inhabitants. The largest NUTS 1 region is
continental Finland with over 300′000km2 , while the NUTS region with the highest population is
Nordrhin-Westfalia with a population of eighteen million people.
6See also Jesuit [27] for a description of regional availability.
7Bremen, Hamburg, Berlin, London and (in parts) Paris
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2.3.2 Data Quality
There is some statistical uncertainty about point estimates in survey data. The
degree of this uncertainty depends to a large part on the sample size of the un-
derlying survey.
The surveys listed in table 2.2 contain a widely varying number of observa-
tions. Moran [33] showed with bootstrap procedures that the degree of un-
certainty of LIS inequality measures is small, i.e., confidence intervals are in a
range from plus/minus 1 to 3 percent. Regional inequality measures, however,
are less precise than country level estimates due to the reduced sample size.
Table 2.3 gives an indication of the approximative quality of the regional
measures. The regions are classified here into four categories - weak, suffi-
cient, good and excellent - subject to the respective number of observations.
For Italy8, France, Spain, Greece and Austria, the sample size of the surveys is
high enough to allow a decomposition without loss of reliability. For several
surveys, however, the quality seems problematic. The regional decomposition
in Germany, in particular, is based on relatively small sample sizes and con-
tains a large number of regions. It is unsurprising, therefore, that the lowest
reliability is found for Bremen and Hamburg where inequality measures are
based in some surveys on fewer than 100 observations. The same holds partly
for the UK, where some regions also fall into a problematic data quality range.
The insufficient sample size for a part of the surveys precludes any further de-
composition, even though it would have been preferable to restrict the analysis
to the incomes of the working age population.
2.3.3 Data Treatment
The calculation of inequality measures requires some adjustments. Accord-
ingly, I follow the recommendations outlined in Atkinson [31]. In a first step,
household income is transformed into individual equivalent income. To correct
for economies of scale in consumption, as households vary in size, an equiva-
lence scale has to be applied. The income is divided by the square root of the
8The available NUTS 2 decomposition is unreliable for several regions. The same holds for
France.
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Table 2.3: Quality Indicator based on the Number of Observations per Region
Name NUTS Country 1985 1990 1995 2000
Berlin (west) de3 DE * - ** **
Schleswig-Holstein def DE - - - *
Hamburg de6 DE - - - -
Niedersachsen de9 DE ** * ** ***
Bremen de5 DE - - - -
Nordrhein-Westfalen dea DE *** *** *** ***
Hessen de7 DE ** * * **
Rheinland-Pfalz + Saarland deb+dec DE * * * **
Baden-Wuerttemberg de1 DE *** ** *** ***
Bayern de2 DE *** ** *** ***
North & Cumbria ukc + ukd1 UK * * * ***
Yorks & Humberside uke UK ** ** ** ***
North West ukd-ukd1 UK *** ** ** ***
East Midlands ukf UK * ** * ***
West Midlands ukg UK ** ** ** ***
East Anglia ukh1 UK * * * ***
Greater London uki UK ** ** ** ***
South East exc London ukj+ukh2+ukh3 UK *** *** *** ***
South West ukk UK ** ** ** ***
Wales ukl UK * * * ***
Scotland ukm UK ** ** ** ***
Nord Ovest itc IT *** *** *** ***
Nord Est itd IT *** *** *** ***
Centro (IT) ite IT *** *** *** ***
Sud (IT) itf IT *** *** *** ***
Isole (IT) itg IT *** *** *** ***
Iˆle de France fr1 FR *** *** *** ***
Bassin Parisien fr2 FR *** *** *** ***
Nord - Pas-de-Calais fr3 FR *** ** ** **
Est fr4 FR *** *** *** ***
Ouest fr5 FR *** *** *** ***
Sud-Ouest fr6 FR *** *** *** ***
Centre-Est fr7 FR *** *** *** ***
Me´diterrane´e fr8 FR *** *** *** ***
Flandern be2 BE *** *** *** ***
Wallonia be3 BE *** *** *** ***
Brussel be1 BE ** - * *
Noroeste es1 ES *** **
Noreste es2 ES *** **
Comunidad de Madrid es3 ES ** *
Centro (ES) es4 ES *** ***
Este es5 ES *** ***
Sur es6 ES *** ***
Canarias (ES) es7 ES * *
Voreia Ellada gr1 GR *** ***
Kentriki Ellada gr2 GR *** ***
Attiki gr3 GR *** ***
Nisia Aigaiou, Kriti gr4 GR ** **
Finland Fi FI *** *** *** ***
Denmark Den DEN *** *** *** ***
Luxembourg Lux LU *** *** *** ***
Ireland Ir IE *** *** *** ***
Austria Ost Aus1 AT *** ***
Austria Sd Aus2 AT *** **
Austria West Aus3 AT *** ***
Sweden Swe SE *** *** *** ***
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern de8 DE - *
Brandenburg de4 DE * *
Sachsen-Anhalt dee DE * *
Thu¨ringen deg DE * *
Sachsen ded DE ** ***
Legend: (-) < 200 obs., (*) < 500 obs., (**) < 800 obs., (***) > 800 obs.
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household size, and subsequently, the households are weighted by the num-
ber of members. As shown by Atkinson [31] this equivalization procedure is
an approximation of the OECD9 equivalence scales and is commonly applied.
Note that the choice of the equivalence scale can have a significant impact on
the distribution of income. The economies of scale of consumption are not the
same everywhere and depend on the income level of the region or the house-
hold. See Brandolini [30] for a discussion of this problem and a description of
some equivalence scales applied for EU countries.
In a second step, the data are top and bottom coded. This ensures compara-
bility across surveys as top incomes are not reported for reasons of confidential-
ity. Household income is top-coded at 10 times the median of non-equivalized
income, following the LIS recommendations. In addition, the data are bottom
coded at 1% equivalized mean income (Gottschalk and Smeeding [26]), and
negative incomes are dropped.
To compare absolute income values (deciles or average income) across Eu-
rope at a given point in time, two adjustments have to be made. First, because
the survey data were not collected in an exact five year sequence, most of them
have to be slightly adjusted. The respective income values are raised (or low-
ered) by the specific per capita Gross National Income (GNI) growth rates.
Second, the data have to be expressed in a common currency standard and
corrected for inflation and price level Differences, as the LIS data are given
in nominal terms in the respective national currency. To make the incomes
Comparable, they are converted into year 2000 real purchasing power stan-
dard units (PPS)10. Brandolini [30] discusses the (quite substantial) impact of
different deflators and methodical issues on price level adjustments. As the fo-
cus is on regions within developed countries, the price level differences are (on
aggregate) much smaller than within a sample including developed and de-
veloping countries. Regional disparities within countries, e.g., in Italy between
northern and southern regions, present an unsolved and substantial problem.
Although there are substantial differences in regional price levels11, no regional
9In the original OECD equivalence scale, every adult household member after the first is given
a weight of 0.7, and children are weighted 0.5.
10All conversion rates were taken from the AMECO database.
11The cost of housing, in particular, varies substantially within countries (Joliffe [34])
2.3. DATA ANDMETHODS 31
PPS deflators are available.
2.3.4 Inequality Measurement
Disposable, Market and Net-Market Income
In light of the different welfare systems, inequality measurement in Europe
should not limit itself to disposable income. Generally speaking, the optimal
approach is to distinguish between the wage income distribution among work-
ers and the market income distribution among the whole population in addi-
tion to the distribution of disposable income (Atkinson [22]). Unfortunately, it
is not feasible to constrain inequality on wage incomes, given the limited sam-
ple size of some of the surveys. Additionally, market income is not available
for all the surveys. Instead, the focus, in addition to that on disposable income,
is on after-tax market income or (in short) net-market income among the whole
population.
Market income (MI) is composed of wages and salaries, income from self-
employment, property income and private sector pensions. Accordingly, the
difference between market and disposable income (DPI) consists (roughly12)
of social and private transfers and tax payments (including mandatory contri-
butions for self-employed and employees). Hence,
DPI ∼= MI + trans f ers − taxes
In the LIS, most surveys contain market income data13, but unfortunately, the
surveys report for several countries14 only after-tax incomes. Therefore, only
net-market income can be evaluated in those countries.
However, making no distinction between market income and net-market
income results in a substantial measurement error. Therefore, I restrict the anal-
ysis on net-market income to get a homogeneous inequality sample.
12neglecting ’other cash income’
13The following surveys contain market income data: Germany (de84, de89, de94, de00), France
(fr84, fr89, fr94), UK (uk86, uk91, uk95, uk99), BE (be92, be97), FI (fi87, fi91, fi95, fi00) and DK
(dk95, dk00), SE (se95, se00).
14Italy, Belgium, Spain, Austria, Greece and France
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In the following, net-market income will sometimes be abbreviated as MI-net in-
come.
The calculation is done by subtracting taxes from market income and is
(roughly) equivalent to disposable income without transfers:
MI-net ≡ MI − taxes ∼= DPI − trans f ers
However, there is one problem with this transformation. The impact of trans-
fer payments will be overstated because transfers are also subject to taxes. To
mitigate the issue, MI-net is set equal to the original MI value if MI-net < 0
due to taxes on transfers.
There are two features of net-market income that have to be emphasized to
correctly interpret the inequality levels and also the subsequent application in
the econometric analysis.
First, the two biggest sources of transfers are unemployment compensation
and public pensions (although market income already includes private sector
pension). Hence, the survey sample underlying net-market income inequality
includes a substantial number of people with zero income.
Second, taxes, like transfers, have a redistributive effect on inequality that is
not taken into account. Mahler and Jesuit [35] calculated the redistributive
contributions of taxes and transfers on the Gini. (Thus, they excluded all net-
market income surveys from their analysis.) They point out that taxes have
a much smaller impact on inequality than transfers, even though the share of
actual redistribution by taxes varies strongly between countries. According
to their calculation, the relative share of taxes in overall fiscal redistribution
15 was, on average, around 25%, but obviously, the relative impact of taxes
on inequality depends strongly on the selected inequality measure, i.e., on the
respective sensitivity to changes in upper incomes.
However, it should be emphasized that inequality measures based on net-
market income are the best feasible solution and accomplish the main purpose.
Thus, the impact of globalization on inequality can be analyzed without the
distortive influence of transfer-based redistribution across Europe.
15Measured as the difference between the disposable and the market income Gini coefficients
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Inequality Measures
To document regional inequality, three measures with different properties are
applied: the Gini coefficient, the mean logarithmic deviation (MLD) and the
ratio of the 90th to the 50th percentile (P90P50).
The Gini coefficient serves as the main inequality measure in most applica-
tions due to its prominent status in the literature and its straightforward inter-
pretation. However, because the Gini coefficient may conceal divergent move-
ments at different points in the distribution, the mean logarithmic deviation
(MLD) and P90P50 decile ratio are applied as additional inequality measures.
The MLD belongs to the family of entropy-based inequality indexes (see Cow-
ell [36] for a survey of inequality measures). The MLD has the property of
being a more bottom sensitive measure than the Gini. Furthermore, it allows
for the decomposition of the overall inequality into within and between in-
equality terms. (I prefer the MLD over the closely related Theil index because
it is preferable to assign equal weight to rich and poor regions in this research
context.)
Note that as a bottom-sensitive measure, the MLD has a higher inter-regional
variation because it is sensitive to the number of people with no or very low
market income, which varies rather strongly between countries and regions.
The higher standard deviations in the upcoming summary table 2.4 confirm
this presumption, but note also that the higher variation (compared to the Gini)
can be observed at the country level and for disposable income.
The ratio of the 90th to the 50th percentile (P90P50) completes the picture as a
measure that is more sensitive to movements in the upper part of the income
distribution. In contrast to the Gini and the MLD index, this decile ratio mea-
sure is not affected by the top coding problem because top-coded incomes do
not reach as low as the 90th percentile. (Unfortunately, is not possible to cap-
ture the very top-incomes with LIS data, even though they had a large impact
on the income distribution (Piketty [37]).
The net-market income Gini, MLD and P90P50 coefficients will be abbreviated
in the further writing as M-Gini, M-MLD and M-P90P50.
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2.4 Descriptive Evidence
2.4.1 Overview
As described in the previous section, the documentation of inequality within
European regions is based on the Gini, MLD and P90P50. This section is orga-
nized into two parts as follows.
• The first part documents the overall sample characteristics; descriptive
statistics and the within and between variation of the regional inequality
sample are shown.
• The second part goes into more detail; levels and trends of intra-regional
inequality are described using graphical representations whereby the fo-
cus is on the Gini as the most commonly used inequality measure.
Summary Statistics and Variance Analysis
Table 2.4 displays the sample averages16 and standard deviations for the three
inequality measures: Gini, MLD and P90P50. The statistics are displayed for
disposable and net-market income at a given time.
As several countries are added to the sample in 1995, the values for the
balanced sample, consisting of the EU-4 and Belgium, Denmark, Luxembourg
and Finland (see table 2.2), are displayed in addition to the numbers of the full
sample in parentheses.
The summary statistics show that inequality was rather stable over time on
average. The data show a decline of inequality from wave two (1985) to wave
three (1990), followed by an increase to wave four (1995) and a rather stable
period to wave five (2000). This is in line with the stylized facts described at
the beginning of the chapter. Note that the increase in inequality from 1990 to
1995 was not driven by the inclusion of additional regions.
All three inequality measures show a similar behavior, but the MLD in par-
ticular, as a bottom sensitive measure, reacts very strongly to the removal of
16These summary statistics are not overall measures of EU-15 (without Portugal and Nether-
lands) inequality and are therefore not fully in accordance with the stylized facts outlined at the
beginning of the chapter.
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Table 2.4: Summary Statistics
II (1985) III (1990) IV (1995) V (2000)
Mean 0.28 0.28 0.29 (0.29) 0.29 (0.29)
DPI
St. Dev. 0.03 0.03 0.04 (0.04) 0.03 (0.04)
Mean 0.44 0.43 0.45 (0.46) 0.46 (0.47)
Gini
MI-Net
St. Dev. 0.04 0.05 0.04 (0.05) 0.03 (0.04)
Mean 1.81 1.80 1.89 (1.89) 1.89 (1.91)
DPI
St. Dev. 0.15 0.19 0.20 (0.20) 0.19 (0.20)
Mean 2.10 2.12 2.24 (2.24) 2.27 (2.31)
Q90Q50
MI-Net
St. Dev. 0.23 0.32 0.29 (0.28) 0.26 (0.28)
Mean 0.17 0.15 0.16 (0.16) 0.15 (0.16)
DPI
St. Dev. 0.05 0.04 0.05 (0.05) 0.05 (0.05)
Mean 0.79 0.72 0.79 (0.80) 0.82 (0.84)
MLD
MI-Net
St. Dev. 0.16 0.20 0.14 (0.17) 0.14 (0.15)
Balanced subsample values are in parentheses
transfer income.
Apart from the fact that the income distribution is much more unequal for net-
market income, there is no significant difference observable in the trend for
disposable and net-market income inequality.
The standarddeviations show no evidence of regional convergence of (intra-
regional) inequality. Interestingly, disposable income inequality has a higher
coefficient of variation than does net-market inequality. This indicates that
transfers do not smooth out inequality differences between regions or (and
more specifically) between regions of different countries.
Variance analysis allows us to gain further insights into how transfers af-
fect inequality. The analysis is based on the Gini coefficient to allow a com-
parison with country studies (but the results for the MLD are of comparable
size). Country-level inequality data are usually rather stable over time, i.e., the
between-group variation dominates the overall variation. Li et al. [38] show
that the cross-country variance explains roughly 90% of the overall variation
36 CHAPTER 2. INTRA-REGIONAL INEQUALITY
in the Deininger and Squire [39] inequality data set.
Table 2.5 displays the residual sum of squares (SS) and the respective shares
of the between- and within-group (regions) variation. The sum of squares is
calculated for the disposable (Gini) and net-market income (M-Gini) and for
the full and the EU-4 sample.
Table 2.5: Analysis of Variance for Gini and M-Gini
Full Sample EU-4 Sample
Gini M-Gini Gini M-Gini
SS in (%) SS in (%) SS in (%) SS in (%)
Between-group 0.27 79 0.33 69 0.11 68 0.22 71
Within-group 0.06 21 0.15 31 0.05 32 0.09 29
Total 0.34 100 0.48 100 0.16 100 0.31 100
In the case of the Gini, 79% of the sample variance is between regional. The
within-group variation contributes around 21% to the overall variance. For M-
Gini, the share of between-regional variance is 69%, and the within-variance is
around 31%. In the case of the EU-4 sub-sample, the between-regional variance
contributes around 68% for Gini and 71% for M-Gini.
The between-group variation for disposable income is lower in the EU-4 (68%)
than in the full sample (79%), while it remains essentially equivalent for net-
market income (69% and 71%).
This outcome is confirmed by the within- and between-group sample stan-
Table 2.6: Within- and Between-Group Standard Deviations for the Gini and
M-Gini Samples
Full Sample EU-4 Sample
Standard Deviation Gini M-Gini Gini M-Gini
Between-group 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.04
Within-group 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02
Total 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.047
dard deviations displayed in table 2.6. Transfer payments do not reduce the
between standard deviation of the full sample, but in contrast, in the EU-4
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sample, the between standard deviation falls strongly from 0.04 to 0.02. Hence,
transfers reduce differences in inequality between the regions in the EU-4 but
not the between variation in the full sample. This is not surprising, as the
full sample includes, in addition to the EU-4, several countries that have very
different degrees of transfer-based redistribution, i.e., Greece, Spain and the
Nordic countries.
The within-group standard deviations are reduced strongly by transfers in the
full sample as well as in the EU-4 sample.
To summarize, the two main findings of this section are as follows.
• The variation of intra-regional inequality levels - measured by the stan-
dard deviation - remained constant, i.e., there was no sign of a conver-
gence of regional inequality levels.
• Transfer payments reduce the within-group variation. Furthermore, they
are found to reduce regional inequality disparities within the EU-4, but
not within the full sample.
Unemployment and Net-Market Income
There are three groups of transfer payments: unemployment compensation,
public pensions and other transfers (disability pay, child allowances, etc.). Mahler
[35] finds for a broad sample of LIS surveys that the first two compensations
constitute about two thirds of all social transfers and that half of redistribution
through transfers is due to retirement pensions.
The net-market inequality measures are surely correlated to regional unem-
ployment rates and possibly to the regional age structure as well. Table 2.7
lists the Spearman’s correlation coefficients between the inequality measures
separately for DPI and MI-net, regional unemployment rates (UNEMP) and the
share of the population aged over 65 (AGE).
Overall, the figures show that the correlation between disposable and net-
market income inequality is higher for measures that are less bottom sensi-
tive. Furthermore, the P90P50 (ratio of the ninetieth percentile to the median)
is more strongly correlated to the Gini coefficient than to the more bottom-
sensitive MLD. Unsurprisingly, unemployment is much more strongly corre-
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Table 2.7: Spearman’s Rank Correlations
Gini M-Gini MLD M-MLD P90P50 M-P90P50 UNEMP AGE
Gini 1
M-Gini 0.51* 1
MLD 0.87* 0.49* 1
M-MLD 0.31* 0.88* 0.36* 1
P90P50 0.87* 0.53* 0.79* 0.31* 1
M-P90P50 0.62* 0.80* 0.55* 0.60* 0.71* 1
UNEMP 0.09 0.49* 0.22* 0.52* 0.22* 0.42* 1
AGE -0.01 0.02 0.01 0.07 -0.04 -0.01 -0.14 1
lated to measures based on net-market income than to those based on dispos-
able income. Note as well that the share of the population aged over 65 is not
correlated to inequality. Given the number of unemployed, however, the cor-
relation between net-market inequality and unemployment seems rather low.
A scatter plot (figure 2.1) shows that the correlation between unemploy-
ment and the degree of effective redistribution by transfers (measured as the
difference between M-Gini and (DPI) Gini) is reduced by a group of outliers.
These are, on the one hand, several Spanish regions and on the other hand,
Figure 2.1: Redistribution and Unemployment
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the two regions of the Mezzogiorno where high unemployment rates are not
accompanied by high degrees of redistribution.
2.4.2 Level and Trends of Intra-regional Inequality
The goal in the following is to document the heterogeneity of inequality levels
across regions and over time.
Inequality Levels: How Large are the Differences between Regions?
Let me start with the tails of the regional inequality distribution. This sub-
section documents the gap between the regions with the lowest and highest
inequality values.
Table 2.8 summarizes the five regions with highest and lowest Gini coefficients
for 1995 and 2000. As expected from country-level data, the highest levels
of disposable income inequality are measured in UK regions and in regions
around the Mediterranean Sea. The southern regions of Italy, Spain and Voreia
Ellada Greece, in general, all display high levels of inequality.
In contrast, the lowest levels of inequality can be found in the Nordic countries
and, perhaps surprisingly, in some eastern German regions. As an interesting
example, Sachsen-Anhalt has one of the highest net-market but one of the low-
est disposable income inequality levels. A plausible explanation would be the
lack of high incomes combined with high levels of unemployment. Sachsen-
Anhalt also has one of the lowest P90P50 inequality values, which seems to
confirm the foregoing assumption.
If the focus is on the highest net-market inequality, then after the UK and the
southern parts of Italy, regions in Spain (for 1995) and eastern Germany com-
plete the picture. For example, the NUTS 1 region Isole (IT) has an M-Gini that
is comparable to the (DPI) Gini coefficient of Mexico (0.49)17. Interestingly,
nearly the same can be said of London.
The regions with the lowest net-market inequality are geographically rather
disperse. Along with the Nordic countries, western regions of Germany show
markedly low inequality values. Another surprise here is that the list of the top
5 regions with the lowest M-Gini coefficients is completed by Attiki in Greece.
17source: LIS
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Another noteworthy fact is that the highest observed level of disposable in-
come inequality, i.e., Greater London in 2000 with a Gini of 0.388, is lower than
the lowest net-market inequality value of 0.4 in Baden-Wuerttemberg.
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Table 2.8: Highest and Lowest Inequality Levels
1995: M-Gini 2000: M - Gini
Bottom 5 Top 5 Bottom 5 Top 5
Schleswig-Holstein 0.396 Sur (ES) 0.531 Denmark 0.413 Isole (IT) 0.549
Baden-Wuerttemberg 0.390 Noroeste 0.531 Comunidad de Madrid 0.410 Me´diterrane´e 0.546
Luxembourg 0.389 North & Cumbria 0.529 Attiki 0.410 North & Cumbria 0.534
Brussel 0.385 Wales 0.528 Austria West 0.407 Greater London 0.526
Finland 0.368 Greater London 0.523 Baden-Wuerttemberg 0.406 Sachsen-Anhalt 0.521
1995: Gini 2000: Gini
Bottom 5 Top 5 Bottom 5 Top 5
Finland 0.217 North & Cumbria 0.364 Est 0.226 North & Cumbria 0.357
Denmark 0.218 Greater London 0.345 Denmark 0.225 Greater London 0.388
Sweden 0.221 Isole (IT) 0.355 Sachsen-Anhalt 0.225 South East exc London 0.342
Thu¨ringen 0.201 Sur (ES) 0.346 Thu¨ringen 0.216 Sud (IT) 0.358
Sachsen 0.204 Voreia Ellada 0.363 Sachsen 0.218 Isole (IT) 0.386
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Inequality Levels: Overview 2000
To complete the more anecdotal evidence of the top and bottom inequality val-
ues figures, (2.2 and 2.3) display in a regional map of Europe the inequality
levels in 2000 for disposable and net-market income measured by the Gini.
Even though the actual numbers cannot be fully identified, maps are a useful
tool to present the spatial pattern of inequality:
Figure 2.2: Gini: Level in Year 2000
Disposable income inequality (figure 2.2) follows a well-known country
pattern. The highest inequality levels are found around theMediterranean Sea,
especially in Italy (Mezzogiorno), Spain (Catalania and Noroeste) and Greece
(Attiki), and in the UK (London). Furthermore, higher inequality compared
to neighboring regions is found in urban regions such as Brussels, Paris, Bre-
men or eastern Austria. Relatively low income inequality occurs in eastern
and southern Germany, the Nordic countries andmost French regions. Dispos-
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Figure 2.3: M-Gini Level in Year 2000
able income inequality is in a similar range for a large part of France, Belgium
and Germany. Note, however, that Germany is less homogeneous than France
(even without eastern Germany).
Comparing the results for disposable with the pattern of net-market income
inequality (in figure 2.3), a similar pattern emerges, even though the intra-
country variation is higher in most countries - especially in the EU-4 (the UK,
Italy, Germany and France).
The UK, Spain and Italy - all countries with less generous welfare states
- show high levels of inequality for net-market and for disposable income in
most regions. Remarkable differences between the two inequality measures
are found in eastern Germany, southern England and in Austria. Eastern Ger-
many was already mentioned above as an example for high unemployment
and low upper income inequality, which explains the observed data. On the
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other hand southern England and the Austrian regions show a relative low
degree of net-market inequality but end up with relatively high disposable in-
come inequality. Those regions are characterized by low unemployment rates
and (at least in case of the UK regions) higher upper income inequality.
Inequality Trends: Overview 1995 - 2000
Figures 2.4 and 2.5 illustrate the absolute change in inequality values for the
1995-2000 time period.
Overall, disposable income inequality (figure 2.4) was stable or declined
in large parts of Europe during the period in question. The only substantial
increases occurred in Finland, Sweden, Belgian regions, Hamburg and Isole
(IT). The strongest decrease occurred in the regions of Sur (Spain), southern
Austria and Est (France).
The analysis of net-market income (figure 2.5), however, shows some dra-
matic differences. Inequality increased in most parts of Germany, in the south-
ern parts of Italy and of France and in Finland. And it comes as a surprise that
inequality declined in Sweden, given the increase of DPI inequality. In addi-
tion to Sweden, inequality declined inmost Spanish regions, in the UK, Austria
and parts of France.
Even though disposable income inequality remained more or less constant
(on average) from 1995 to 2000, the exercise illustrates substantial regional het-
erogeneity within countries. More importantly, the exercise revealed that net-
market inequality developed more heterogeneously during this time period.
Inequality Trends: EU-4 1985 - 2000
The preceding analysis focused on the 1995 - 2000 period; the following doc-
uments the way in which intra-regional inequality has developed since 1985.
The analysis is restricted to the EU-4 countries18 as data are not available for
all countries respective of regions.
Country box plots are applied as a presentational tool, thus allowing the as-
18The numbers for Belgium and the other country NUTS 1 regions that are available from 1985
can be taken from the data tables in the appendix
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Figure 2.4: Gini 1995 - 2000: The Legend indicates absolute Changes x 100
sessment of how strongly intra-regional inequality varies within the respective
countries.
Figure 2.6 displays box plots of intra-regional disposable income inequality
(Gini) by country since 1985. Figure 2.7 shows box plots for M-Gini.
This exercise permits an analysis of the intra-country differences in inequal-
ity as they have changed over time and gives some insights into how redistri-
bution shaped the income distribution in Europe. First, note that, as already
previously, the United Kingdom has higher inequality levels in disposable and
net-market income than France and Italy. Second, and more insightful, is the
development in the four countries over time that reveals interesting differences
between disposable and net-market income.
• Figure 2.6 shows that disposable income inequality declined in France
over the observed period, while the regional variation increased moder-
ately. Such an increase in the variation between regions is also observed
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Figure 2.5: M-Gini 1995 - 2000: The Legend indicates absolute Changes x 100
for Germany19 and Italy, whereas for the UK, inequality increased fur-
ther, while the spread between the regions even declined slightly.
• If, instead, M-Gini coefficients are analyzed (figure 2.7), the picture be-
comes substantially different. Inequality and the spread between regions
increased in all four countries. For France, this is especially striking, as
the welfare state disguised a slight increase in inequality.
Furthermore, note that in all countries, the between-regional variation is higher
for net-market than for disposable income inequality. Hence, transfers reduce
differences between regions within the same countries.
The two main observations are as follows: first, redistribution, measured by
the difference of DPI and M-Gini, became more important in shaping the in-
come distribution between 1985 and 2000 (with the exception of the UK) and
19western Germany
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Figure 2.6: Gini: 1985 to 2000
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Figure 2.7: M-Gini: 1985 to 2000
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second, the regional variation within countries increased over time, especially
if net-market income is analyzed.
2.4.3 Summary
The twomost important insights of the data evaluation, then, are the following:
• The data emphasize the importance of looking beyond country borders.
There exists substantial regional variation in inequality levels as well as
trends within countries that average out in country-level analysis.
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• The distinction between disposable and net-market income inequality al-
lows one to document the way in which transfer payments shaped the
pattern of intra-regional inequality in Europe. Not only does the pattern
of net-market inequality levels look substantially different from the gen-
eral perception but there are substantial changes in inequality that were
smoothed out by transfers.
As a caveat, it is important to keep in mind that the quality of the regional data
are not very good in every case, so some caution in the interpretation of the
results is advisable.
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2.5 Extension: Inter-regional Inequality
Up to this point, this chapter has described the intra-regional inequality in Eu-
rope from 1985 to 2000. This extension completes the picture by documenting
the contribution of inter-regional inequality to overall inequality.
The MLD can be additively decomposed into within and between inequal-
ity components. The calculation of the respective regional income shares to cal-
culate the between-regional inequality components is based on regional house-
hold mean incomes in year 2000 purchasing power standard units.
Table 2.9 summarizes the MLD components for the full (Panel A) and the EU-4
(Panel B) sub-sample and for net-market and disposable income.
Table 2.9: MLD - Decomposition into Within and Between Components
Panel A: MLD Decomposition for the Full-Sample
Disposable Income Net-Market Income
1985 1990 1995 2000 1985 1990 1995 2000
Within 0.183 0.150 0.170 0.157 0.770 0.681 0.757 0.787
Between 0.009 0.013 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.016 0.022 0.025
Total 0.19 0.165 0.185 0.172 0.785 0.697 0.779 0.812
Panel B: MLD Decomposition for the EU-4 Subsample
Disposable Income Net-Market Income
1985 1990 1995 2000 1985 1990 1995 2000
Within 0.190 0.160 0.174 0.165 0.78 0.71 0.76 0.80
Between 0.009 0.010 0.012 0.013 0.014 0.018 0.018 0.026
Total 0.198 0.170 0.186 0.179 0.79 0.72 0.78 0.83
The contribution of the between components to overall inequality is lim-
ited. Inter-regional inequality adds marginally between five (1985) and nine
(2000) percent to overall disposable income inequality and around two to three
percent to net-market inequality. The contributions of between components
to overall net-market inequality are lower because transfers have a relatively
stronger impact on intra-regional than on inter-regional inequality.
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But the main observation is that between-regional inequality was rising
over time; the MLD between components increased between 44 and 87 per-
cent from their 1985 levels to 2000.
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2.6 Extension: Median and GDP-Growth
Introduction
The growth of the median income is an indicator that receives considerable at-
tention as a proxy for the well-being of the overall population. Furthermore,
the median is applied frequently for the construction of various poverty mea-
sures. This extension aims to briefly document the growth of median income
across European regions and compare the development to GDP growth.
In a first step, the growth of median income across regions is described. Then,
the growing growth-gap between median income and GDP per capita is docu-
mented and decomposed into its subcomponents.
Table 2.10 shows the average median growth rates per anno - unweighted
and population weighted - over five year periods from 1985 to 2000. Median
income grew strongly from 1985 to 1990 and again, but somewhat weaker, from
1995 to 2000. In the period from 1990 to 1995, average regional median income
was stagnant or even declining. Note that the full sample, which includes
strong growth countries such as Spain, was growing more strongly than the
EU-4 sample from 1995 to 2000.
Table 2.10: Average Growth Rates p.a. of Disposable Median Income
Time Period
Sample 85-90 90-95 95-00
Median Growth p.a. EU-4 2.98% 0.23% 1.45%
Median Growth p.a. (pop. weighted) EU-4 2.98% -0.01% 1.34%
Median Growth p.a. (pop. weighted) Full 2.53%
Table 2.11 displays the growth differential between median income and
GDP per capita.
The analysis shows that in the 1985 - 1990 period, the growth rates between
median and GDP per capita were similar. In the following period, from 1990
to 2000, GDP per capita was growing significantly faster than median house-
hold income. This growth gap is even more pronounced if the median is based
instead on net-market income.
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Table 2.11: Growth Difference between GDP per Capita and Median House-
hold Income.
Panel A: GDP p.c. - DPI-Median
Sample 85-90 90-95 95-00
Growth diff. p.a. EU-4 0.09% 0.53% 0.65%
Growth diff. p.a. (pop. weighted) EU-4 -0.01% 0.87% 0.90%
Growth diff. p.a. (pop. weighted) Full 0.66%
Panel B: GDP p.c. - MI-net-Median
Sample 85-90 90-95 95-00
Growth diff. p.a. EU-4 -0.32% 1.44% 0.78%
Growth diff. p.a. (pop. weighted) EU-4 -0.40% 1.74% 1.24%
Growth diff. p.a. (pop. weighted) Full 0.81%
Preliminary Analysis
How can the growth gap be interpreted? Methodologically, there is no GDP
equivalent to median household income. However, GDP or more precisely net
(after subtracting depreciation) gross national product (GNP) - respectively,
gross national income (GNI) - can be converted into household disposable income
(HDI). HDI is (after dividing by the number of households) roughly compara-
ble to survey mean household income. Therefore, it is possible to decompose
the growth rate difference into three parts by doing some accounting: (i) into
a growth gap between GDP and HDI, (ii) into a growth gap between HDI and
mean survey income and (iii) into a growth gap between median and mean
survey income.
The main methodical differences are as follows.
(i) The main difference between GDP and HDI consists of capital deprecia-
tion, undistributed profits that flow to households in the form of capital
gains (only dividends flow into household income), direct and indirect
taxes (including social contributions), net transfers and differences of the
price deflators for households and GDP.
(ii) HDI and mean survey income are roughly comparable, even though nei-
ther top incomes nor imputed rents are captured as income in surveys.
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(iii) The difference between median and mean survey income is an indicator
of inequality, but note that neither includes top incomes.
Table 2.12 shows the available growth rates for mean, median, HDI and GDP.
Unfortunately, Eurostat does not provide reliable HDI income values for all
years and regions, and therefore, the difference between HDI and survey mean
cannot be distinguished from differences between GDP and survey mean for
all time periods. Nevertheless, several conclusions can be drawn from this
Table 2.12: Mean, Median, GDP and HDI Growth Rates p.a. for the EU-4 (pop-
ulation weighted).
Sample 1985-1990 1990-1995 1995-2000
Mean Growth: DPI (EU-4) 3.06% 0.43% 1.63%
Median Growth: DPI (EU-4) 2.96% -0.01% 1.34%
Mean Growth: MI-net (EU-4) 3.46% -0.29% 1.33%
Median Growth: MI-net (EU-4) 3.35% -0.87% 1.00%
GDP Growth (EU-4) 2.93% 0.86% 2.21%
HDI Growth (EU-4) 1.33%
data. The period 1985 - 1990 was distinctly different from the later periods.
GDP, median and mean income (based on surveys) showed similar growth
rates. Furthermore, net-market income was growing faster than disposable
income.
In the subsequent time periods, the picture changed dramatically. On the one
hand, GDP was growing substantially faster than mean and median income,
and on the other hand, transfers contributed substantially to the growth of
household incomes.
In the last period, the available HDI data allow for a preliminary explanation.
BecauseHDI was growing at the same pace as survey-based household income
(even slightly slower), the growth difference between GDP and median does
not seem to be driven by top incomes. Instead, along with capital depreciation,
undistributed corporate profits are increasing the growth gap between GDP
and median income, hand in hand with a growing gap between household
median and mean income.
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In summary, this analysis demonstrates the following.
• A growth gap between GDP and median income emerged in the early
1990s and did not reverse up to the end of the century.
• This growth differential was, along with capital depreciation, presum-
ably driven by rising (undistributed) corporate profits rather than by an
increase of top-incomes.
• Median income was growing more slowly than the comparable survey
mean income. This points to an increasing disparity between bottom and
upper incomes.
• Transfer payments were a significant source of income growth for the
median household.
Chapter 3
Regional Globalization
Indicators
”The European Union is without doubt one of the greatest example of the spread of
free trade in the world today, and to an economist, that is what globalization is all
about.” Feenstra [7]
3.1 Introduction
3.1.1 Goal of the Chapter
There are no data on levels and trends of globalization intensities for NUTS-1
regions in Western Europe. This lack of information poses a severe obstacle to
the analysis of the impact of globalization at the regional level. The following
chapter tries to resolve this deficit. Regional trade and offshoring intensities are
approximated using top-down calculations for single industry categories. By
linking economic globalization to manufacturing employment, it is possible to
distinguish differing globalization intensities within countries. The more het-
erogeneous a country is in terms of the spatial distribution of its manufacturing
sector, the more heterogeneous will be the impact of globalization. Levels and
trends of four distinct globalization indicators are documented for the period
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1985 - 2000.
3.1.2 Trade and Globalization
There is no unambiguous definition of the term globalization. As Dreher et al.
[40] formulate it: ”Depending on the researcher or commentator, it can mean, among
other things, the growing integration of markets and nation-states, receding geograph-
ical constraints on social and cultural arrangements, the increased dissemination of
ideas and technologies, the threat to national sovereignty by trans-national actors; or
the transformation of the economic, political and cultural foundations of societies.”
From an economic perspective, globalization refers to the increased integration
of the world economy. Increasing trade flows, especially through intermediate
good trade, capital flows, technology transfers (especially through FDI) and
migration are at the core of the story.
The time from the mid-80s to the end of the twentieth century was a period of
massive economic integration and increasing openness. The general condition
for free trade improved dramatically in many parts of the world as the suc-
cessful conclusion of the Uruguay Round in 1994 let trade barriers for many
products fall worldwide. Even more important, the economic integration of
the European Union or, more precisely, the Single European Market was one
of the biggest free trade experiments ever implemented. Beyond those politi-
cal dimensions, trade got a further boost through technological advance, espe-
cially through computer and communication technology (ICT) that increased
the tradability of goods and services, reduced transport costs and allowed the
relocation of production1. The explosive increase of trade in intermediates -
which received a lot of academic attention in recent years - was a direct conse-
quence of these developments.
As already discussed in the introduction, globalization is - in addition to
the financial and technological aspects - mostly about trade in goods (trade in
services is a rather recent phenomenon) and, therefore, is intrinsically linked
to manufacturing industries. The exposure and the impact of globalization on
any geographical unit therefore depend on the size and structure of its manu-
1There are several terms to describe the various aspects of this phenomenon - offshoring, out-
sourcing, vertical specialization, delocalization and international subcontracting.
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facturing sector. The first order impact of globalization will be felt primarily in
the manufacturing sector.
The manufacturing sector (or the tradable good sector) is accounting in many
countries for only a relatively small and declining share of GDP, but if one
takes into account that manufacturing production in many countries is region-
ally concentrated, its importance should not be underestimated. As docu-
mented by OECD [41], the economic development of many European regional
economies is closely linked to the performance of a few key manufacturing
industries. The regional size of the manufacturing sector and the respective
composition of industries are the result of various factors that are beyond the
scope of this study to discuss. That said, exogenous factors such as spatial
effects (trade access) or the availability of resources surely have an important
role in the determination of manufacturing patterns.
To clarify terminology: Asmentioned above, a very narrowdefinition of the
term globalization is used in this dissertation. While focusing solely on the in-
creasing integration of the world economy perhaps unjustly removes the term
”globalization” from its cultural, political and financial aspects, the expression
provides a convenient synonym here for economic openness.
The remaining part of this chapter is structured as follows.
• After a short discussion of popular trademeasures, the available country-
specific evidence on globalization intensity and on the development of
manufacturing employment is documented.
• The next section describes the systematic approach to calculating regional
globalization indicators and applies the method to regionalize the four
openness measures of interest.
• The regional measures are documented extensively in section 3.4.
• To complement the analysis of regional globalization, the final section
(3.5) of this chapter describes the construction of regional ICT intensities
in manufacturing.
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3.1.3 Trade Dependency Indicators
A rough distinction can be made between two groups of trade or economic
globalization indicators. The first group reflects the overall volume of trade
for the national economies. The second group of indicators tries to capture the
role of multinational enterprises. These measures include trade in intermediate
products, intra-firm or intra-industry trade. The OECD handbook on global-
ization [42] gives a comprehensive review of a broad set of possible measures.
The first group includes many frequently used measures of openness. The
most prominent examples are the ratio of the average of exports and imports
to gross domestic product (GDP) or the share of exports to GDP.
Strictly speaking, these are not measures of openness but indicators of the
dependency (or economic integration) of the national economy on the world
economy - two countries can have the same trade ratio to GDP but differ in
their level of restrictions and tariffs.
The second group of globalization indicators, trade in intermediate goods
or intra-industry trade, has received intense attention due to its growing im-
portance and share of total trade. See Hummels [43] for a documentation of
the rise of the importance of vertical specialization in global trade. Particu-
larly, the offshoring of business activities (including services) has recently been
given much attention, not least because of the supposed adverse effects on do-
mestic employment.
A measure that has been widely used in empirical work is the outsourcing indi-
cator suggested by Feenstra andHanson [8] calculated as the share of imported
intermediate inputs in the total purchase of non-energy materials of individual
industries. The information in input-output tables (IOT) and more specifically,
the information in the imported transactions matrix has been used for this pur-
pose.
The broad application of this measure has become easier due to the increased
availability of input-output tables. The findings are very heterogeneous across
countries. The offshoring intensities found lie between 8% in Japan and nearly
80% in Singapore. The results for the European countries are between 20% for
France and more than 70% in Ireland (based on the year 2000), as documented
in OECD [44].
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Note that in several studies, there were also less specific measures con-
structed2 to give weight to the multidimensional aspects of globalization (An-
derson [45], Heshmati [46], Dreher [47]).
Based on these considerations, I construct four single dimensional mea-
sures of trade globalization that cover different aspects of economic integra-
tion. Those four indicators have a rather straightforward interpretation that is
an advantage over other multivariate measures of globalization.
• The first two indicators are traditional trade-based openness measures,
i.e., the share of export to manufacturing value-added and share of im-
ports to domestic supply. This distinction between export and import
shares may be useful for doing inference, as export-growth benefits the
corresponding industry, while import growth is often associated with ris-
ing competition for domestic producers.
Furthermore, note that I set trade in relation to industry value-added and
not to gross domestic product (GDP). It is more accurate to compareman-
ufacturing trade to manufacturing value-added instead to GDP. Other-
wise, structural change and change in trade intensities could not be dis-
entangled because the output share of service increases in the economies
of all industrial countries. Obviously, the indicator has subsequently
been interpreted as the degree of dependence on foreign markets or the
degree of import competition for the manufacturing sector instead of for
the whole economy.
• As a third measure, an indicator for import-competing industries is con-
structed based on Kletzer [14] by considering changes in the import share
(or import penetration ratio). By analyzing the displacement statistics of
import-competing industries, Kletzer found that import-related job loss
comprises a sizeable share of US manufacturing job loss3.
• As a fourth indicator, offshoring intensities are constructed based on IOT-
analysis of manufacturing industries. The measure is given as the share
2The indicators are constructed by combining several measures using principal component
analysis.
3More Specifically, he finds that the displaced workers are older, less formally educated, and
longer tenured than are displaced non-manufacturing workers.
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of imported intermediate inputs relative to total intermediate inputs, as
outlined in Feenstra and Hanson [8].
3.1.4 Some Facts about Globalization in Europe
To set the stage for the construction of regional globalization indicators, I show
some facts about the two components used in their construction - manufac-
turing employment and trade flows (indicators of the economic integration of
countries into the world economy).
Let me begin with a review of the European manufacturing sector. It is
well known that the manufacturing sector has been declining in most parts
of Western Europe over the last decades. Country-level employment figures,
summarized in table 3.1, confirm this without doubt. As shown in the first
three columns, the number of people employed in manufacturing declined in
all of the countries shown (except Italy and Denmark) during the period from
1985 to 2000. In addition, the last two columns of table 3.1 display regional
NUTS-1 minimum and maximum manufacturing employment shares for each
country. These numbers highlight the considerable regional variation within
larger countries.
It is generally assumed that job losses in manufacturing are mainly a result of
productivity gains and restructuring rather than of processes associated more
directlywith globalization, e.g., the relocation of production (OECD [41], Kirkegaard
[1]). However, while the reduction in employment was accompanied by a pro-
ductivity increase, the share of industry value added to GDP declined nonethe-
less.
With regard to globalization, there are various sources of openness indica-
tors. In table 3.2, data from the Penn World Table (PWT)4 and from the ETH
Globalization Index5 (Dreher [47] are shown to document some trends of eco-
nomic integration in Europe. For both measures, the level in 1985 and the sub-
sequent 5 year growth rates are presented. With regard to the PWT data, two
observations should be made. First, from 1985 to 1990, openness was declining
4Total trade (exports plus imports) as a percentage of GDP.
5The index uses an average of nine indicators measuring either actual flows or restrictions to
trade and capital.
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Table 3.1: Manufacturing Employment Shares
Regional Share
1985 2000 Change Min 2000 Max 2000
Germany de 0.28 0.18 -34% 0.06 0.26
France fr 0.2 0.14 -32% 0.06 0.18
UK uk 0.18 0.12 -32% 0.07 0.19
Italy it 0.23 0.23 -2% 0.09 0.32
Belgium be 0.22 0.16 -27% 0.12 0.19
Austria at 0.21 0.17 -17% 0.14 0.21
Spain es 0.21 0.17 -18% 0.05 0.25
Greece gr 0.2 0.15 -25% 0.13 0.27
Denmark dk 0.18 0.18 1% - -
Sweden se 0.21 0.17 -20% - -
Finland fi 0.27 0.19 -29% - -
Ireland ie 0.26 0.21 -17% - -
Luxembourg lu 0.23 0.14 -37% - -
Data source: Eurostat Regio Database
in all countries, and second, openness was increasing in all (and increasingly
strongly in most) countries from 1995 to 2000. The period in between, 1990 to
1995, was more heterogeneous, as some countries where openness declined in
the earlier period recovered and others - e.g., Germany or Belgium - saw the
PWT indicator decline slightly further.
In contrast, the ETH-KOF index never declined (except in the case of Greece)
and is - unsurprisingly for an aggregated measure - less volatile than trade
volumes (PWT) alone. Both indicators show similar rankings in 1985, with
Belgium and Ireland at the top and Italy and Spain at the bottom of the distri-
bution.
This brief review confirmed the common knowledge that manufacturing
was declining and that openness, i.e., globalization intensity, was increasingly
strongly from 1995 to 2000. Furthermore, it showed, on the one hand, that there
is substantial intra-country heterogeneity in manufacturing and, on the other
hand, that large differences between globalization intensities exist.
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Table 3.2: ETH-KOF Globalization and PWT-Openness Indicators
Level 1985 1985-1990 1990-1995 1995-2000
KOF Index Growth rates: EU Countries
Germany 57 7% 4% 24%
France 59 13% 1% 16%
UK 74 1% 2% 9%
Italy 50 13% 17% 18%
Belgium 84 7% 1% 6%
Spain 58 16% 9% 16%
Greece 64 -6% 6% 24%
Denmark 69 8% 13% 9%
Sweden 69 17% 7% 5%
Finland 62 12% 15% 15%
Ireland 84 3% 6% 5%
PWT-Open. Growth rates: EU Countries
Germany 51 -4% -4% 40%
France 47 -7% 1% 27%
UK 57 -10% 13% 2%
Italy 45 -13% 27% 11%
Belgium 140 -2% -5% 27%
Spain 41 -13% 26% 37%
Greece 46 -1% -7% 45%
Denmark 76 -8% 2% 22%
Sweden 69 -14% 21% 20%
Finland 57 -17% 38% 18%
Ireland 109 -2% 30% 32%
Data source: ETH-KOF, PWT
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3.2 Method and Procedure
3.2.1 Calculation Method
In the following section, the concepts used to construct the regional globaliza-
tion indicators will be described.
Although there are studies of the impact of globalization on European Regions
[41], there are no measures to assess the exposure to globalization directly.
Here, the calculation of such indicators is based on a top-down approach.
The calculations begin with country-level trade data differentiated by in-
dustry categories following the ’Nomenclature ge´ne´rale des activite´s e´conomiques
dans les Communaute´s Europe´ennes’ (NACE) sectoral classification. There are
two possibilities to construct the regional indicators depending on the form of
the main input data. This data can be either in the form of (i) trade flows, e.g.,
imports in millions of Euro, or (ii) trade shares, e.g., exports relative to value
added or the ratio of imported intermediates to total intermediate consump-
tion.
In both cases, the key idea is to map the trade flows or the trade shares to the
location of industries and correspondingly, to the respective region. Note, how-
ever, that this approximation procedure cannot take interregional trade flows
into account.
How does the construction work and what are the implications of this region-
alization procedure? A description and a comparison of both approaches fol-
lows.
Method (1): Trade flow allocation
The trade flows of an industry (j) (which belongs to the manufacturing indus-
tries (M)) are allocated to a region (i) and are proportional to the corresponding
industry employment (Bj) share of the spatial unit.
tradei = ∑
j∈M
tradej
(
Bij
Bj
)
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The regional trade openness (globalization) indicator can be defined as the ra-
tio of trade to industry value added as opposed to industry demand or GDP.
Glob(Flow)i =
tradei
vai
The lower bound of the measure is given by zero if a region has no industry
employment. The upper bound is given by the country’s trade level. This
indicator is defined such that the globalization value of the country (c) equals
the value added, weighted sums of the regional measures.
Globc =
tradec
vac
=
∑i∈c tradei
∑i∈c vai
= ∑
i∈c
vai
vac
tradei
vai
= ∑
i∈c
vai
vac
Globi
Method (2): Trade share allocation
The second strategy is to allocate country-level globalization measures such as
the ratio of imports to industry value added for every manufacturing industry
(j) to the respective region. The regional indicators are constructed by weight-
ing the country datawith the regional employment shares of the corresponding
industries (j):
Glob(Share)i = ∑
j∈M
(
tradej
vaj
)(
Bij
Bi
)
The lower bound of the indicator is given by zero. However, under the as-
sumption that in every NUTS 1 region at least one person is working in every
industry category (j), the lower bound is the lowest ratio and the upper bound
the highest ratio of trade to value added for the manufacturing industries.
Comparison
Both methods suffer from the same limitation in that there are no regional pro-
ductivities (prodij) on the same digit level of manufacturing industries. The
difference between the two measures lies in the different treatment of the miss-
ing productivities. By expressing value added (va) as employment multiplied
by productivity, this difference becomes visible:
Glob(Flow)i = ∑
j∈M
(
tradej
vai
)(
Bij
Bj
)
= ∑
j∈M
(
tradej
prodi
)(
Bij
BiBj
)
(3.1)
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Glob(Share)i = ∑
j∈M
(
tradej
vaj
)(
Bij
Bi
)
= ∑
j∈M
(
tradej
prodj
)(
Bij
BiBj
)
(3.2)
The flow-allocation method (eq. 3.1) calculates regional trade shares on the
basis of the regional average productivities (prodi), while the share-allocation
method (eq. 3.2) calculates them on basis of average industry productivities
(prodj). The distinction becomes important if productivity is not homogenous
across manufacturing industries within the country, i.e., prodzj 6= prodij for all
z ∈ I. This is presumably the case in Italy (north-south), for example, or in
Germany (east-west). On the other side, there is also substantial variation of
productivity across industries.
In summary, the share approach relies on differences between the regions
in terms of their manufacturing structure because the measure depends only
on the shares of the particular manufacturing industries relative to each other,
while the flow approach depends also upon differences in average regional
productivity. One cannot say which of the two measures will be more accurate
a priori because the question depends mostly on the application.
3.2.2 A Remark on Interregional Trade
This top-down based regional trade allocation method is based on cross-border
flows of goods. The systematic construction of a regional trade matrix is not
feasible based on current available data because it would require a full set of re-
gional input-output tables. Neglecting interregional trade relations, however,
is also problematic.
Trade flows between the regions of a given country will not be measured,
but trade flows into and out of small countries will be. In the standard view,
smaller countries are thought to be more open than large countries due to their
smaller domestic markets. From a regional perspective, however, their trade
values wind up too high relative to large country regions because a part of
their cross-border trade should conceptually be counted as being interregional
trade.
As a remedy, flows of trade will be restricted here to those entering and leav-
ing Europe. This ensures that there is no direct border contact between regions
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and their respective trading partners and presumably reduces the distorted
measurement of regional trade between large and small countries. An unfor-
tunate side effect of the restriction is that all of the trade flows within the single
European market are excluded, and these intra-European flows constitute, of
course, one of the main drivers of increasing economic openness in Europe.
3.2.3 Globalization Measures
Export Intensity
As an initial measure, I construct regional export intensities. I define the vari-
able EXPEX as (sectoral) export6 (exp) intensities weighted by the shares of re-
gional employment in industry j (Bij) relative to total regional manufacturing
employment (Bi).
EXPEXi = ∑
j∈M
(
expj
vaj
)(
Bij
Bi
)
(3.3)
The share approach is applied because there is no systematic information on
whether firms producing for exports have different productivities than firms
producing for the domestic market within the same industry category (j).
This prevents the resulting export intensities from merely depending on the av-
erage productivity of the region. Otherwise, regions with a low productivity
relative to the country average would show higher export intensities than their
more productive counterparts given an otherwise identical industry structure.
The calculation is based on exports to non-European countries (Ex-EU). Re-
garding the issue (mentioned in the previous section) of domestic market size,
this procedure may also alleviate the problem of re-exports7.
Remark 1. Note that if country ”A” exports intermediate goods to country ”B”
and imports final goods (that used the original intermediate goods as inputs)
from ”B”, then the exports are double-counted.
6to non-EU countries
7Due to re-exports, among other things, Belgian exports of manufacturing goods are more than
twice as large as the corresponding value added
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Import Penetration Ratio
The regional import penetration ratio does not measure actual trade flows but
serves as a proxy for import competition in the region (i). The intuition behind
this is simply that a region without car production should not be affected by
car imports.
The flow approach seems appropriate here, as low productivity regions ac-
cordingly end up with higher import penetration ratios than high productivity
regions, given identical employment shares.
The ratio of imports from non-EU countries in region (i) (impi) to regional
industry demand (vai + impi)
8 weighted by the regional share of employment
in industry (j) is labeled IMPEXi.
IMPEXi = ∑
j∈M
(
impj
(vai + impi)
)(
Bij
Bj
)
(3.4)
Note that the regional import penetration ratio can - under certain circum-
stances - be strongly influenced by a single industry category, e.g., importation
of electronic components and goods.
Import Competition
The variable Import Competition (IC) is defined as the manufacturing worker
share under import competition.
ICi = ∑
j∈S
(
Bij
Bi
)
(3.5)
, where S = ”selection of industries under import competition”. An industry
(j) is part of (S) if the ratio of imports (impj) to industry demand (vaj + impj)
has been growing by more than 11% in the previous period (see Kletzer [14]).
For example, the number of industries in (S) in country (c) in the year 2000
depends on the import growth of the respective industries in (c) between 1995
and 2000.
The main methodological differences from the previous variables are that
past trade growth is used to determine the level of import competition, that the
8Note that (va + imp) does not equal total industry demand because imports from within the
EU 25 are not included and industry value is not equivalent to manufacturing value added. That
is, vai does not equal the sum of vaij because it includes mining and construction.
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variable is determined not by the actual trade flows, but only by the regional
employment structure and that the import competition variable depends on an
(arbitrary) cutoff value (11%).
Offshoring Intensity
Offshoring intensity is defined as the ratio of imported intermediate goods
(IMj) to total intermediate goods (ITj) weighted by the industry (j) structure
of the region (i). Thus, the regional indicator is the weighted average share
of imported intermediate goods to total intermediate goods in manufacturing
industries.
OFFSMi = ∑
j∈M
(
IMj
ITj
)(
Bij
Bi
)
(3.6)
, where Bij is the employment of industry j in region I, and M the number
of manufacturing industries. The available data do not allow a separation of
offshoring activities into intra- and extra-EU flows. Note that if the industry
substitutes its production with imported inputs, this will lead to an underes-
timation of the degree of offshoring because both the numerator and the de-
nominator of 3.6 will increase by the same amount.
3.3 Data
The sources of the input data are the OECD Structural Analysis (STAN) and
OECD bilateral trade database for export and import figures, the OECD Input-
Output database for the transaction matrices, the EUROSTAT Regio database
for employment figures and EUKLEMS [48] for data on capital and on value
added by manufacturing industries.
All input-output tables are from the OECD Input-Output database. For
the EU-4 countries, IO-tables are available since 19859 and for the remaining
countries since 1995 (with the exception of Ireland, for which the IOT is only
9Data for Italy 1990 ismissing. The transactionmatrix was approximated using the 1992 supply-
use tables (corrected).
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available for the year 2000).
The manufacturing industries are classified according to NACE. I distin-
guish 14 industry categories listed in table 3.3. The availability of regional
employment data does not allow a more detailed classification. The regional
Table 3.3: Classification of Industry Categories
NACE No. Description
D 15-37 Manufacturing
da 15-16 Manufacture of food products; beverages and tobacco
db 17-18 Manufacture of textiles and textile products
dc 19 Manufacture of leather and leather products
dd 20 Manufacture of wood and wood products
de 21-22 Manufacture of pulp, paper and paper products; publishing and printing
df 23 Manufacture of coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel
dg 24 Manufacture of chemicals, chemical products and man-made fibers
dh 25 Manufacture of rubber and plastic products
di 26 Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products
dj 27-28 Manufacture of basic metals and fabricated metal products
dk 29 Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c.
dl 30-33 Manufacture of electrical and optical equipment
dm 34-35 Manufacture of transport equipment
dn 36-37 Manufacturing n.e.c.
manufacturing employment figures were partially incomplete and had to be
adjusted accordingly.
The construction of the globalization variables requires regional employment
data in a compatible industry classification level and compatibility with the
LIS timeframe as well, i.e., for every fifth year beginning in 1985 to 2000. The
quality of regional employment data are rather poor. The regional classifica-
tion follows the NUTS 95 rather than NUTS 03 to ensure comparability with
the LIS. Note that several regional employment figures - especially those for
the UK - had to be adjusted accordingly.
Given the available data, the lowest feasible industry aggregation level is NACE
rev.1 R-17. Data availability is particularly poor for the years 1985 and 1990
and, consequently, precludes the application of the NACE level (2) classifica-
tion. It is no surprise that data quality as well as availability increases greatly
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over time. Hence, the following adjustments were mostly made for the 1985
and 1990 employment figures.
Missing data points were interpolated using adjacent years whenever possible.
If those data were also not available, the number of employees was approxi-
mated by the average countrywide growth rate for the specific industry. This
assumes that the respective industries were developing homogenously across
regions. As this is not feasible in the case of smaller regions, some adjustments
were done on a case by case basis. More specifically, rather than applying
countrywide growth rates, growth rates of similar regions in terms of geogra-
phy and economic development were applied to approximate missing figures.
If data were missing for an industry category over several years and for most
regions, employment was set to zero. This problem, however, arose only oc-
casionally in the case of the leather industry. Note that the leather industry
(NACE dc, 19) is in most IO-tables anyway, included as part of the larger tex-
tile industry.
The regional employment data from Eurostat cover only the number of em-
ployees rather than the number of full time equivalent employees. To calculate
comparable employment shares across Europe, the regional employment data
were harmonized with country-level employment figures from the better har-
monized EUKLEMS database.
As has been mentioned, the data on ICT and total capital per industry are
from EUKLEMS database. As KLEMS does not contain estimates for Greece,
the respective ICT capital figures were approximated using regional invest-
ment data and ICT-related employment figures.10
10More precisely, the ICT shares of Spain and Italy in 1995 were taken as a starting point and
corrected by the difference in ICT-related employment. The country-level data were extended to
the year 2000 using net investment figures by applying the perpetual inventory system under the
assumption that the depreciation rate for ICT is around 10 percent higher than for total capital.
The regional values were approximated with the regional investment share of NACE sectors (j)
and (k), which have the highest ICT capital share of all industry categories.
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3.4 Descriptive Evidence
The following section documents the regional globalization indicators. An
overview is provided based on summary statistics and the correlation coeffi-
cients of the different measures. In the following, the focus is on the regional
disparities of the four globalization indicators. Maps of European regions and
country box plots are applied as descriptive tools. The maps allow one to com-
pare regions visually across different countries and help to provide an impres-
sion of the spatial globalization (intensity) distribution within Europe. The
box plots give an overview of the globalization indicators by year and country
and allow for quick assessment of common trends and development of within-
country variations.
The complete data tables can be found in the appendix.
3.4.1 Overview
Summary Statistics
Table 3.4 shows the mean and standard deviation of the globalization indica-
tors separately by year and sample selection.
Table 3.4: Summary Statistics by Year and Sample Selection
1985 1990 1995 2000
Globalization Indicators EU-4 Full EU-4 Full EU-4 Full EU-4 Full
Offshoring Mean 0.223 - 0.222 - 0.233 0.259 0.245 0.288
(OFFSM) St.Dev. 0.044 - 0.050 - 0.025 0.071 0.033 0.090
Export intensity Mean 0.311 0.322 0.291 0.302 0.383 0.360 0.471 0.456
(EXPEX) St.Dev. 0.071 0.078 0.040 0.053 0.043 0.102 0.052 0.145
Import penetration ratio Mean 0.170 0.177 0.167 0.173 0.193 0.182 0.251 0.247
(IMPEX) St.Dev. 0.051 0.055 0.044 0.046 0.054 0.066 0.051 0.071
Import Competition Mean 0.569 0.557 0.315 0.316 0.399 0.404 0.592 0.611
(IC) St.Dev. 0.129 0.143 0.227 0.218 0.227 0.258 0.254 0.223
• Offshoring: Average offshoring intensity declined until 1990 and increased
afterward. In the full sample, we have higher averages and higher stan-
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dard deviations.
• Export intensity: Export intensity average and standard deviation both
declined from 1985 to 1990. In the subsequent period (1990-2000), aver-
age and standard deviation increased strongly. A comparison between
the full and the EU-4 samples shows that the average export intensities
are similar but that the full sample has a higher standard deviation. This
is not surprising, as countries with openness indicators below the sam-
ple average (Greece and Spain) and well above the average (Belgium and
Ireland) are added to the EU-4 sample.
• Import penetration ratio: The increase of import penetration began in
1990. For the EU-4, the import indicator increased by around 50% in the
period 1990-2000. The full sample average is slightly lower than that of
the EU-4, but here again, the standard deviation is higher.
• Import competition: There is a substantial fluctuation of the indicator
combined with high standard deviations. The highest average import
competition is found in 2000, i.e., around 60% of all manufacturing work-
ers were facing increased import competition. This reflects the strong
growth of import shares in the period 1995-2000. There is no systematic
difference between the EU-4 and the full sample.
In summary, all indicators increased between 1990 and 2000. Furthermore, the
relative standard deviations (the coefficient of variation) are lower in 2000 than
in 1985, with the exception of IC.
Correlation Between the Indicators
Even though there are differences with regard to content and methodical pro-
cedure between the four variables, there are significant positive correlations
between them, with the exception of the import competition variable (IC). Ta-
ble 3.5 shows the Spearman’s rank correlations between the four globalization
indicators. There is a significant positive correlation between EXPEX, IMPEX
and OFFSM in levels and after a within-transformation (i.e., after subtracting
the regional variable mean). The variable import competition (IC) is uncorre-
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Table 3.5: Spearman’s Rank Correlations, all Years
OFFSM EXPEX IMPEX IC
Correlation in levels
OFFSM 1
EXPEX 0.604 1
IMPEX 0.522 0.6984 1
IC -0.0977 0.005 0.045 1
Correlation after within-transformation
OFFSM 1
EXPEX 0.501 1
IMPEX 0.370 0.87 1
IC 0.191 0.366 0.42 1
lated to the other indicators in levels, but there is a positive correlation to im-
port shares after the within-transformation. Not surprisingly, offshoring (i.e.,
the intermediate import share) is more strongly correlated to import than to
export intensity.
3.4.2 Export Intensity (EXPEX)
Cross-Regional Comparison: 2000
Figure 3.1 gives an overviewby indicating the year 2000 EXPEX values on amap
of European regions. The very highest levels of manufacturing export shares
in 2000 are observed in the Nordic countries, Ireland, regions of Belgium and
Bremen. The lowest ratios of export to valued added - around 0.3 - are found
in regions of Spain and Greece.
The EU-4 countries - Germany, the United Kingdom, France and Italy -
display substantial disparities in their regional export intensities. The export
shares within these countries are between 0.4 and 0.6. In Italy, there is a clear
north-south pattern, while in Germany, an east-west pattern is visible.
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Figure 3.1: Export Intensity: 2000
EU-4: 1985 - 2000
Figure 3.2 summarizes the development of export intensities for the EU-4 coun-
tries with box plots for the period 1985 to 2000.
Noteworthy observations include the following.
• There is a marked increase of the export share in all German regions from
1995 to 2000. France and Italy display strong growth since 1990, while not
much movement is visible in the UK, even though from higher levels.
• In the period from 1985 to 1990, export shares were stagnant or declining
in all four countries.
• Thewithin-country variationwas increasing over time, especially in France
between 1995 and 2000.
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Figure 3.2: Export Intensity 1985 to 2000
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3.4.3 Import Penetration Ratio: IMPEX
Cross-Regional Comparison: 2000
The pattern of the regional import penetration ratios is similar to the one ob-
served for export intensities. Map 3.3 shows the levels of the import indicator
for the year 2000. As would be expected from country-level data, the manu-
facturing import share is highest in Ireland, the UK (especially in the West and
East, with the exception of the capital region Greater London) and Belgium. The
lowest import shares are found in relatively less developed (poorer) regions
such as Spain, southern Italy and eastern Germany. Somewhat surprisingly,
this group of regions is joined by Luxembourg and Rheinland-Pfalz & Saar-
land. In Germany and France, the import of electronics has a strong influence
on regional import ratios. This explains in part why the regions Bayern and Est
(France) show high IMPEX values.
In Greece, the region Attiki is the center of the Greek chemical and trans-
port industries and has high import values. Presumably, the region imports
substantial amounts of intermediate inputs. Specifically, imports of transport
equipment are by far the most important import category (with a share of over
30% of the total).
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Figure 3.3: Import Penetration Ratio: 2000
EU-4: 1985 - 2000
The main observations in the figure 3.4 are as follows.
• The overall trends are similar for imports and exports (see figure 3.2). The
highest import share, that of the UK, increased even further after 1990.
• Remarkably, the within-country variation is lower in all four countries
compared to export intensities, and this characteristic is especially dis-
tinct for Italy. This shows that the import penetration ratios across indus-
try categories are more homogeneous than are the export intensities.
3.4.4 Offshoring: OFFSM
Cross-Regional Comparison: 2000
The spatial distribution of offshoring is displayed in figure 3.5. The regional in-
tensities are very heterogeneous, ranking from below 0.2 in France-Ouest up to
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Figure 3.4: Import Penetration Ratio 1985 to 2000
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0.65 in Ireland. The pattern varies substantially from the picture found for ex-
port and import intensities. The highest offshoring intensities are found again
in Ireland and Belgium, closely followed by those of Austria and the Nordic
countries. Surprisingly, however, Spanish manufacturers are also importing a
rather large share of their intermediate inputs in this period. Relatively low
values of OFFSM emerge in France, Italy and Greece (again, with the exception
of Attiki). In Germany, offshoring intensity diverts from the usual east-west
pattern, as several Eastern-La¨nder have relatively high values and Bayern has
one of the lowest intensities. In the UK, offshoring intensity is highest in the
industrial centers in the south-east and in regions wheremanufacturing of elec-
tronics or cars is relatively important.
EU-4: 1985-2000
The regional offshoring levels in the EU-4, as displayed in figure 3.6, show
strong country ties, but there are substantial disparities within those countries.
The differences between the regions with the lowest and highest manufactur-
ing offshoring intensities within the countries are about 15 to 20 percent.
The main observations by country are as follows.
• Germany: Offshoring intensity increased strongly after 1990 from around
0.17 up to 0.27, an increase of more than fifty percent.
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Figure 3.5: Offshoring Intensity: 2000
• France: Offshoring intensity declined in France after 1990. Technological
change did not stop at the French borders, and production processes in
France also became more fragmented. Offshoring was declining in some
industries with large regional employment shares, e.g., the production of
machinery and motor vehicles.
• UK: The offshoring intensity remained relatively constant over time and
was at the highest level of the four countries described here.
• Italy: The period shows a moderate increase in offshoring (with an no-
table decline in 1990).
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Figure 3.6: Offshoring Intensity 1985 to 2000
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3.4.5 Import Competition: IC
Cross-Regional Comparison: 2000
As can be seen from figure 3.7, in the year 2000, the highest levels of import
competition were measured in Germany, Spain, parts of France and in north-
ern Italy. The UK, Austria and the Nordic countries exhibited low import com-
petition because imports did not grow strongly between 1995 and 2000. (Recall
that the variable does not take into account the actual or past level of the import
share.) The variables show relatively low intra-country variations. This results
from the insufficient disaggregation level of regional industrial data. If imports
in most (or all) industrial categories increased strongly (i.e., more strongly than
the benchmark level of 11%), then there can be no or only very limited intra-
country variation.
EU-4 countries: 1985-2000
The box plots in figure 3.8 demonstrate the low intra-country (but high inter-
country and high over-time) variation for the EU-4 since 1985. The highest
values of import competition by country are for the UK in 1985, for France and
Germany in 2000 and for Italy in 1995.
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Figure 3.7: Import Competition: 2000
3.5 Information and Communication Technology -
ICT
As noted in chapter 1, information and communication technology (ICT) is
closely related to globalization and should be part of any econometric spec-
ification trying to estimate the impact of globalization. This section briefly
describes the construction of regional ICT intensities to complement the pre-
ceding openness indicators.
The ICT share in manufacturing is measured as the share of information
and communication technology capital relative to total capital. The necessary
data for ICT and total capital figures are derived from EUKLEMS, as discussed
in the data section.
The procedure to calculate the regional manufacturing ICT levels is identical
to the construction of the regional offshoring intensities. The country-level ICT
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Figure 3.8: Import Competition 1985 to 2000
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shares by industry category are weighted by the respective regional industry
employment share. Implicitly, it is assumed that technology is country specific
and that regional differences are only due to the composition of the respective
industry.
The variable ICT is calculated as:
ICTi =
capICTj
capj
Bij
Bi
, where capICT is information and computer technology capital, capj is the
share of total capital for industry (j), and Bij corresponds to the employment
of industry (j) in region (i).
The Variable ICT
Summary statistics of the ICT indicator are given in table 3.6. Average regional
Table 3.6: Summary Statistics by Year and Sample Selection
1985 1990 1995 2000
EU-4 Full EU-4 Full EU-4 Full EU-4 Full
ICT Mean 0.077 0.080 0.094 0.097 0.107 0.099 0.141 0.122
St. Dev. 0.014 0.022 0.013 0.019 0.026 0.033 0.038 0.043
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manufacturing ICT intensity increased after 1985. Unsurprisingly, growth was
strongest in the period from 1995 to 2000. Even within the EU-4 sample, re-
gional standard deviation increased over time. A particularly striking increase
occurred between 1990 and 1995.
Standard deviation is higher for ICT than for the globalization indicators.
As can be seen by the country box plots in figure 3.9, this is mostly due to
higher variation between countries rather than to higher within-country vari-
ation, but the difference between the regions (within a given country) with the
lowest and highest ICT intensities is around 12 to 40 percent.
Figure 3.9: ICT Intensity 1985 to 2000
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• Country trends are important: In particular, Italy and France show only
minor intra-country variations.
• There was a very strong ICT increase in the UK after 1985. In Italy, the
ICT ratio remained fairly constant. France had very low ICT values in
1985 and remained at that level until 1995. Germany displays a moderate
increase over time. The increase in intra-country variation there is largely
due to German reunification.
Part III
Econometric Investigation
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Chapter 4
Econometric Approach
4.1 Procedure
Both the broad research goals of this study and the possible concerns about the
reliability of the input data make a careful and extensive econometric analysis
necessary. Meta-analysis techniques are applied as a tool to evaluate the rela-
tionship of interest in a most systematic way.
Meta-analysis is a quantitative literature review and aims to identify the causes
of different empirical findings on the same subject. The guidelines for building
a meta-database and the subsequent use of meta-regressions are drawn from
Stanley [49]. As in a traditional meta-analysis of a series of empirical contribu-
tions, the most crucial step is the selection of studies and results to be included
in the sample. But the main difference to a standard meta-analysis is that all of
the necessary input data (the coefficients) are generated by the author, i.e., the
data generation process is fully transparent. This has the advantage that the
coefficients (the effect size) are fully comparable.
The following section explains this econometric approach and outlines themeta-
analysis process.
It is important to note that there is no established empirical model. A re-
view of the studies summarized in table 1.1 shows that, as an expedient, many
contributions follow the Kuznets model of structural change (Kuznets [50]) as
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a guideline to set up their empirical models. This is unsatisfactory in light of
the findings that the Kuznets argument is not supported by inequality data (Li
et al. [38]), at least not in the developed country context.
However, the econometric procedure requires a regression equation as a
starting point. A promising strategy is to build upon the foundation given by
the research on wage inequality and job displacements, as both phenomena
contribute to changes in income inequality. The literature stresses the role of
offshoring as a main characteristic of economic globalization. Furthermore, it
emphasizes the importance of technology to explain rising wage inequality,
as discussed above. In particular, the role of information and communication
technology should not be neglected, as has been done in most studies on in-
come inequality (with the notable exception of Jaumotte et al. [21]), given the
inter-linkage of globalization and technological progress.
Based upon the foregoing, a basic regression equation is formulated as fol-
lows:
INEQ = β1 GLOB + β2 TECH + ρ CONTR + u (4.1)
The important feature of the equation is that two variables separately capture
the impact of globalization (GLOB) and the impact of technology (TECH) on in-
equality (INEQ). The choice of control variables (CONTR) and the specifications
of the error term (U) are discussed extensively in the following section 4.2. In
short, this equation serves as the starting point and guideline to construct the
so-called meta-database.
In a first step, many feasible model specifications are determined based
on that equation. The specifications contain, in particular, all combinations
of (1) alternative dependent (inequality measures) and (2) primary indepen-
dent (globalization measures) variables, (3) the set of control variables, (4) the
estimation methods and (5) the structure of the error term.
In a second step, all the feasible regressions are run, and the findings (i.e., the
resulting coefficients) are compiled into the meta-database. Note that the re-
sults of those primary regressions are not presented in detail.
In a third step, the coefficients in the meta-database are evaluated using de-
scriptive statistics and regression methods. The dual goal here is to determine
the most robust results and at the same time, to identify possible effects of the
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model specifications.
These findings serve also as a basis for the specification of a benchmark model
for analyzing the impact of globalization on inequality. Subsequently, this re-
gression is used to address additional robustness concerns and for further esti-
mations.
Overall, the use of a meta-analysis has the convenience of being a very
transparent procedure because all regression results (rather than just a selec-
tion made by the author) are incorporated into the evaluation. Furthermore,
the meta-analysis has the advantage of allowing the efficient comparison of
various combinations of dependent and independent variables.
Sala-I-Martin [51] applied a similar strategy by testing which variables were
systematically significant in a growth regression framework. In this case, how-
ever, the proposed procedure is focused on the econometric specification (in
addition to the choice of variables).
Predictions regarding the sign of the coefficients of interest, β1 and β2 in
eq. 4.1, are ambiguous at this point. Two distinct hypotheses with opposing
predictions can be formulated regarding the impact of globalization and tech-
nology on the income distribution.
• Globalization and/or information and communication technology are in-
creasing inequality by pushing the relative demand for skilled workers
or worsening the labor market outcome for low-skilled workers.
• Inequality is reduced due to positive effects on productivity, which leads
to lower unemployment rates, among other things. This second argu-
ment is based on empirical results suggesting that globalization (with
special regard to offshoring) increased productivity on the single indus-
try level (see Olson [52] for a review).
Ultimately, whether and in what direction income inequality is affected by
globalization and technology is a matter to be settled by the data. Perhaps,
transfers play an important role in shaping the actual outcome.
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4.2 The Meta-Database
4.2.1 Introduction
This section describes the compilation of the meta-database, i.e., the selection
process and the specification of the regressions on which the coefficients in the
meta-database are based. As already mentioned, the main steps to set up the
meta-database are as follows.
(i) Based on the basic test equation (4.1), several sets of dependent and in-
dependent variables are specified,
(ii) the appropriate test methods are selected based on specification tests
(iii) and all the proposed regressions are run. The actual results of all of these
regressions are not displayed, however. Instead, the resulting parameter
estimates are compiled into a meta-database of regression coefficients.
4.2.2 Sample Description
The units of analysis are NUTS 1 regions during the time period 1985 to 2000.
The database covers thirteen countries1, of which five are not further sub-
classified and are therefore counted as one region each in accordance with the
definitions of NUTS 1. The overall number of regions (i) is 61 (N).
A distinction is made between an EU-4 sample, which consists of western
Germany, France, United Kingdom and Italy, and a full sample, which addi-
tionally includes Spain, Greece, Austria, Belgium, Finland, Sweden, Denmark,
Luxembourg and eastern Germany. The panel has four time periods (t) in five
year intervals because data are not on hand for every year. Data are available
from 1985 forward for the EU-4 sample and since 1995 for the additional re-
gions in the full2 sample. The data form an unbalanced panel.
As a cautionary measure, several regions are removed from the sample be-
cause either the data quality of the dependent variables (LIS-based inequality
estimates) is very low or they show strong outlier characteristics. The city re-
1The Netherlands and Portugal are not included due to missing regional data in the LIS.
2The full sample corresponds to the EU-15 without Portugal and the Netherlands.
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gions Hamburg and Bremen are dropped due to the first reason, while the
Spanish region Canaries and Luxembourg are removed due to the second.
4.2.3 Specifications
Test Equations
The basic econometric model is based on equation (4.1), i.e.:
INEQit = α + β1GLOBit + β2TECHit + ρ CONTRit + uit, i = 1, ..., N and t = 1, ...,T
(4.2)
where subscript (i) denotes regions and (t) time periods.
The regression 4.2 is run for several dependent inequality variables (INEQ) to
reduce the incidence of spurious findings and to distinguish between lower
and upper income-sensitive measures.
Specifically, three intra-regional income inequality measures - Gini, MLD
and P90P50 - are used. In addition, these are applied in each case on the basis
of disposable income as well as net-market income. The goals here are to ob-
tain more precise estimates and to gain insights into the role of redistribution
with regard to the impact of globalization.
As main independent variables (GLOB), the four measures (OFFSM, EXPEX,
IMPEX and IC), which were discussed in the previous chapter, are applied sepa-
rately at a time. The variable ICT is included as proxy for technological progress
(TECH) in all regressions.
The choice of controls (CONTR) is a nontrivial task, especially in view of the
lack of a common workhorse model that fits the research questions. The model
(respective of the choice of independent variables) is set up as follows.
(i) The first model is limited to the primary variables with a direct link to the
research questions - globalization intensity GLOB, and technology inten-
sity TECH - complemented by the share of industrial production relative
to GDP (IND-VA). It is important to control for structural change, given
that both GLOB and TECH do not take into account the size and develop-
ment of the manufacturing sector. These three variables build the basic
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model.
(ii) In a second step, further variables are added to the basic model to control
for regional characteristics that influence the outcome.
These control variables can be ordered into two subgroups. The first
group includes indicators of the economic development and the economic
structure of the region. The second group contains measures of labor
market rigidity, social and educational variables.
Economic development is, to some extent, already covered by the share
of industry value added relative to GDP. In addition, the share of agricul-
tural employment relative to total employment is added to cover rural
regions. Furthermore, an age dependency indicator is included, covering
the share of the population older than 65, because the income data were
not restricted to the working age population. The basic model plus the
agricultural (AGR) and the age share (AGE) constitute the extended model.
(iii) As a further measure falling in the second category of controls, the appli-
cation of patents per million inhabitants is included. This variable can be
seen as a proxy for the level of high skill education and for the presence
of research clusters (see (OECD [41]). Note that the patent variable can
be interpreted as an approximation of the technological development of a
region, but not for the technological state of its production sector (which
is already captured by ICT).
As an approximation of labor market rigidity, the share of unionization3
is applied even though the variable is not available on the regional level.
The inclusion of labor market variables is common to most such studies
either in the form of a measure of wage bargaining or ameasure of union-
ization as a percentage of the workforce.
The extended model plus the number of patent applications (PAT) and
union share (UNION) complete the full model.
GDP per capita has not been included in the model, despite the fact that
regional growth may have substantial impact on the income distribution. On
3As an alternative variable, wage coordination is sometimes applied to measure labor market
conditions. I do not include it due to its more limited availability.
4.2. THE META-DATABASE 91
one hand, this allows the model to capture the impact of globalization through
higher growth rates. On the other hand, if rich or rapidly growing regions
are likely to be more open, this generates an omitted variable bias. Hence,
the globalization variable may capture unrelated economic development or
growth effects on the income distribution. Note, however, that the variables
patent application (PAT) and the employment share of agriculture (AGR) are
substantially correlated to GDP per capita and therefore mitigate the problem.
Nevertheless, the impact of GDP is discussed in a subsequent robustness anal-
ysis to further address these concerns.
Overall, themodel specification deviates slightly from the econometric stud-
ies on household inequality outlined in chapter 1: Many studies, at some point,
make a reference to Kuznets [50] and try to control for the inverted U-shape
pattern of inequality and economic development as between-sector inequality
rises during the transition process. Empirically, this is done by either including
GDP and squared GDP in the analysis (Li et al. [38] and Dreher et al. [19]) or
by applying sector dualism variables (Alderson and Nielson [15]). As already
mentioned, for my approach, however, the Kuznets argument is of secondary
importance because it is primarily an issue in developing countries.
Additionally, the model does not incorporate a measure capturing the educa-
tional level of the population (e.g., the secondary school enrollment ratio) be-
cause first, data availability before 1995 is rather scarce, and second, the mea-
sure would be difficult to interpret in a regional analysis due to the relatively
high mobility of young people, which weakens the direct link between skill in
the workforce and secondary school enrollment.
In summary, the following three sets of control variables are applied:
basic: CONTRit = IND-VAit (4.3)
extended: CONTRit = IND-VAit + AGRit + AGEit (4.4)
full: CONTRit = IND-VAit + AGRit + AGEit + PATit + UNIONit (4.5)
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Summary Statistic and Correlations
Table 4.1 documents the mean and standard deviation of the applied vari-
ables. At this point, the inequality and globalization measures (including ICT)
will not be further discussed, as they were already documented extensively
in the preceding chapters. With regard to the remaining variables, a signif-
icant positive trend is only visible for the number of patent applications. A
decline occurred in the industrial sector, while the share of elderly people, the
union share and the employment share of agriculture remained roughly con-
stant over time.
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Table 4.1: Sample Summary Statistics
1985 1990 1995 2000
Standard Standard Standard Standard
Code Name Mean deviation Mean deviation Mean deviation Mean deviation
GINI DPI Gini 0.28 0.03 0.27 0.03 0.29 0.04 0.29 0.03
M-GINI MI-net Gini 0.43 0.04 0.42 0.05 0.45 0.04 0.46 0.03
MLD DPI MLD 0.17 0.05 0.15 0.04 0.16 0.05 0.15 0.04
M-MLD MI-net MLD 0.79 0.15 0.73 0.20 0.79 0.14 0.82 0.13
P90P50 DPI P90P50 1.81 0.16 1.81 0.19 1.89 0.20 1.89 0.19
M-P90P50 MI-net P90P50 2.10 0.24 2.13 0.33 2.23 0.29 2.27 0.26
OFFSM Offshoring 0.22 0.04 0.22 0.04 0.25 0.06 0.28 0.09
EXPEX Export intensity 0.32 0.07 0.31 0.06 0.36 0.10 0.45 0.14
IMPEX Import intensity 0.16 0.05 0.16 0.04 0.17 0.06 0.24 0.06
IC Import Competition 0.55 0.14 0.29 0.21 0.40 0.25 0.59 0.22
ICT Share of ICT capital 0.08 0.02 0.09 0.02 0.10 0.03 0.12 0.04
PAT Patent app. per Mio. inhab. (logs) 3.82 1.29 3.36 1.69 3.82 1.35 4.29 1.44
IND-VA Industry value added to GDP 0.32 0.07 0.31 0.07 0.26 0.06 0.24 0.06
AGR Agricultural employment share 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.06 0.07 0.05 0.06
AGE Share of population (65+) 0.15 0.02 0.14 0.02 0.14 0.02 0.16 0.01
UNION Union share x 100 36.5 17.0 33.0 16.6 33.0 16.6 29.0 15.7
MFS1 Manufacturing employment share 0.21 0.06 0.18 0.05 0.16 0.06 0.14 0.05
GDPC1 GDP per capita (in logs) 9.78 0.22 9.92 0.23 9.85 0.31 9.97 0.31
1 MFS and GDPC are not part of the meta-database specifications but are applied in a later section.
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To identify possible collinearity issues, table 4.2 shows the Spearman’s cor-
relation coefficients for the regressors. Overall, the correlations seem to be
Table 4.2: Spearman’s Correlation Coefficients
OFFSM EXPEX IMPEX IC ICT PAT IND-VA AGR AGE
OFFSM 1
EXPEX 0.480 1
IMPEX 0.555 0.687 1
IC -0.09 0.007 0.049 1
ICT 0.152 0.480 0.464 -0.11 1
PAT 0.077 0.402 0.287 -0.05 0.395 1
IND-VA -0.08 -0.17 -0.07 -0.03 -0.15 0.095 1
AGR -0.31 -0.42 -0.53 0.107 -0.53 -0.47 -0.03 1
AGE 0.022 0.076 0.082 0.253 0.162 0.014 -0.00 0.13 1
UNION 0.387 0.145 0.178 -0.23 0.166 0.071 0.148 -0.12 0.112
unproblematic. The highest correlations are found between the globalization
variables (with the exception of IC), which is not surprising given that those
measures were constructed based on the same methodical procedures. The
calculation of variance inflation factors (VIF) confirms that collinearity is a rel-
atively minor problem. Some experimentation showed that the VIF is sensitive
to the variable patents and union share4.
Note that a panel data unit root test (Kyoung [53]) is clearly rejected for all
dependent variables.
Specification of the Error Term
This subsection discusses the structure of the error term uit in equation 4.2.
Most regions5 are under the scope of institutional and political factors that are
determined on the country level. This holds at large for income distribution
as well as for the globalization intensity. For example, regional inequality is
shaped by the respective country tax regime and the level of import compe-
tition by country-specific tariffs. Furthermore, there are unobserved region-
4The VIF rises after within-transformation for patents (PAT) and union share from around 1.5
to around 4.5, based on a full model specification including offshoring. The variable PAT shows
especially high signs of collinearity in wave four.
5Except the economically small country-regions Denmark, Finland, Sweden, Luxembourg and
Ireland
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specific factors - such as geographic peculiarities or cultural traits (Tabellini
[54]) - that influence the regional economic structure.
Standard panel estimation techniques handle the presence of such unob-
served factors, provided that these factors remain constant over time. That
assumption may hold in the case of cultural or geographical traits but does not
necessarily do so for country-level factors.
In general, the country-level influence on variables is not problematic per se
and constitutes an important part of the results, but unobserved time-variant
country effects may bias the results. Furthermore, these distortions will vary
strongly between countries because they depend on the respective number of
regions. As an example, consider the strong growth dynamics in Spain from
1995 to 2000.
The structure of the error term uit and the appropriate regression methods
are determined based upon these considerations. The following compositions
of uit are considered:
uit = µc + ǫit (4.6)
uit = µc + γt + ǫit (4.7)
uit = µc + γt + γct + ǫit (4.8)
uit = ηi + ǫit (4.9)
uit = ηi + γt + ǫit (4.10)
uit = ηi + γct + ǫit (4.11)
, where µc captures country-specific effects, ηi region-specific effects, γt is pick-
ing up overall time effects, γct time-variant country effects, and ǫit is the i.i.d.
error term.
In the first three error specifications (4.6 - 4.8), it is assumed that unob-
served effects are present that are country-specific but constant over time. Or-
dinary least squares regression including country (4.6) and time dummies (4.7)
and additional interaction terms between country and time dummies (4.8) will
be an efficient estimator under the assumption of no region-specific effects.
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This pooled cross-section regression allows for the estimation of regional vari-
ables that are constant over time, and it has the advantage that it keeps cross-
sectional information. This is a desirable property because household-based in-
equality measures are not very volatile in the short run, and as a consequence,
a large part of the variance is cross sectional and not time variable.
The next error specification, a one-way (4.9) or a two-way (4.10) error com-
ponent model (depending on the inclusion of time effects γt), assumes the pres-
ence of unobserved regional effects. One can expect to find evidence for un-
observed regional effects on top of unobserved country effects because many
possible regional characteristics (such as geographical location or the degree of
urbanization) cannot be controlled for in the model. The OLS estimates are bi-
ased in the presence of ηi even though presumably, country dummies capture
a substantial part of the regional fixed effects.
Experimentationwith various specifications showed that a generalizedHaus-
man test for poolability remains inconclusive, i.e., depends on the specification.
However, either the standard fixed effect (FEM) or the random effect (REM)
model is a valid estimator depending on the correlation of the unobserved er-
ror components ηi with the regressors. Applying FEM captures only the within
variation of the data but by doing so also reduces the possible of an omitted
variable bias. In addition, the random effects model (which keeps some of the
between-region variation) is applied as an efficient estimator if E(Xitηi) = 0.
The presence of cross-sectional dependence violates the assumption of FEM
and REMmodels if the unobserved factors that create interdependencies across
cross-sections are correlated with the regressors. The standard Breusch-Pagan
LM test for cross-sectional dependence is not valid because the dataset has the
form of small T and large N. In this case, the parametric testing procedure pro-
posed by Pesaran ([55]) can be applied. The Pesaran test-statistic is accepted at
the usual confidence levels, thus indicating that cross-sectional dependence is
not an issue in the data-set, given the proposed specifications.
The final specification (4.11) controls for unobserved, time-variable country
effects in addition to regional fixed effects. This is important given the varying
number of regions per country and the intermixture of regions and countries
in the sample.
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Specification 4.11 relies also on either FEM or REM models but includes inter-
action terms (γct) of time and country dummies on top of the regional effects
6.
Unfortunately, this leads to a substantive loss of information on globalization
and inequality. It remains to be seen whether the elimination of unobserved
time-variable country effects outweighs the informational loss.
These specifications can be summarized as follows. Three estimation meth-
ods - OLS, FEM, REM - are applied in combination with the respective dummy
setting. The error compositions 4.6 and 4.9 are described as no (time) dummy
specification (ND), the error terms 4.7 and 4.10 as time dummy specifications
(TD) and 4.7 and 4.11 as time-variable country dummy specification (CT).
4.2.4 Summary
The size of the meta-database is documented in table 4.3. The content is as
follows.
• Every regression is replicated six times because the analysis is based
upon three distinct inequality measures - the Gini, MLD and P90P50 -
which are at any one time applied separately for disposable and for net-
market income.
• Regarding the right hand side of equation 4.2, the regressions are run for
each of the four globalization variables separately. This procedure should
reduce potential collinearity issues strongly.
• The three sets of control variables (eq. 4.3, 4.4, 4.5) - basic, extended and
full - are applied.
• Based on the error structures given in equations 4.6 to 4.11, three dummy
specifications (ND, TD, CT) and three estimation methods (OLS, FEM,
REM) are used.
In summary, the database contains coefficients of a total of 1296 regressions or
216 regressions per inequality variable.
6To avoid perfect collinearity, time-variable country effects are applied only to countries count-
ing as more than one region!
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Table 4.3: The Meta-Database
Number of
Category Regressions
DEPENDENT VARIABLES 6
Gini, MLD, P90P50 for disposable and net-market income
GLOBALIZATION 4
Offshoring, exports share, import penetration ratio, import competition
MODEL SPECIFICATION / CONTROLS 3
basic = IND-VA
extended = basic + AGE + AGR
full = extended + PAT + UNION
METHODS 3
OLS, FEM, REM
DUMMY SPECIFICATION 3
No (time) dummies (ND)
Time dummies (TD)
Time-variable country dummies (CT)
SAMPLE 2
Full sample / balanced EU-4 sample
Total number: 1296
Number per dependent variable: 216
Number per globalization variable: 324
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As the appropriate model is not known a priori, it is convenient to use a
covariance matrix robust to heteroskedasticity in all specifications.
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Chapter 5
Evaluation and Results
5.1 Overview
This chapter is subdivided into two parts.
(i) The first and larger part presents the results of the meta-analysis. The
meta-analysis aims to evaluate sign, size and significance of the different
parameter-estimates and to identify possible specification effects. The
results are documented in a two-step procedure.
(a) In the first step, some descriptive evidence is given for size and
significance of the parameter-estimates in the meta-database. As a
caveat, note that the mean of the coefficients and p-values has to be
regarded with some caution because not all specifications are effi-
cient in every setup. More precisely, there are no systematic in-depth
tests done if the choice of the error structure and the respective re-
gression method is appropriate under every model specification.
(b) In the second step, the analysis is complemented by running meta-
regressions where the coefficients and the corresponding p-values
are used as dependent variables. In doing so, the goal is to identify
possible effects of the influence of inequality measurement, sample
size, model and dummy settings.
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(ii) In the second part of the chapter a regression model is specified as a
benchmark for further estimations based upon the findings of the pre-
cedingmeta-analysis. Subsequently, this regression is used to analyze the
robustness of the results and to discuss the interdependence of structural
change and globalization. The importance of growth effects and possible
endogeneity concerns about the globalization variables are addressed.
5.2 Results of the Meta-Analysis
5.2.1 Descriptive Evidence
Distribution of the Coefficients
Figures 5.1 and 5.2 show the histograms of the globalization coefficients (β1 in
eq. 4.2) in the meta-database separately for net-market and disposable income
Gini. Both histograms reveal substantial differences between the four global-
ization measures.
To begin with, the histograms of the globalization coefficients for M-Gini
Figure 5.1: Histogram of the Globalization Coefficients based on M-Gini
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are displayed in figure 5.1. The larger part of the parameter-estimates for off-
shoring (OFFSM) is to the right-hand side of zerowith very few negative values.
The first peak in the observations of the OFFSM coefficients is around 0.15, and
a second peak is between 0.3 and 0.4. This would translate into elasticities of
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0.08 to 0.17. In the cases of EXPEX and IMPEX, there is a peak around 0.2, but
both measures show also substantial negative values. The IC coefficients are
clustered around zero or 0.05, although there are a few negative outliers.
Figure 5.2: Histogram of the Globalization Coefficients based on (DPI) Gini
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Figure 5.2 displays the estimates for disposable income inequality. A compari-
son with the net-market income findings reveals the following differences.
• None of the OFFSM coefficients is negative, and some of the estimates are
even larger than in the net-market income case. This is surprising because
the estimates were not standardized. Note, however, that the peak of the
distribution is close to zero.
• The coefficients of the variables EXPEX, IMPEX and IC are now closely
clustered around zero, although the larger part of the estimates turned
out to be negative.
Overall, OFFSM seems to be the only globalization variable that shows positive
impact on inequality independent of the specification. Interestingly, OFFSM
is found to be even more robustly positively related to disposable than to
net-market income inequality. This indicates that offshoring is somehow neg-
atively correlated with (effective) redistribution, i.e., with the difference be-
tween (DPI) Gini and M-Gini.
The respective export and import coefficients display a more ambiguous pat-
tern, especially in case of net-market income regressions. Clearly, the estimates
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have to be analyzed more extensively before it will be possible to draw conclu-
sions from these observations.
The distribution of the ICT coefficients (β2 in eq. 4.2) is displayed in figure
5.3. In the case of the disposable income Gini, there is a positive peak visible
around 0.2 and a negative peak around minus 0.25. For net-market income in-
equality, the estimates are strongly skewed to the left, even though the highest
peak of the distribution is near zero. This stands in contrast to the theoretical
considerations and empirical findings on wage inequality from Feenstra and
Hanson [9] among others, whereby offshoring and ICT coefficients are expected
to have the same (positive) sign. A possible explanation for the negative sign
Figure 5.3: Histogram of the ICT Coefficients based on M-Gini and (DPI) Gini
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is that ICT is an important growth factor (see Jorgenson [56]) and may cause
lower inequality by increasing demand for less qualified labor.
Averages of the Coefficients
Table 5.1 displays the variance-weighted average coefficients (COEFF) of the
globalization variables and of the information and communication technol-
ogy variable ICT. Apart from the average marginal effects, the robustness of
these results is indicated based on the corresponding (average) p-values (P-
VAL). Thereby, (***) indicates a very robust result, i.e., the average p-value is
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smaller than 0.1, (*) stands for p-values smaller than 0.3 and (-) implies that
significance is low, i.e., an average p-value larger than 0.3.
The weighted means of the globalization and technology coefficients and
the indicators of the corresponding p-values are shown separately for the de-
pendent variables of the underlying regressions - the three inequality measures
Gini, MLD and P90P50 and disposable (columns 1-6) or net-market income
(columns 7-12) - at a given time. The table is split into panels 1 - 3 to present
the results for each of the three dummy settings ND, TD, CT (see table 4.3), as
these have a strong impact on the size and significance of the coefficients.
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Table 5.1: Weighted Average Coefficients of the Globalization Variables and of ICT
Dependent Disposable Income Net-market Income
variable Gini MLD P90P50 Gini MLD P90P50
COEFF P-VAL COEFF P-VAL COEFF P-VAL COEFF P-VAL COEFF P-VAL COEFF P-VAL
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Panel 1: ND - No (time) Dummies
OFFSM 0.205 *** 0.316 *** 0.414 - 0.176 * 0.573 * 0.566 -
EXPEX 0.006 - -0.00 - 0.118 - 0.106 *** 0.180 - 0.383 *
IMPEX -0.02 - -0.12 * 0.289 - 0.169 * 0.280 - 0.871 *
IC -0.00 - 0.008 - -0.03 - 0.016 * 0.050 * 0.089 *
ICT 0.033 - -0.10 - 0.535 * -0.09 - -0.48 * -0.07 -
Panel 2: TD - Time Dummies
OFFSM 0.253 *** 0.433 *** 0.416 - 0.115 - 0.408 * 0.257 -
EXPEX -0.01 - 0.019 - -0.04 - -0.03 - -0.29 * -0.06 -
IMPEX -0.05 - -0.14 * 0.311 - -0.01 - -0.30 * 0.285 -
IC -0.01 * 0.008 - -0.07 * -0.00 - -0.01 - 0.015 -
ICT -0.00 - 0.025 - 0.182 - -0.31 *** -0.94 * -1.19 *
Panel 3: CT - Time-Variable Country Dummies
OFFSM 0.211 * 0.199 - 1.350 *** 0.415 *** 0.882 * 2.564 ***
EXPEX 0.070 * 0.062 - 0.431 * 0.163 * 0.315 *** 0.901 *
IMPEX 0.019 - -0.06 - 0.315 - 0.137 * 0.145 * 0.487 *
IC -0.00 - -0.01 - 0.007 - 0.022 * 0.038 * 0.086 *
ICT -0.23 * -0.59 * -1.36 * -0.73 *** -3.01 *** -4.04 ***
*** Average p-value smaller than 0.1, * Average p-value smaller than 0.3, - Average p-value equal to or larger than 0.3
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The main observations drawn from table 5.1 are as follows.
• The globalization variables aremostly positively related to inequality (on
average), but the significance level seems rather poor at first glance. Of
the four globalization variables, only OFFSM has a positive sign for all in-
equality measures and dummy specifications. Regarding the other three
measures, no unambiguous conclusion can be drawn. Overall, the vari-
able IC (import competition) shows the weakest results of all four vari-
ables.
• A comparison between DPI and MI-net based estimations shows sub-
stantial differences in the coefficients. With the exception of offshoring,
the coefficients are on average less significant on DPI than on MI-net in-
equality. Surprisingly OFFSM has a more robust impact on disposable
than on net-market income inequality. This indicates that offshoring is
negatively correlated to redistribution and also confirms the observa-
tions made in the analysis of the preceding figures 5.1 and 5.2. However,
this finding nearly disappears in panel 3 when controlling for country-
specific time trends because transfer systems are strongly different across
countries. With regard to the trade-based measures EXPEX and IMPEX,
the signs of the coefficients do not change in the respective panels, but
the p-values indicate a slightly better significance for MI-net than for DPI
inequality.
• The coefficients are similar with respect to sign and significance for the
three inequality measures - Gini, MLD and P90P50 - with some minor ex-
ceptions. For net-market income, the coefficients on the bottom-sensitive
MLD show - in panel 2 - the best significance. This indicates that the im-
pact of globalization ismore pronounced on the lower parts of the income
distribution.
• The dummy specification has a strong impact on the estimates. The in-
troduction of time dummies (panel 2) reduces the size and significance
of the coefficients on MI-net inequality. This is especially pronounced for
EXPEX and IMPEX but holds as well for the remaining globalization vari-
ables. The coefficients based on DPI react more heterogeneously to the
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inclusion of time dummies but remain, on average, only weakly signifi-
cant and close to zero. An exception is offshoring, where the coefficient
even increases from panel 1 to panel 2. In contrast to time dummies,
controlling for country-specific time trends (panel 3) strongly improves
the significance of the globalization coefficients on net-market income in-
equality.
• With regard to ICT, a rather robust negative coefficient is found on net-
market income inequality, as expected from figure 5.3. For disposable
income inequality, on the other hand, the ICT coefficient is less stable. In
most cases, it has a positive, although insignificant, sign, except for panel
3, where the coefficient turns negative as well.
To complete the picture, table 5.2 additionally displays the average parameter-
estimates (ρ) for the remaining variables (CONTR) in equations 4.2. The struc-
ture of the table is identical to the preceding table 5.1.
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Table 5.2: Weighted Average Coefficients of the Control Variables
Dependent Disposable Income Net-market Income
variable Gini MLD P90P50 Gini MLD P90P50
COEFF P-VAL COEFF P-VAL COEFF P-VAL COEFF P-VAL COEFF P-VAL COEFF P-VAL
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Panel 1: ND - No (time) Dummies
IND-VA -0.10 *** -0.07 * -0.55 * -0.17 *** -0.29 * -1.17 ***
AGR 0.167 * 0.247 *** 0.644 * 0.104 - 0.172 - 0.844 -
AGE -0.02 - 0.095 - -0.45 - 0.183 * 1.293 *** 1.522 *
PAT -0.00 * -0.00 * -0.01 - -0.01 * -0.04 * -0.04 *
UNION -0.09 *** -0.04 * -0.31 *** -0.15 *** -0.50 *** -0.91 ***
Panel 2: TD - Time Dummies
IND-VA -0.08 * -0.13 * -0.38 * -0.05 - -0.08 - -0.60 *
AGR 0.160 * 0.195 * 0.690 * 0.118 - 0.096 - 1.004 -
AGE -0.02 - 0.048 - -0.42 - 0.079 - 0.898 * 1.353 -
PAT -0.00 - -0.00 - -0.00 - -0.00 * -0.04 * -0.03 *
UNION -0.10 *** -0.16 * -0.27 *** -0.13 *** -0.67 *** -0.73 *
Panel 3: CT - Time-Variable Country Dummies
IND-VA -0.14 *** -0.17 *** -0.65 *** -0.15 * -0.42 * -0.98 ***
AGR 0.132 * 0.177 *** 0.587 *** 0.100 * -0.02 - 1.082 -
AGE -0.29 *** -0.41 *** -1.07 * -0.11 - 0.114 - 0.478 -
PAT 0.001 - 0.001 - 0.002 - -0.00 *** -0.03 *** -0.02 *
UNION(1) . . . . . . . . . . . .
*** Average p-value smaller than 0.1, * Average p-value smaller than 0.3, - Average p-value equal to or larger than 0.3
(1) Note that UNION is a country level variable and therefore not included in Panel 3.
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The main findings, listed by variable, are as follows.
• The share of industry value added relative to GDP (IND-VA) is negatively
correlated to inequality, but is not highly significant. The relationship,
however, is rather robust to the choice of inequality measure and dummy
specification, and it holds before and after transfer payments. This con-
firms the evidence from several previously noted country studies (section
1.2.2) suggesting that deindustrialization increases household inequality.
• The share of agricultural employment (AGR) is positively related to DPI
inequality. Interestingly, the coefficients turn insignificant in the case of
net-market income inequality. It seems that rural regions either do less
redistribution, or those regions become richer as the importance of agri-
culture declines, which may allow them to spend more on transfers.
• The variable AGE is rather unstable across specifications. In the case of
net-market income inequality, the share of people older than 65 has a pos-
itive sign on the bottom-sensitive MLD. This possibly reflects the impact
of public pensions, which are not part of net-market income.
• The number of patent applications (PAT) is negatively related to inequal-
ity, and the correlation seems rather robust across inequality variables
and dummy specifications.
• The union share (UNION) is negative and very robustly related to inequal-
ity.
In summary, the averages of the control coefficients are in line with expecta-
tions from previous studies on inequality, despite the fact that the robustness
of several variables is rather poor.
5.2.2 Meta-Regression Analysis
The preceding analysis indicates that offshoring (OFFSM) has a positive impact
on inequality. This finding is robust to the underlying income specification or
to the choice of inequality measure. By contrast, the other globalization vari-
ables - EXPEX, IMPEX and IC - are neither clearly positive nor negatively cor-
related to inequality. To this point, however, the analysis is incomplete. The
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low average significance levels, on one hand, and the ambiguous impact of the
trade measures on inequality, on the other hand, are both sources of concern.
Furthermore, the analysis revealed the strong impact of dummy settings on the
significance and even the signs of the estimates. These specification effects are
analyzed more systematically in the following.
To identify effects of the model specifications on the coefficients, several
meta-regressions are run. The dependent variables of these regressions are
the compiled globalization and technology coefficients (COEFF) in the meta-
database (β1 and β2 in eq. 4.2). The independent variables are dummies for
the specifications of the underlying regressions. The meta-regression looks as
follows:
COEFF = α + δND + δCT + δOLS + δREM + δBASIC + δFULL + δDPI + ǫ (5.1)
. The right-hand side of the meta-regression equation includes dummies for
the respective specifications summarized in table 4.3, i.e., for the estimation
methods (δOLS, δREM), the choice of dummy specification (δND, δCT), sample size
(δEU-4), model setup (δBASIC, δFULL) and income specification (δDPI) of the under-
lying regressions. Note that the meta-database contains 324 estimated coeffi-
cients per globalization variable.
Given the not promising results, the variable IC is not included in the meta-
regressions. Table 5.3 displays the results of the variance-weighted ordinary
least squares regression on the estimated coefficients (eq. 5.1). The meta-
regression is conducted separately for the coefficients of the three globalization
indicators (columns 1 - 3) and of the technology indicator ICT (column 4)1.
The findings are as follows.
METHOD The estimation method (δOLS, δREM) does not have a significant effect
on the size of the offshoring coefficients. In contrast, the coefficients of
EXPEX and IMPEX become smaller if the regression is based on OLS in-
stead of REM or FEM. As shown in ICT (column 4), OLS and REM have a
1Note that the ICT coefficients are pooled from the regressions of the three respective globaliza-
tion variables, i.e., based on 972 observations instead on 324.
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Table 5.3: Meta-regression Results: Dependent Variables = Estimated Coeffi-
cients (COEFF) of Globalization Variables and ICT
Coefficients OFFSM EXPEX IMPEX ICT
(1) (2) (3) (4)
δOLS .044 -.037
∗∗∗ -.077∗∗∗ .045∗∗
(.039) (.014) (.023) (.026)
δREM .018 .017 .112
∗∗∗ .064∗∗∗
(.032) (.012) (.021) (.022)
δND .089
∗∗∗ .053∗∗∗ .059∗∗∗ .068∗∗∗
(.032) (.013) (.022) (.026)
δCT .041 .130
∗∗∗ .092∗∗∗ -.515∗∗∗
(.036) (.014) (.021) (.031)
δBASIC -.028 -.019
∗ -.033∗ -.012
(.030) (.012) (.019) (.019)
δFULL -.015 .019 .012 -.101
∗∗∗
(.031) (.012) (.020) (.021)
δEU-4 .231
∗∗∗ -.035∗∗ -.057∗∗∗ -.001
(.033) (.014) (.021) (.021)
δDPI .032 -.070
∗∗∗ -.148∗∗∗ .28∗∗∗
(.027) (.011) (.018) (.02)
CONST. .122∗∗∗ .041∗∗ .055∗ -.297∗∗∗
(.043) (.018) (.029) (.031)
Obs. 324 324 324 972
R2 .15 .352 .42 .39
F statistic 6.93 21.4 28.5 77
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; * denotes significance at the 10
percent level; ** denotes significance at the 5 percent level; *** denotes
significance at the 1 percent level.
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positive effect, but because the average ICT coefficient is negative, larger
coefficients imply estimates that are either closer to zero or are even turn-
ing positive.
DUMMY The coefficient size of the globalization variables reacts strongly on
the dummy specification (δND, δCT), as was already indicated in the pre-
ceding tables. The main message is, again, that coefficients become big-
ger if the regression includes no time dummies or time-variable country
dummies.
MODEL The model specification (δBASIC, δFULL), i.e., the use of different sets
of control variables, does not affect or only weakly affects the average
coefficient size of the globalization variables. The ICT coefficient becomes
more negative in the case of the full model setting, presumably due to the
inclusion of the related technology variable PAT (the number of patent
applications) in the regression.
SAMPLE If the (underlying) regression is run on the EU-4 sub-sample (δEU-4),
the coefficient of offshoring is significantly larger, while the coefficients
of exports and imports are somewhat lower than in the full sample case.
INCOME The incomemeasurement of the underlying inequality variables (δDPI)
has a highly significant effect on export, import and ICT coefficients, re-
sulting in lower trade and higher (less negative) ICT estimates (as has
been shown in table 5.1).
Based on these findings, the incidence of negative coefficients of the trade-
based globalization measures (EXPEX, IMPEX) can be explained. A negative
coefficient occurs if the regression controls for an overall time trend but not for
country-specific trends or if the cross-sectional information (in levels) remains
in the data. Furthermore, regressions on the EU-4 sample are more likely to re-
sult in negative coefficients. In other words, regions within the EU-4 countries
with higher than average levels of export intensities are likely to have lower
income inequality. On the contrary, an above average increase of export inten-
sity, relative to the respective country, causes a relative increase of inequality
in the particular region, but given that income inequality is not very volatile
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in the short run, this result has less relevance even though the positive sign is
highly significant.
To complement the analysis, meta-regressions on the p-values (P-VAL) of
the estimated coefficients are also conducted:
P-VAL = α + δND + δCT + δOLS + δREM + δBASIC + δFULL + (5.2)
δOFFSM + δEXPEX + δGINI + δMLD + ǫ
The regression equation (5.2) includes the same regressors as eq. 5.1, except
(δdpi), and also includes additionally dummies for the respective globalization
variable (δOFFSM, δEXPEX) and the inequality variable (δGINI, δMLD), of the under-
lying regression.
The regression results are shown in table 5.4. In the first two columns, the
p-values of the three globalization coefficients are pooled. In column 1, the un-
derlying regressions were run on DPI, in column 2, they were run on MI-net
inequality. Columns 3 and 4 repeat the exercise for the ICT coefficients.
These first four columns (columns 1 to 4) show how the specification ef-
fects differ for the two income measurements of the underlying regressions
and whether or not the selection of the globalization variable has an impact
on the ICT coefficient. In addition, columns 5 - 8 in table 5.4 display the meta-
regression results separately for each globalization variable and the technology
indicator (as in table 5.3) to identify how the significance level of the coeffi-
cients (p-values) differs between the three inequality measures.
Overall, the results confirm the findings presented in table 5.3, but some
new insights are gained as well. As it turns out, offshoring is less significantly
correlated to upper income inequality (P90P50), while the significance levels of
the remaining globalization variables do not show strong differences between
the inequality measures. The offshoring indicator OFFSM is more strongly sig-
nificant than the variables EXPEX and IMPEX on inequality measures based on
disposable income. For net-market income, the significance levels of the glob-
alization variables are not systematically different. Furthermore, in regressions
including the variable OFFSM, the ICT coefficient has slightly less significance.
This is not surprising in light of the close interdependence between the two
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measures.
With regard to further specification effects, the findings indicate the following
differences between DPI and MI-net based regressions.
METHOD The method dummies (OLS, REM) in columns (1) and (2) show that
only the net-market income-based coefficients differ significantly between
the estimation methods. The results point to the presence of unobserved
regional fixed effects in the MI-NET case.
DUMMY Both specifications ND and CT increase the significance of the glob-
alization variables (compared to time-dummy specifications), indicating
the presence of overall time trends in net-market income-based regres-
sions.
MODEL The set of included control variables does not seem to have a system-
atic impact on the significance of the globalization variables (with some
minor exceptions). ICT is less significant in the full model case.
SAMPLE The EU-4 sub-sample delivers better significance than the total sam-
ple. Specifically, the reduction of the underlying p-values for the vari-
ables OFFSM and ICT is highly significant (columns 5 and 8).
5.2.3 Summary
The complexity of the relationship between globalization and inequality is mir-
rored by the differing effects of the particular globalization variables on in-
equality and the presence of considerable specification effects. To summarize,
the main findings for the primary variables of this analysis are the following.
OFFSM Offshoring increases inequality. This holds for net-market income but
also, and more strongly, for disposable income inequality. The relation-
ship is more distinct for the EU-4 than for the full sample. With regard
to net-market income inequality, the coefficients become larger and more
significant when the regression includes country-specific time dummies.
One reason for this is the presence of opposing country trends (those of
Spain and Greece).
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Table 5.4: Meta-regression Results: Dependent Variables = P-Values of Global-
ization and ICT Coefficients.
P-Values GLOBALIZATION(1) ICT OFFSM EXPEX IMPEX ICT
DPI(2) MI-NET(3) DPI(2) MI-NET(3) DPI & MI-NET(4)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
δOLS .020 -.059
∗∗ .139∗∗∗ -.002 -.037 .013 -.034 .068∗∗∗
(.031) (.028) (.031) (.022) (.033) (.040) (.039) (.022)
δREM -.030 -.161
∗∗∗ -.090∗∗∗ .065∗∗∗ -.137∗∗∗ -.063 -.086∗∗ -.013
(.031) (.028) (.031) (.022) (.033) (.040) (.039) (.022)
δND -.022 -.158
∗∗∗ -.094∗∗∗ .220∗∗∗ -.160∗∗∗ -.057 -.052 .063∗∗∗
(.035) (.031) (.035) (.025) (.037) (.044) (.043) (.024)
δCT -.025 -.197
∗∗∗ -.169∗∗∗ -.105∗∗∗ -.118∗∗∗ -.221∗∗∗ .006 -.137∗∗∗
(.031) (.028) (.031) (.022) (.033) (.040) (.039) (.022)
δBASIC .051
∗ -.009 .037 -.008 .029 .031 .003 .015
(.031) (.028) (.031) (.022) (.033) (.040) (.039) (.022)
δFULL .002 .052
∗ .049 -.081∗∗∗ .042 -.012 .051 -.016
(.031) (.028) (.031) (.022) (.033) (.040) (.039) (.022)
δEU-4 -.096
∗∗∗ -.085∗∗∗ -.020 -.005 -.176∗∗∗ -.006 -.090∗∗ -.013
(.031) (.028) (.031) (.022) (.033) (.040) (.039) (.022)
δOFFSM -.199
∗∗∗ -.035 -.043 .100∗∗∗
(.031) (.028) (.031) (.022)
δEXPEX .071
∗∗ -.019 -.011 .024
(.031) (.028) (.031) (.022)
δGINI -.083
∗∗ -.047 .001 -.057∗∗∗
(.033) (.040) (.039) (.022)
δMLD -.068
∗∗ -.031 .021 -.019
(.033) (.040) (.039) (.022)
CONST. .391∗∗∗ .492∗∗∗ .400∗∗∗ .134∗∗∗ .420∗∗∗ .458∗∗∗ .362∗∗∗ .291∗∗∗
(.034) (.031) (.034) (.024) (.044) (.053) (.051) (.024)
Obs. 486 486 486 486 324 324 324 972
R2 .174 .173 .158 .373 .18 .114 .04 .112
F statistic 11.17 11.05 9.95 31.4 7.66 4.51 1.44 13.4
Notes: (1) Pooled p-values of the OFFSM & EXPEX & IMPEX coefficients. (2) Underlying regressions were based on DPI
inequality or, (3), on MI-net inequality. (4) No distinction made between DPI and MI-net inequality.
Standard errors in parentheses; * denotes significance at the 10 percent level; ** denotes significance
at the 5 percent level; *** denotes significance at the 1 percent level.
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EXPEX / IMPEX The sign of the trade-based coefficients is ambiguous. The over-
all effect on net-market income inequality is negative, but the regional
time variations relative to the respective countries reveal a hidden posi-
tive impact on inequality. Again, the relationships are more distinct for
the EU-4 sample. EXPEX is, on average, more significant than the import
variable IMPEX (and IC as well).
ICT Information and communication technology ICT has a rather robust neg-
ative coefficient on net-market income inequality measures. For dispos-
able income, the results are ambiguous and less significant. In contrast to
the globalization variables, the findings are not influenced by the sample
choice.
The main insights regarding the model specifications are the following.
METHOD The effect of globalization on inequality is stronger and more robust
in levels than in differences. An explanation for this is the presence of
unobserved regional characteristics (fixed effects) correlated to inequal-
ity and to globalization, resulting in an omitted variable bias. Never-
theless, regression in levels may be preferable given the relatively low
time-variation of income inequality.
SAMPLE The findings are more distinct and stable for the EU-4 than for the
full sample. This is explained by the fact that in the latter, a group of
rather heterogeneous countries - Mediterranean countries like Spain and
Greece, on the one hand, and the very different Nordic countries on the
other hand - join the sample. This emphasizes the difficulty of finding a
model that controls for all the various special characteristics, even in an
all-European sample.
INCOME The results provide evidence that redistribution does not automati-
cally mitigate the impact of globalization on income distribution. In the
case of offshoring, the correlation is even negative. This last finding, how-
ever, is mainly a country-level phenomenon and disappears after con-
trolling for the country-specific trends. For trade based measures, the
findings were similar but more pronounced on net-market as opposed to
disposable income inequality.
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5.3 A Benchmark Model
In this section, to address several open econometric issues and to conduct some
sensitivity tests, a benchmark model is specified based on the insights of the
meta-analysis. More specifically, this regression serves as a benchmark to an-
alyze the role of GDP, the robustness of the main findings regarding different
inequality measurement, possible endogeneity problems of the globalization
variables and the interdependence of structural change and offshoring.
5.3.1 Specification
The following econometric model is considered:
GINIit = α + β1 OFFSMit + β2 ICTit + β3 IND-VAit + β4 AGRit + (5.3)
β5 PATit + β6 UNIONit + µc + γt + (µcγt) + ǫit
Offshoring is themain independent variable of the benchmark regression, given
its more robust relationship to inequality in comparison with the remaining
globalizationmeasures. Regression 5.3 corresponds basically to the FULLmodel
specification (see section 4.2.3), although the variable AGE is excluded due to its
poor average significance indicated in the meta-analysis. In addition to coun-
try effects (µc), the regression controls for common time trends (γt) and for
time-variable country effects (µcγt), given their strong impact on the average
coefficient size. This interaction term between country and time dummies is in
parentheses because it is optional in the benchmark setting.
The Gini, as the most commonly applied inequality measure, is used as the
main dependent variable. A comparison of the applied inequality measures is
part of the robustness tests. The analysis is restricted to the EU-4 to ensure a
more homogeneous sample, which is less prone to outliers and less influenced
by country trends than is the case for the full sample.
5.3.2 Results and Robustness Analysis
All the previous results and conclusions are based on weighted means of es-
timated coefficients and on the results of meta-regressions. Now, table 5.5 re-
ports the regression results based on equation 5.3. The regressions are primar-
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ily estimated using OLS, as poolability is accepted at the 95% level given the
use of country dummies. Furthermore, a Ramsey RESET test for no omitted
variables is accepted at the 95% confidence level for columns 1-3 and for the
GDP case (4).
The first three columns display the regression results for the benchmarkmodel.
This confirms that offshoring has a stronger positive impact on disposable in-
come inequality (column 1) than on net-market income inequality (column 2).
ICT is not significant on disposable income, in contrast to the share of industry
value, which is more significant for DPI than for MI-net regressions. Column 3
is again based on net-market income, but now, interaction terms between time
and country dummies are included2. The fit of the regression improves dras-
tically from 0.63 in the benchmark specification to 0.71. The variable OFFSM
becomes larger and highly significant, while the negative relationship of ICT to
inequality becomes much stronger.
In column 4, GDP per capita (GDPC) (in logs) is included in the regression as
a control variable. However, in light of the high correlations of PAT and AGR
to GDPC, both of the former variables are dropped from the regression. The
results show that GDP per capita is negatively correlated to net-market income
inequality. Importantly, the OFFSM and ICT coefficients are virtually unchanged
compared to column 3. That said, the explanatory power of the regression is
now slightly weaker than with AGR and PAT included. This finding indicates
that the economic growth is not a primary channel of the effects of globaliza-
tion on inequality.
In all of the remaining columns 5-8, the regressions are also based on net-
market income. Columns 5 and 6 are based on the same specification, but as
a sensitivity test, the MLD in (5) and the P90P50 in (6) are applied as depen-
dent variables. The results are similar to the Gini regression in (4), even though
OFFSM is marginally less significant in the MLD case. The explanatory power
of the regressions is also lower, with Rsq. 0.61 and 0.63 instead of 0.69.
In the final two columns 7-8, offshoring is treated as an endogenous variable.
Due to the lack of reliable instruments, the regression is estimated using sys-
temGMMestimation (abbreviated as BB in table 5.5) instrumenting levels with
2Indicated as CT the time-variable country dummy in table 5.5
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Table 5.5: Benchmark Regression Results and Robustness Analysis
Dep.Var. Gini M-Gini M-Gini M-Gini M-MLD M-P90P50 M-Gini M-Gini
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
OFFSM .261∗∗∗ .117 .493∗∗∗ .486∗∗ 1.133 4.076∗∗∗ .343∗ .264∗∗
(.082) (.117) (.184) (.196) (.731) (1.323) (.197) (.114)
ICT -.002 -.591∗∗∗ -1.572∗∗∗ -1.455∗∗∗ -6.062∗∗∗ -8.138∗∗∗ -1.200∗∗∗ -.329∗∗
(.147) (.181) (.298) (.325) (1.341) (2.683) (.320) (.168)
IND-VA -.130∗∗∗ -.049 -.085 -.108∗ -.350∗ -1.028∗∗∗ -.102 -.079
(.038) (.053) (.053) (.057) (.201) (.327) (.100) (.079)
AGR .082 .096 .109
(.063) (.108) (.090)
PAT -.0002 -.010∗∗∗ -.008∗∗∗
(.001) (.003) (.002)
UNION -.443∗∗∗ -.473∗∗∗ -.155
(.111) (.182) (.190)
GDPC -.045∗∗∗ -.133∗∗ -.192∗ -.051∗∗ -.047∗∗
(.016) (.061) (.104) (.025) (.022)
L.GINI .383∗∗
(.144)
Const. .437∗∗∗ .670∗∗∗ .588∗∗∗ 1.011∗∗∗ 2.759∗∗∗ 4.330∗∗∗ 1.067∗∗∗ .781∗∗∗
(.063) (.099) (.054) (.147) (.527) (.940) (.219) (.297)
Obs. 128 128 128 128 128 128 128 96
R2 .697 .636 .712 .691 .616 .632 . .
F statistic 24.24 20.71 18.59 19.28 16.07 20.02 41.24 57.09
Method OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS BB† BB†
Dummy‡ TD TD CT CT CT CT CT TD
Hansen Test§ . . . . . . .334 .165
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; * denotes significance at the 10 percent level; ** denotes
significance at the 5 percent level; *** denotes significance at the 1 percent level.
‡ TD = time and country dummies, CT = time-variable country dummies
† BB = Blundell and Bover GMM estimator.
§ Hansen J test statistic of overidentifying restrictions (Hansen [57]).
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differences (Blundell and Bover [58]). The regressions use different dummy
specifications, and in column 8 a lagged dependent variable is also included.
Nonetheless, the coefficients on offshoring and on ICT remain significant if
somewhat smaller than before.
The size of the coefficients can be interpreted as follows. The coefficients on
OFFSM for net-market income inequality translate into elasticities between 0.17
and 0.25, i.e., a 10% increase in offshoring causes a rise in the Gini of between
1.7% and 2.5%. On the other side, a 10% rise in ICT reduces inequality between
1% and 2%. In summary it can be said, therefore, that the magnitude of the
results ranges within a credible scope.
Results and Robustness Analysis for EXPEX
Although the regression model was specified specifically for offshoring, it can
also be used to estimate the impact of different globalization indicators. To
complete the analysis, the previous benchmark regression is used, with some
adjustments, for the export share of manufacturing (EXPEX) instead of off-
shoring.
The regression is based on the benchmark equation 5.3, but OFFSM is sub-
stituted with EXPEX. Additionally, there is no focus on time-variable country
dummies (CT), given the results of the meta-analysis. The goal here is, on the
one hand, to address the questions of endogeneity and sensitivity to other in-
equality measures and, on the other, to better explain the incidence of the neg-
ative and positive signs of the EXPEX coefficient. All but the first regressions
are run on net-market income inequality.
Table 5.6 presents the results for export intensity3 EXPEX.
Columns 1 and 2 show the results of the benchmark specification for dispos-
able (1) and net-market (2) income inequality. The regressions are based on the
EU-4 sample and include time and country dummies. A Pesaran test4 of cross-
sectional independence is clearly accepted for this setup. A value of negative
1.3 for the EXPEX coefficient would translate into an elasticity of negative 0.1. In
3The results for imports are slightly less consistent, but essentially similar.
4The Breusch-Pagan LM test is not valid in a small T and large N context, see Pesaran [55]
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column 3, the variables AGR and PAT are substituted with (log) GDP per capita
GDPC. Columns 4 and 5 show regressions in which the dependent variable is
now the MLD and the P90P50, respectively. The results are robust to different
inequality measures, as documented in the next two columns. The estimated
coefficients on the export intensity are also negative, but only statistically sig-
nificant for the MLD. Moreover, the elasticity is quite a bit larger in magnitude,
i.e., (negative) 0.3 for the MLD.
In column 6, the export intensity is treated as endogenous. The coefficients
are estimated using the system GMM estimator (BB). The coefficient on EX-
PEX remains significant and negatively correlated to inequality. With regard to
controls, (log) GDP per capita, the union share and the number of patent ap-
plications are, as before, significant.
The remaining three columns identify the specification under which positive
coefficients on EXPEX - as indicated in figure 5.1 or table 5.3 - emerge. The re-
gressions are estimated by FEM and use the EU-4 in (7) and the full sample size
in (8) and (9). In column 8, the export coefficient is no longer significant, and
the fit of the regression is drastically lower than in the comparable regression
in column 7 for the EU-4. However, a highly significant positive coefficient
emerges by including time-variable country dummies (CT), as shown in col-
umn 8.
5.3. A BENCHMARKMODEL 123
Table 5.6: Regression Results and Robustness Analysis for EXPEX
Dep. Var. Gini M-Gini M-Gini M-MLD M-P90P50 M-Gini M-Gini M-Gini M-Gini
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
EXPEX -.016 -.114∗ -.136∗ -.776∗∗∗ -.435 -.169∗ -.150∗∗ .0003 .178∗∗∗
(.052) (.066) (.072) (.256) (.411) (.094) (.064) (.092) (.054)
ICT -.168 -.687∗∗∗ -.572∗∗∗ -2.155∗∗∗ -2.132∗ -.552∗∗∗ -.495∗∗∗ -.422∗∗∗ -1.125∗∗∗
(.131) (.160) (.165) (.559) (1.194) (.123) (.116) (.117) (.257)
IND-VA -.132∗∗∗ -.035 -.052 -.121 -.662∗ -.046 -.007 -.221∗ -.365∗∗∗
(.039) (.051) (.058) (.197) (.339) (.099) (.102) (.122) (.094)
AGR .040 .075
(.072) (.098)
PAT -.0007 -.010∗∗∗
(.002) (.002)
UNION -.586∗∗∗ -.482∗∗∗ -.445∗∗∗ -2.083∗∗∗ -1.943 -.456∗∗∗ -.399∗∗∗ -.291∗∗∗
(.103) (.166) (.162) (.578) (1.316) (.115) (.113) (.105)
GDPC -.055∗∗∗ -.173∗∗∗ -.272∗∗∗ -.059∗∗ -.120∗∗ .002 -.028
(.016) (.053) (.097) (.023) (.052) (.068) (.035)
Const. .537∗∗∗ .723∗∗∗ 1.297∗∗∗ 3.790∗∗∗ 6.387∗∗∗ 1.265∗∗∗ 1.924∗∗∗ .614 .866∗∗
(.049) (.072) (.151) (.493) (1.046) (.230) (.531) (.669) (.344)
Obs. 128 128 128 128 128 128 128 184 184
R2 0.652 .643 .623 .535 .561 . .59 .389 .629
F statistic 23.45 21.69 21.88 13.06 9.95 16.94 6.08 10.73 7.67
Method OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS BB† FEM FEM FEM
Dummy‡ TD TD TD TD TD TD TD TD CT
Hansen-test§ . . . . . 0.134 . . .
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; * denotes significance at the 10 percent level; ** denotes
significance at the 5 percent level; *** denotes significance at the 1 percent level.
‡ TD = time and country dummies, CT = time-variable country dummies
† BB = Blundell and Bover GMM estimator.
§ Hansen J test statistic of overidentifying restrictions (Hansen [57]).
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5.3.3 Structural Change and Offshoring
To this point, there has been no discussion of whether the impact of offshoring
on inequality depends on the regional economic size of the manufacturing sec-
tor. The variable OFFSM measures the offshoring intensity of the manufactur-
ing sectors. The reason that offshoring was set in relation to manufacturing
and not to overall economy-wide employment or to GDP was to disentangle
the effects of globalization and structural change. This section, however, asks
if the impact of offshoring is stronger in regions with a relatively larger share
of manufacturing employment.
A test of this question can be carried out by checking whether the relation-
ship between offshoring and inequality is stronger in regions with a greater
share of manufacturing employment. The basic strategy in the next set of re-
gressions, then, is to interact the regional manufacturing employment share
with globalization to see whether this additional variable results in statistically
significant coefficients and improves the fit of the regressions.
The regressions are based on the benchmarkmodel (equation 5.3) including
an interaction between offshoring and manufacturing employment. Note that
in the benchmark setup, the economic size of manufacturing is captured by the
variable IND-VA, i.e., by the ratio of value-added relative to GDP. This vari-
able is negatively correlated to inequality even though the significance of the
coefficients was rather low, indicating that regions with large industry shares
have more equal distributions of income. Given the decline of manufacturing
in many European regions (as documented in table 3.1), this implies that dein-
dustrialization increased inequality.
Now, as an adjustment to equation 5.3, the regression and the main interaction
term (OFFSM X MFS) include the share of manufacturing employment (MFS)5,
instead of manufacturing value added (IND-VA), as employment and produc-
tivity changes may offset one another. The weak results for IND-VA in the pre-
vious section support this conclusion. Nevertheless, the variable is also applied
and interacted with OFFSM as a robustness test.
Note that the variables OFFSM and the share of manufacturing employment
5Mean and standard deviation of MFS are given in table 4.1.
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(MFS) are correlated neither in levels nor after within-transformation6.
Table 5.7 shows the results of the regressions for several specifications. Two
main results emerge from this table: First, the interaction term OFFSM X MFS
is in all regressions negative and highly significant and second, offshoring and
the manufacturing employment share (MFS) are individually positive related to
inequality. The other variables keep the same coefficients as in the regressions
without interaction term.
Column 1 of the table displays the benchmark setting with the manufac-
turing employment share added to the regression, both individually and inter-
acted with openness. In column 2 GDP per capita (in logs) is included7 to cap-
ture possible omitted growth effects. The fit of the regression rises somewhat
from 0.57 to 0.59. Column 3 repeats the regression for the EU-4 sub-sample.
The next column 4 show a regression based on FEM for the full sample. In col-
umn 5 the coefficients are estimated by REM and time-variable country dum-
mies are included. The corresponding Sargan-Hansen test statistic is given in
the last row indicating that the REM assumptions are not rejected. These stable
results indicate that unobserved regional effects are not an issue.
In the last column 6 industry value added (IND-VA) is substituted for manu-
facturing employment as described above. The coefficients on the interaction
term remain weakly significant, but the coefficients of both IND-VA and OFFSM
are no longer significantly different from zero. The explanatory power of the
regression is also lower compared to the case with MFS. This suggests that em-
ployment and productivity changes were offsetting each other with respect to
the impact on inequality.
To quantify the results of this table, the estimated coefficients are evaluated
at different points along the distribution of manufacturing employment. The
coefficients in column 1 suggest that an increase in offshoring of around 10%
would increase inequality around 0.2%, given a manufacturing employment
of about the mean. If manufacturing employment was one standard deviation
6Spearman’s rho of roughly negative 0.09 in levels and positive 0.01 after within-
transformation. In both cases, a test for independence is clearly accepted
7The variables AGR and PAT are dropped from the regression due to collinearity issues.
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Table 5.7: Regression Results for Structural Change and Offshoring. Depen-
dent Variable = M-Gini
Dep. Var. M-Gini
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OFFSM X MFS -2.410∗∗∗ -2.077∗∗∗ -2.333∗ -2.366∗∗ -2.926∗∗∗
(.738) (.763) (1.329) (1.155) (.883)
OFFSM X IND-VA -1.411∗
(.774)
OFFSM .447∗∗ .325∗ .539∗ .443∗ 1.075∗∗∗ .357
(.192) (.198) (.297) (.258) (.212) (.274)
ICT -.633∗∗∗ -.594∗∗∗ -.567∗∗∗ -.429∗∗∗ -.420∗∗∗ -.531∗∗∗
(.146) (.148) (.170) (.115) (.138) (.153)
MFS .470∗∗∗ .355∗∗ .411 .686∗∗∗ .526∗∗∗
(.179) (.177) (.300) (.265) (.202)
IND-VA .292
(.205)
PAT -.009∗∗∗
(.002)
AGR .122∗
(.065)
UNION -.394∗∗ -.423∗∗ -.387∗∗ -.399∗∗∗ -.430∗∗
(.173) (.171) (.184) (.117) (.180)
GDPC -.040∗∗∗ -.047∗∗ -.109∗ -.045∗∗ -.068∗∗∗
(.015) (.019) (.059) (.018) (.014)
Const. .568∗∗∗ 1.025∗∗∗ 1.029∗∗∗ 1.604∗∗∗ .701∗∗∗ 1.304∗∗∗
(.138) (.192) (.183) (.605) (.172) (.162)
Obs. 177 177 128 128 177 177
R2 .612 .583 .634 .604 .567
Methods OLS OLS OLS FEM REM OLS
Dummy‡ TD TD TD TD CT TD
Sample FULL FULL EU-4 EU-4 FULL FULL
Sargan-Hansen§ . . . . 0.15 .
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; * denotes significance at the 10 percent level;
** denotes significance at the 5 percent level; *** denotes significance at the 1 percent level.
‡ TD = time and country dummies, CT = time-variable country dummies
§ Sargan-Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions (fixed vs random effects) (see Arellano [59]).
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below the mean, the same increase in offshoring would lead to an increase in
inequality of 1 percentage point. For a region with manufacturing employ-
ment one standard deviation above the mean, the increase in offshoring would
actually result in a decline in inequality of around 0.5%.
These results show that the impact of offshoring is not more pronounced
in regions with a large manufacturing sector. On the contrary a lower share of
manufacturing employment is associated with a stronger effect of offshoring
on the income distribution. Or to put it in a less static fashion, the decline of
manufacturing amplified the impact of offshoring.
To give further evidence, it would be necessary to analyze this finding in
greater detail on the single industry level, which is unfortunately beyond the
scope of the available data. That said, the results emphasize the importance
that globalization or trade intensity be measured independently from the size
of the manufacturing sector in a regression model for income inequality.
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Chapter 6
Extension: Service Offshoring
..many service workers will also have to accept the new, and not very pleasant, reality
that they too must compete with workers in other countries. And there are many more
service than manufacturing workers..; Blinder [4]
6.1 Introduction
The preceding analysis discussed the impact of globalization on income in-
equality across European regions. The findings point to the conclusion that
offshoring in manufacturing industries is positively related to income inequal-
ity. This chapter complements the research on offshoring by extending the
focus to services. More specifically, the aim of the analysis is to construct a
feasible indicator of regional service offshoring and to shed some light on the
impact on unemployment.
Service offshoring, the sourcing of service inputs from abroad either from
an affiliated or unaffiliated firm, has received a great deal of attention in the
media and recently, in academic publications as well. Empirical research on
service offshoring is motivated by the belief that it will be the next large source
of trade growth in developed countries.
There is no doubt that tradability of serviceswill increase strongly over the next
decades as further improvements in information and communication technolo-
gies allow more and more service tasks to become tradable. Alan Blinder [4]
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even called the phenomenon of service offshoring a second Industrial Revolu-
tion.
In view of the expectations of strong future growth in service offshoring, ev-
idence about the experience up to now is certainly helpful in conducting the
inevitable debate about negative effects on job security and income distribu-
tion.
6.2 Measuring Service Offshoring
The initial situation and preconditions are similar to those in chapter 3, but
the procedure applied to estimate the overall offshoring intensity in manu-
facturing cannot be adopted directly. Although service offshoring may also
affect manufacturing productivity or employment, the main impact is presum-
ably felt in service industries. Therefore, measuring service offshoring only
in manufacturing - as done for example in Crino [60] - is not appropriate in
this context. Instead, the degree service offshoring has to be measured on a
economy-wide scale including all sectors.
The level of service offshoring (TSO)
TSO = ∑
s∈S
(
total import of service inputs s
total use of service inputs s
)
is approximated by the share of imported service inputs relative to total service
inputs for the whole economy, where the service sector S includes telecommu-
nication, finance, computing, research and business services (NACE 64-67,71-
74). The necessary data are drawn from the OECD Input-Output database for
all countries and years. Asmentioned in chapter 3, this kind of measure under-
estimates the level of service offshoring because previously in-house-produced
service inputs that are offshored are not captured.
The variable TSO (total service offshoring) is a country-level variable. A re-
gionalization is not feasible as there are no sufficiently disaggregated service
employment figures available. To estimate the regional impact, it is interacted
with the regional employment share of high-technology sectors1. The reasoning
1Source: Eurostat htec emp reg series - knowledge-intensive high-technology services: NACE
Rev. 1.1 codes 64, 72, 73, i.e., employment in telecommunication, computing and research.
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behind this is that service offshoring relies on the availability of a highly skilled
service workforce to organize the offshoring process.
Figure 6.1 displays the resulting service offshoring intensities by country
and year. On average, around 7% of the service (S) inputs were imported. Swe-
den, Finland and Belgium show the highest values, followed by Austria and
Spain. Service offshoring increased in most countries, but there are also some
exceptions, notably France, the UK and Italy, where a decline is observable.
Figure 6.1: Service Offshoring (TSO): 1995 and 2000
6.3 Service Offshoring and Unemployment
6.3.1 Motivation and Literature
This chapter deviates from the primary research focus of this study in that the
econometric analysis does not focus on the impact on inequality, but on un-
employment. In light of the stir about actual and potential job loss, the focus
on unemployment rather than on income distribution seems promising at this
time more and is potentially easier to identify, given that the actual impact is
presumably rather small to date.
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A review of the actual empirical research on service offshoring supports
this effort. On the one hand, there are several empirical contributions asking
how large the phenomenon can become. These studies point out that there is a
huge number of potential offshorable service jobs (e.g., Bardhan and Kroll [61],
Jensen and Kletzer [62] and Van Welsum and Vickery [63]). In light of the high
probability that service offshoring will continue to grow in the near future and
over the coming decades, there seems to be a lot to worry as a consequence.
On the other hand, several studies indicate that the number of jobs actually off-
shored is small thus far, at least relative to total job turnover (e.g., Kirkeegaard
[1], Mankiw and Swagel [2]). Amiti and Wei find in case studies for the UK
[64] and the US [65] that service offshoring has had only a marginal employ-
ment based on manufacturing data. Similarly, Liu and Trefler [66] find only
a small impact on employment by matching US population survey data with
trade data. These findings indicate that the impact of service offshoring is neg-
ligible, at least for now.
With regard to productivity, however, several studies find a positive impact
of service offshoring. Using manufacturing panels, Amiti and Wei [67] for the
US and UK, Gorg and Hanley [68] for Irish manufacturing2 and Crino [60] for
a sample of several European countries all find a significant positive impact
of service offshoring on total factor productivity. These findings indicate that
the positive effects on productivity more than offset possible negative employ-
ment impacts. In a theoretical contribution, Mitra and Ranjan [69] come to the
similar conclusion that the positive productivity impact of service offshoring
can be expected to produce a negative impact on unemployment.
All of the available studieswere based on industry-level evidence but inevitably
suffer from insufficient data disaggregation3. To focus instead on regional data
may help to identify better evidence on the impact of service offshoring.
I am not aware of any attempts to measure the cross-national or even cross-
regional impact of service offshoring on unemployment up to now.
2They only found a positive impact on exporting industries.
3See Krugman [3] for a discussion of the problem for similar data.
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Table 6.1: Descriptive Statistics for Applied Variables
Mean St. Dev. Min. Max. Change p.a.
Year 2000 1995-2000
UNEMP Unemployment rate 0.093 0.051 0.023 0.231 -2.8%
TSO Total service offshoring 0.091 0.078 0.035 0.613 7.3%
HT-EMP High-tech. employment share 0.031 0.013 0.009 0.064 4.1%
INV Investment share into service sectors 0.371 0.125 0.091 0.569 2.2%
ICT ICT in manufacturing 0.122 0.043 0.027 0.211 4.5%
GDPC GDP per capita 23’406 8’490 10’321 50’425 2.7%
IND-VA Share of industry value added 0.241 0.063 0.089 0.379 -1.7%
AGR Agricultural employment share 0.05 0.059 0 0.319 -4.1%
UNION Union share 0.287 0.153 0.1 0.79 -1.8%
6.3.2 Econometric Analysis
Overall, the data for the econometric analysis are available in the form of a bal-
anced panel based on 61 regions and two time periods 1995 and 2000.
A brief description and summary statistics of the applied variables are shown
in table 6.1. The for the first time4 applied variables - regional unemploy-
ment rates (UNEMP), high-tech employment share (HT-EMP) and the invest-
ment share into services sectors5 (INV), are available from Eurostat.
An analysis of the full 1985 - 2000 time period, as done in the preced-
ing econometric framework, does not seem promising, given that service off-
shoring is a rather recent phenomenon. Therefore, this study focuses on the
1995 - 2000 time period. An extension to 2005 would certainly be helpful, but
data availability makes coverage of the EU up to 2005 difficult. The regional
database on inequality and globalization is used to identify if and how unem-
ployment and service offshoring are correlated on the regional level.
The econometric analysis is based on a slightly adjusted version of bench-
mark regression 5.3:
UNEMPit = α + β1(TSOit ∗ HT-EMPit) + β2TSOct + β3HT-EMPit + β4INVit
+β5ICTit + β6IND-VAit + β7AGRit + β8UNIONit + uit
The variable service offshoring TSO is a country-level variable and is therefore
interacted with the employment share of high-technology sectors. In addition
to the technology share in manufacturing (ICT), the regression includes an in-
4HT-EMP and INV are only available since 1995.
5(NACE 65-74: finance, computing, research and business services
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dicator (INV) for the share of capital investment relative to overall investment
in private sector service industries that are relevant for service offshoring in-
stead of the number of patent applications (PAT). The error term is specified
as uit = ηc + γt + ǫit, where ηc captures country-specific effects, γt picks up
overall time effects, and ǫit is the i.i.d. error term. The full model will be es-
timated by ordinary least squares and by a fixed effect specification. In both
cases, time dummies are included. In all estimations, the standard errors are
robust to heteroskedasticity and are allowed to cluster within countries.
6.3.3 Results
Table 6.2 reports the regression results. Column 1 shows the full regression
results; column 2 gives the results for a reduced model where the statistically
insignificant structural variables IND-VA and AGR are dropped from the regres-
sion. In column 3, the reduced test equation is re-estimated using fixed effect
estimation instead of least squares. Consequently, the fit of the regression im-
proves strongly from .58 to .71. GDP per capita (in logs) is included only in
the final two columns of table 6.2 as an explanatory variable. This allows esti-
mation of the full effect of the variables of interest, including possible growth
effects. This seems reasonable, given the evidence of the productivity effects
of service offshoring. The results provide some support for the conjecture that
service offshoring reduces unemployment. Even though the interaction term
between total service offshoring and high-technology employment has a pos-
itive sign, the marginal effect of TSO is negative for all values of HT-EMP. The
interaction term is no longer significant if the estimation is based on FEM. This
indicates that omitted region-specific effects that bias the results with regard to
HT-EMP are present.
Concerning the control variables, the service investment share (INV) is posi-
tive and very robustly related to unemployment. ICT, (log) GDPC and UNION
are all robustly negatively correlated to the unemployment rate. The share of
agricultural employment (AGR) and the share of industry value added to GDP
(IND-VA) show no explanatory power. The inclusion of GDP per capita as an
explanatory variable makes ICT insignificant and reduces the high-technology
employment HT-EMP coefficient strongly but otherwise has no impact on the
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Table 6.2: Regression Results: Dependent Variable = Unemployment Rate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
TSO X HT-EMP 21.041∗∗∗ 21.845∗∗ 6.177 21.918∗ 6.418
(7.905) (8.721) (7.435) (11.373) (6.146)
TSO -1.250∗∗∗ -1.454∗∗∗ -.973∗∗ -1.281∗∗∗ -.852∗∗∗
(.381) (.324) (.385) (.352) (.282)
HT-EMP -3.573∗∗∗ -3.194∗∗∗ -.537 -2.031∗ -.251
(.945) (.995) (1.044) (1.184) (.804)
INV .181∗∗ .232∗∗ .218∗∗∗ .230∗∗∗ .193∗∗∗
(.087) (.091) (.031) (.083) (.022)
ICT -.402∗∗ -.524∗∗∗ -.571∗∗∗ -.245 -.498∗∗∗
(.204) (.197) (.164) (.197) (.136)
GDPC -.094∗∗ -.215∗∗∗
(.038) (.078)
IND-VA -.246
(.156)
AGR .029
(.110)
UNION -.007∗∗ -.007∗∗∗ -.006∗∗ -.007∗ -.005∗∗
(.003) (.002) (.003) (.004) (.002)
CONST. .331∗∗∗ .269∗∗∗ .339∗∗∗ 1.132∗∗∗ 2.431∗∗∗
(.067) (.057) (.087) (.364) (.789)
Obs. 118 118 118 118 118
R2 .633 .579 .716 .683 .776
Method OLS OLS FEM OLS FEM
Dummy‡ TD TD TD TD TD
Notes: Standard errors adjusted for intra-country correlations in parentheses; * denotes
significance at the 10 percent level; ** denotes significance at the 5 percent denotes
level; *** significance at the 1 percent level. ‡ TD = time and country dummies
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service offshoring coefficients.
Quantitatively, the reduced model in column 2 indicates that a 10% increase in
service offshoring, given the average level HT-EMP, results in a decline in the
unemployment rate of about 0.7%. Given values of HT-EMP one standard devi-
ation above the mean, the findings indicate an unemployment decline of about
0.4%. As the increase of average service offshoring was around 30% between
1995 and 2000, this is clearly too strong and points to the possible presence of
omitted time-variable country variables.
6.4 Concluding Comments
The data confirm that service offshoring has been growing strongly in the past.
Unfortunately, a direct regionalization, based on the methodology applied in
chapter 3, is not possible due to insufficiently disaggregated service employ-
ment statistics.
The analysis of the relationship between service offshoring and income dis-
tribution strongly suggests that there is no evidence linking service offshoring
to higher unemployment. On the contrary, the findings indicate that regions
that are more exposed to service offshoring have lower unemployment rates.
However, given the limited time period of the analysis, the results should be
interpreted with caution with regard to predictions of future developments.
Chapter 7
Summary and Conclusions
The role of globalization in shaping income distribution is an intensely debated
topic in academic and public circles. However, despite the importance of this
question for the public perception of globalization and, thereby, for the sup-
port of trade liberalization, there is no consensus on the effect on inequality.
The available empirical evidence does not allow one to draw unambiguous
conclusions, but in light of the complexity of the question and the different
focal points of the relevant studies, this comes as no surprise.
This dissertation reinvestigates the relationship between globalization and
income distribution. It proposes two main adjustments to previous studies to
improve the reliability of the estimations. These are (i) to conduct the empirical
analysis based on regional globalization intensities and inequality measures
in a relatively homogeneous economic area (the European Union) and (ii) to
estimate the effects of globalization on net-market, instead of solely on disposable
income inequality.
(i) The empirical exploitation of regional values of inequality and globaliza-
tion allows a more precise estimation than a mere cross-country analysis.
In the latter, all sub-national heterogeneity is averaged out, and in the
worst case, opposing trends between regions may offset each other.
(ii) The different transfer systems across Europe make the identification of
the effects of globalization on inequality difficult. To deal with this prob-
lem, a separate analysis is conducted for net-market and disposable in-
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come inequality. This allows me to determine whether transfer-based
redistribution mitigates the impact of globalization on inequality.
The main challenge to implementing these propositions is the lack of feasi-
ble data. One of the main contributions of this dissertation, then, is to compile
a consistent database of inequality and globalization variables across European
regions.
• The intra-regional inequality measures are calculated based on survey
data compiled by the Luxembourg Income Study. This data source al-
lows one to obtain feasibly consistent regional figures across time and
countries.
• Due to the lack of comparable and consistent regional data on global-
ization, the required indicators are constructed based on a top-down ap-
proach and using available data sources. Thereby, country-level data on
trade and offshoring are combined with regional manufacturing employ-
ment figures.
The descriptive evaluation of these measures reveals substantial gaps between
the lowest and highest levels of both regional inequality and globalization
within larger countries and emphasizes the importance of taking regional het-
erogeneity into account. These data on globalization and inequality build the
basis for the subsequent investigation.
The econometric procedure is challenging because there is neither an es-
tablished econometric model available to rely upon nor are the variables to be
applied in such a framework clearly specified. As a further difficulty, the re-
gional inequality and globalization data have the disadvantageous feature of
being less reliable than their country-level counterparts.
To deal with these issues, a meta-analysis of globalization coefficients is done.
Therefore, a meta-database of regression coefficients, estimated by the author,
is compiled based on a large number of regressions using various model set-
tings and specifications drawing on the regional inequality and globalization
data.
This procedure allows for an assessment of the stability of the findings and
the identification of possible specification effects. Overall, the meta-analysis
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techniques prove very helpful in eliminating spurious findings and allow for
efficient identification of the most robust results and best specifications.
The results reflect the ambiguity of the findings in the empirical litera-
ture with regard to the impact of globalization, but they clearly indicate that
offshoring behaves very differently from export- and import-based openness
measures. The analysis shows that an increase in the intensity of offshoring
makes the income distribution less equal. This finding is rather robust across
model specifications, with the caveat that it applies much more strongly to the
EU-4 regions than to the overall EU-151. Interestingly, ”effective” redistribu-
tion, i.e., the difference between disposable and net-market income inequality,
is weaker in regions with higher offshoring intensity. An implication of this is
that the transfer system fails to mitigate the impact on income distribution.
Regarding the trade-basedmeasures, the results give no univocal picture. They
show a negative relationship to inequality, in accordance with the findings of
Jaumotte et al. [21], but when country trend effects are incorporated into the
model, the relationship between export and import intensity and inequality
turns positive. This suggests that country-specific time-variant omitted vari-
ables bias the coefficients. It is also possible that a negative relationship on the
country level coexists with a regionally positive one. The use of net-market
income inequality delivered similar but more robust results than did dispos-
able income inequality. Furthermore, a comparison of bottom and top income-
sensitive inequality measures indicated that the impact is more pronounced on
the lower parts of the income distribution.
As a further finding, the results reported in this dissertation challenge the
belief that ICT contributed to a rise in inequality. At least for Europe, the evi-
dence considered here suggests, on the contrary, that technology is responsible
for a decrease in net-market income inequality. In other words, the regional
data give no evidence of a skill-bias of technological change. The most likely
explanation is that ICT, as an important growth factor, helps to reduce unem-
ployment and thereby net-market income-based inequality. This interpretation
receives support from the finding that ICT is less statistically significant with
1without Portugal and the Netherlands
140 CHAPTER 7. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
regard to disposable income inequality.
As an extension and to complement the findings on offshoring in manu-
facturing, I test the hypothesis that service offshoring may be responsible for
increasing unemployment. Service offshoring is still in its infancy but, by all
predictions, will be growing very fast over the next decade and will be the next
important trend in globalization.
Some preliminary findings point to the conclusion that in case of market ser-
vices2, there are no negative employment effects. Service offshoring appears,
in fact, to be correlated negatively to unemployment.
The negative public perception of globalization (and especially of offshoring)
outlined at the beginning of this study is supported by the robust results for
offshoring. Any conclusions must be put into perspective, however, given the
mostly negative findings for trade-based measures and the opposite signs for
offshoring and technology, which may offset one another.
At the moment, it is difficult to draw general policy conclusions based on the
findings, as there are substantial differences between the economic openness
measures regarding the impact on inequality.
An important implication of the results is that the effectiveness of the wel-
fare systems in compensating losers from globalization is low. Hence, region-
specific transfer payments may be helpful to keep public support in favor of
further progress in economic globalization.
This study shows the advantage of regional analysis in assessing the impact
of a global phenomenon like globalization. The findings demonstrate how the
consideration of regional heterogeneity in larger countries can produce differ-
ent conclusions than regular cross-country analysis. Given the substantial re-
gional differenceswithin most European countries, a pure country-based focus
is likely not suitable to estimate the impact of globalization on inequality.
At the same time, however, the analysis also pointed out the weaknesses of
the approach. The substantial data deficiencies - measurement errors in the
inequality and globalization data - and omitted variables can distort the find-
2Excluding trade, transport, tourism and personal services
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ings. The differences in the results for the EU-4 countries and the more hetero-
geneous full sample are an indication of just how important a careful econo-
metric assessment of the relationship between globalization and inequality is.
Despite these difficulties, it is possible to identify robust results beneath the
noise in the data with the aid of meta-analysis techniques.
For future research, a robust theoretical framework would be especially
helpful as a basis to better identify the connections between globalization and
inequality. Furthermore, the use of more sophisticated methods to measure the
regional intensity of offshoring and of final-goods trade may yield a high pay-
off. Additionally, and less demanding, an extension of the research focus up to
the present date seems a worthy goal, as regional coverage and quality of the
necessary data has improved considerably in the last few years.
Overall, this analysis provided a first step toward a better understanding of
the role of globalization and technological progress in shaping income distri-
bution. It has shown that additional information gained by a regional approach
can substantially improve the empirical evidence and lead to different conclu-
sions, while at the same time, it has also stressed that a more sophisticated
framework and an improved database are necessary to arrive at final answers
and definite policy recommendations.
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Table 7.1: Net-market Income Gini Coefficients
Name NUTS Country 1985 1990 1995 2000
Berlin (west) de3 DE 0.41 0.38 0.39 0.50
Schleswig-Holstein def DE 0.39 0.36 0.39 0.45
Hamburg de6 DE 0.49 0.40 0.44 0.51
Niedersachsen de9 DE 0.42 0.38 0.41 0.44
Bremen de5 DE 0.63 0.47 0.53 0.53
Nordrhein-Westfalen dea DE 0.42 0.39 0.42 0.44
Hessen de7 DE 0.45 0.38 0.46 0.47
Rheinland-Pfalz + Saarland deb+dec DE 0.42 0.37 0.43 0.42
Baden-Wuerttemberg de1 DE 0.38 0.35 0.39 0.40
Bayern de2 DE 0.41 0.37 0.39 0.43
North Cumbria ukc + ukd1 UK 0.48 0.47 0.52 0.53
Yorks Humberside uke UK 0.47 0.47 0.50 0.50
North West ukd-ukd1 UK 0.46 0.49 0.51 0.49
East Midlands ukf UK 0.46 0.44 0.48 0.45
West Midlands ukg UK 0.47 0.49 0.48 0.48
East Anglia ukh1 UK 0.43 0.40 0.48 0.45
Greater London uki UK 0.47 0.50 0.52 0.52
South East exc London ukj+ukh2+ukh3 UK 0.41 0.40 0.45 0.44
South West ukk UK 0.43 0.43 0.45 0.46
Wales ukl UK 0.46 0.48 0.52 0.50
Scotland ukm UK 0.48 0.50 0.49 0.50
Nord Ovest itc IT 0.38 0.36 0.43 0.44
Nord Est itd IT 0.44 0.39 0.41 0.42
Centro (IT) ite IT 0.40 0.36 0.40 0.41
Sud (IT) itf IT 0.44 0.39 0.46 0.52
Isole (IT) itg IT 0.47 0.43 0.50 0.54
Iˆle de France fr1 FR 0.41 0.41 0.44 0.43
Bassin Parisien fr2 FR 0.46 0.44 0.46 0.47
Nord - Pas-de-Calais fr3 FR 0.49 0.52 0.50 0.51
Est fr4 FR 0.45 0.44 0.44 0.42
Ouest fr5 FR 0.46 0.47 0.47 0.47
Sud-Ouest fr6 FR 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.47
Centre-Est fr7 FR 0.43 0.44 0.45 0.47
Me´diterrane´e fr8 FR 0.47 0.52 0.51 0.54
Flandern be2 BE 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.42
Wallonia be3 BE 0.46 0.50 0.49 0.48
Brussel be1 BE 0.41 0.33 0.38 0.51
Noroeste es1 ES - - 0.53 0.47
Noreste es2 ES - - 0.45 0.44
Comunidad de Madrid es3 ES - - 0.42 0.41
Centro (ES) es4 ES - - 0.51 0.50
Este es5 ES - - 0.48 0.46
Sur es6 ES - - 0.53 0.44
Canarias (ES) es7 ES - - 0.48 0.47
Greek gr1 GR - - 0.47 0.47
Greek gr2 GR - - 0.47 0.49
Greek gr3 GR - - 0.43 0.41
Greek gr4 GR - - 0.46 0.41
Finland Fi FI 0.29 0.30 0.36 0.45
Denmark Den DEN 0.39 0.43 0.43 0.41
Luxembourg Lux LU 0.38 0.37 0.38 0.42
Ireland Ir IE - - 0.49 0.44
Austria Ost Aus1 AT - - 0.45 0.44
Austria Sd Aus2 AT - - 0.45 0.42
Austria West Aus3 AT - - 0.43 0.40
Sweden Swe SE - - 0.47 0.45
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern de8 DE - - 0.42 0.47
Brandenburg de4 DE - - 0.42 0.48
Sachsen-Anhalt dee DE - - 0.45 0.52
Thu¨ringen deg DE - - 0.42 0.48
Sachsen ded DE - - 0.43 0.46
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Table 7.2: Disposable Income Gini Coefficients
Name NUTS Country 1985 1990 1995 2000
Berlin (west) de3 DE 0.24 0.24 0.27 0.27
Schleswig-Holstein def DE 0.25 0.23 0.28 0.27
Hamburg de6 DE 0.29 0.22 0.23 0.3
Niedersachsen de9 DE 0.26 0.25 0.27 0.26
Bremen de5 DE 0.23 0.25 0.27 0.27
Nordrhein-Westfalen dea DE 0.27 0.27 0.29 0.27
Hessen de7 DE 0.29 0.24 0.29 0.29
Rheinland-Pfalz + Saarland deb+dec DE 0.26 0.25 0.26 0.25
Baden-Wuerttemberg de1 DE 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.25
Bayern de2 DE 0.26 0.27 0.28 0.26
North & Cumbria ukc + ukd1 UK 0.29 0.3 0.36 0.36
Yorks & Humberside uke UK 0.28 0.32 0.32 0.33
North West ukd-ukd1 UK 0.28 0.34 0.34 0.33
East Midlands ukf UK 0.3 0.3 0.35 0.34
West Midlands ukg UK 0.28 0.34 0.32 0.33
East Anglia ukh1 UK 0.27 0.29 0.33 0.32
Greater London uki UK 0.33 0.39 0.37 0.39
South East exc London ukj+ukh2+ukh3 UK 0.31 0.31 0.34 0.34
South West ukk UK 0.29 0.32 0.33 0.34
Wales ukl UK 0.28 0.3 0.34 0.32
Scotland ukm UK 0.31 0.32 0.32 0.32
Nord Ovest itc IT 0.3 0.26 0.31 0.3
Nord Est itd IT 0.3 0.28 0.3 0.3
Centro (IT) ite IT 0.29 0.26 0.29 0.28
Sud (IT) itf IT 0.33 0.28 0.34 0.36
Isole (IT) itg IT 0.35 0.31 0.36 0.39
Iˆle de France fr1 FR 0.3 0.29 0.31 0.29
Bassin Parisien fr2 FR 0.3 0.26 0.26 0.26
Nord - Pas-de-Calais fr3 FR 0.29 0.27 0.26 0.28
Est fr4 FR 0.28 0.26 0.26 0.23
Ouest fr5 FR 0.28 0.28 0.27 0.25
Sud-Ouest fr6 FR 0.31 0.28 0.28 0.26
Centre-Est fr7 FR 0.29 0.29 0.27 0.26
Me´diterrane´e fr8 FR 0.3 0.32 0.29 0.29
Flandern be2 BE 0.22 0.23 0.22 0.24
Wallonia be3 BE 0.23 0.24 0.24 0.25
Brussel be1 BE 0.25 0.23 0.23 0.31
Noroeste es1 ES - - 0.34 0.31
Noreste es2 ES - - 0.32 0.3
Comunidad de Madrid es3 ES - - 0.33 0.31
Centro (ES) es4 ES - - 0.35 0.34
Este es5 ES - - 0.34 0.34
Sur es6 ES - - 0.36 0.3
Canarias (ES) es7 ES - - 0.35 0.35
Voreia Ellada gr1 GR - - 0.36 0.33
Kentriki Ellada gr2 GR - - 0.35 0.34
Attiki gr3 GR - - 0.31 0.3
Nisia Aigaiou, Kriti gr4 GR - - 0.35 0.3
Finland Fi FI 0.21 0.21 0.22 0.25
Denmark Den DEN 0.28 0.26 0.22 0.23
Luxembourg Lux LU 0.28 0.28 0.24 0.26
Ireland Ir IE - - 0.34 0.31
Austria Ost Aus1 AT - - 0.34 0.33
Austria Sd Aus2 AT - - 0.34 0.3
Austria West Aus3 AT - - 0.34 0.31
Sweden Swe SE - - 0.22 0.25
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern de8 DE - - 0.23 0.25
Brandenburg de4 DE - - 0.24 0.23
Sachsen-Anhalt dee DE - - 0.24 0.23
Thu¨ringen deg DE - - 0.2 0.22
Sachsen ded DE - - 0.2 0.22
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Table 7.3: Export Intensity Data: EXPEX
Name NUTS Country 1985 1990 1995 2000
Berlin (west) de3 DE 0.22 0.25 0.35 0.46
Schleswig-Holstein def DE 0.23 0.24 0.31 0.46
Hamburg de6 DE 0.22 0.25 0.39 0.55
Niedersachsen de9 DE 0.21 0.22 0.33 0.48
Bremen de5 DE 0.25 0.26 0.35 0.57
Nordrhein-Westfalen dea DE 0.25 0.27 0.37 0.46
Hessen de7 DE 0.23 0.23 0.37 0.53
Rheinland-Pfalz + Saarland deb+dec DE 0.23 0.24 0.35 0.49
Baden-Wuerttemberg de1 DE 0.25 0.27 0.40 0.52
Bayern de2 DE 0.24 0.25 0.37 0.46
North & Cumbria ukc + ukd1 UK 0.41 0.34 0.42 0.54
Yorks & Humberside uke UK 0.36 0.29 0.36 0.42
North West ukd-ukd1 UK 0.41 0.35 0.43 0.44
East Midlands ukf UK 0.36 0.31 0.38 0.40
West Midlands ukg UK 0.43 0.35 0.45 0.49
East Anglia ukh1 UK 0.36 0.31 0.39 0.48
Greater London uki UK 0.37 0.31 0.37 0.34
South East exc London ukj+ukh2+ukh3 UK 0.46 0.38 0.50 0.52
SouthWest ukk UK 0.42 0.35 0.44 0.51
Wales ukl UK 0.42 0.33 0.44 0.53
Scotland ukm UK 0.38 0.31 0.41 0.51
Nord Ovest itc IT 0.32 0.29 0.37 0.45
Nord Est itd IT 0.30 0.28 0.36 0.45
Centro (IT) ite IT 0.26 0.23 0.31 0.40
Sud (IT) itf IT 0.27 0.24 0.32 0.39
Isole (IT) itg IT 0.32 0.26 0.30 0.38
Iˆle de France fr1 FR 0.32 0.33 0.43 0.53
Bassin Parisien fr2 FR 0.27 0.28 0.36 0.43
Nord - Pas-de-Calais fr3 FR 0.26 0.27 0.35 0.43
Est fr4 FR 0.29 0.30 0.40 0.48
Ouest fr5 FR 0.27 0.29 0.37 0.42
Sud-Ouest fr6 FR 0.28 0.29 0.39 0.45
Centre-Est fr7 FR 0.26 0.28 0.36 0.44
Me´diterrane´e fr8 FR 0.28 0.29 0.35 0.44
Flandern be2 BE 0.47 0.45 0.64 0.89
Wallonia be3 BE 0.42 0.38 0.53 0.75
Brussel be1 BE 0.44 0.42 0.50 0.85
Noroeste es1 ES 0.21 0.27
Noreste es2 ES 0.23 0.28
Comunidad de Madrid es3 ES 0.22 0.28
Centro (ES) es4 ES 0.20 0.25
Este es5 ES 0.21 0.26
Sur es6 ES 0.19 0.25
Canarias (ES) es7 ES 0.21 0.27
Voreia Ellada gr1 GR 0.21 0.29
Kentriki Ellada gr2 GR 0.26 0.32
Attiki gr3 GR 0.23 0.34
Nisia Aigaiou, Kriti gr4 GR 0.20 0.28
Finland Fi FI 0.52 0.59
Denmark Den DEN 0.60 0.67
Luxembourg Lux LU 0.50
Ireland Ir IE 0.53 0.83
Austria Ost Aus1 AT 0.35 0.42
Austria Sd Aus2 AT 0.35 0.44
Austria West Aus3 AT 0.37 0.43
Sweden Swe SE 0.57 0.75
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern de8 DE 0.31 0.36
Brandenburg de4 DE 0.33 0.42
Sachsen-Anhalt dee DE 0.34 0.41
Thu¨ringen deg DE 0.32 0.40
Sachsen ded DE 0.36 0.45
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Table 7.4: Import Competition Data: IC
Name NUTS Country 1985 1990 1995 2000
Berlin (west) de3 DE 0.56 0.74 0.36 0.74
Schleswig-Holstein def DE 0.48 0.56 0.19 0.74
Hamburg de6 DE 0.74 0.67 0.33 0.80
Niedersachsen de9 DE 0.53 0.50 0.19 0.80
Bremen de5 DE 0.34 0.62 0.14 0.76
Nordrhein-Westfalen dea DE 0.54 0.63 0.24 0.86
Hessen de7 DE 0.44 0.44 0.25 0.87
Rheinland-Pfalz + Saarland deb+dec DE 0.44 0.41 0.14 0.87
Baden-Wuerttemberg de1 DE 0.42 0.55 0.30 0.88
Bayern de2 DE 0.43 0.53 0.32 0.90
North & Cumbria ukc + ukd1 UK 0.71 0.03 0.45 0.22
Yorks & Humberside uke UK 0.61 0.05 0.35 0.23
North West ukd-ukd1 UK 0.76 0.03 0.41 0.26
East Midlands ukf UK 0.73 0.05 0.35 0.30
West Midlands ukg UK 0.65 0.08 0.51 0.20
East Anglia ukh1 UK 0.64 0.03 0.31 0.19
Greater London uki UK 0.75 0.01 0.35 0.23
South East exc London ukj+ukh2+ukh3 UK 0.80 0.03 0.51 0.25
South West ukk UK 0.73 0.06 0.46 0.18
Wales ukl UK 0.63 0.04 0.55 0.28
Scotland ukm UK 0.66 0.03 0.39 0.32
Nord Ovest itc IT 0.43 0.17 0.93 0.69
Nord Est itd IT 0.45 0.19 0.90 0.69
Centro (IT) ite IT 0.59 0.29 0.90 0.67
Sud (IT) itf IT 0.45 0.26 0.87 0.58
Isole (IT) itg IT 0.29 0.12 0.81 0.45
Iˆle de France fr1 FR 0.69 0.41 0.28 0.78
Bassin Parisien fr2 FR 0.55 0.42 0.21 0.78
Nord - Pas-de-Calais fr3 FR 0.39 0.40 0.26 0.75
Est fr4 FR 0.51 0.41 0.21 0.73
Ouest fr5 FR 0.58 0.45 0.24 0.65
Sud-Ouest fr6 FR 0.50 0.43 0.25 0.71
Centre-Est fr7 FR 0.56 0.52 0.24 0.85
Me´diterrane´e fr8 FR 0.59 0.36 0.21 0.73
Flandern be2 BE 0.50 0.59
Wallonia be3 BE 0.34 0.44
Brussel be1 BE 0.32 0.51
Noroeste es1 ES 0.81 0.87
Noreste es2 ES 0.75 0.74
Comunidad de Madrid es3 ES 0.84 0.71
Centro (ES) es4 ES 0.87 0.87
Este es5 ES 0.86 0.79
Sur es6 ES 0.87 0.87
Canarias (ES) es7 ES 0.81 0.87
Voreia Ellada gr1 GR 0.58 0.61
Kentriki Ellada gr2 GR 0.47 0.50
Attiki gr3 GR 0.33 0.51
Nisia Aigaiou, Kriti gr4 GR 0.52 0.49
Finland Fi FI 0.35 0.14 0.45
Denmark Den DEN 0.19 0.47
Luxembourg Lux LU
Ireland Ir IE 0.17 0.28 0.15 0.66
Austria Ost Aus1 AT 0.09 0.46
Austria Sd Aus2 AT 0.12 0.40
Austria West Aus3 AT 0.11 0.36
Sweden Swe SE 0.33 0.16 0.37
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern de8 DE 0.08 0.63
Brandenburg de4 DE 0.12 0.79
Sachsen-Anhalt dee DE 0.06 0.77
Thu¨ringen deg DE 0.22 0.82
Sachsen ded DE 0.21 0.82
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Table 7.5: Import Penetration Ratio Data: IMPEX
Name NUTS Country 1985 1990 1995 2000
Berlin (west) de3 DE 0.20 0.14 0.16 0.25
Schleswig-Holstein def DE 0.11 0.12 0.11 0.21
Hamburg de6 DE 0.21 0.18 0.17 0.22
Niedersachsen de9 DE 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.20
Bremen de5 DE 0.16 0.16 0.15 0.24
Nordrhein-Westfalen dea DE 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.23
Hessen de7 DE 0.13 0.14 0.17 0.23
Rheinland-Pfalz + Saarland deb+dec DE 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.17
Baden-Wuerttemberg de1 DE 0.16 0.16 0.20 0.25
Bayern de2 DE 0.18 0.18 0.19 0.29
North & Cumbria ukc + ukd1 UK 0.21 0.22 0.24 0.30
Yorks & Humberside uke UK 0.21 0.20 0.26 0.29
North West ukd-ukd1 UK 0.23 0.24 0.26 0.27
East Midlands ukf UK 0.22 0.23 0.28 0.30
West Midlands ukg UK 0.28 0.26 0.30 0.34
East Anglia ukh1 UK 0.21 0.20 0.25 0.33
Greater London uki UK 0.21 0.17 0.18 0.20
South East exc London ukj+ukh2+ukh3 UK 0.23 0.21 0.27 0.30
SouthWest ukk UK 0.21 0.21 0.25 0.30
Wales ukl UK 0.26 0.23 0.27 0.34
Scotland ukm UK 0.22 0.19 0.25 0.29
Nord Ovest itc IT 0.15 0.13 0.16 0.21
Nord Est itd IT 0.10 0.10 0.14 0.17
Centro (IT) ite IT 0.11 0.10 0.14 0.18
Sud (IT) itf IT 0.10 0.10 0.13 0.16
Isole (IT) itg IT 0.14 0.11 0.14 0.15
Iˆle de France fr1 FR 0.12 0.13 0.17 0.26
Bassin Parisien fr2 FR 0.14 0.16 0.19 0.27
Nord - Pas-de-Calais fr3 FR 0.14 0.16 0.17 0.26
Est fr4 FR 0.13 0.16 0.17 0.28
Ouest fr5 FR 0.14 0.16 0.17 0.24
Sud-Ouest fr6 FR 0.10 0.13 0.15 0.21
Centre-Est fr7 FR 0.13 0.14 0.18 0.26
Me´diterrane´e fr8 FR 0.10 0.10 0.12 0.17
Flandern be2 BE 0.28 0.24 0.31 0.41
Wallonia be3 BE 0.25 0.24 0.24 0.35
Brussel be1 BE 0.26 0.22 0.26 0.35
Noroeste es1 ES 0.11 0.16
Noreste es2 ES 0.14 0.19
Comunidad de Madrid es3 ES 0.13 0.18
Centro (ES) es4 ES 0.11 0.16
Este es5 ES 0.14 0.20
Sur es6 ES 0.11 0.15
Canarias (ES) es7 ES 0.36 0.46
Voreia Ellada gr1 GR 0.16 0.23
Kentriki Ellada gr2 GR 0.13 0.24
Attiki gr3 GR 0.25 0.36
Nisia Aigaiou, Kriti gr4 GR 0.10 0.22
Finland Fi FI 0.18 0.21
Denmark Den DEN 0.19 0.21
Luxembourg Lux LU
Ireland Ir IE 0.34 0.34
Austria Ost Aus1 AT 0.12 0.18
Austria Sd Aus2 AT 0.12 0.21
Austria West Aus3 AT 0.12 0.20
Sweden Swe SE 0.17 0.22
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern de8 DE 0.07 0.14
Brandenburg de4 DE 0.08 0.14
Sachsen-Anhalt dee DE 0.11 0.16
Thu¨ringen deg DE 0.12 0.23
Sachsen ded DE 0.11 0.21
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Table 7.6: Offshoring Intensity Data: OFFSM
Name NUTS Country 1985 1990 1995 2000
Berlin (west) de3 DE 0.18 0.18 0.21 0.26
Schleswig-Holstein def DE 0.15 0.16 0.20 0.25
Hamburg de6 DE 0.18 0.18 0.22 0.29
Niedersachsen de9 DE 0.14 0.15 0.20 0.25
Bremen de5 DE 0.13 0.14 0.21 0.25
Nordrhein-Westfalen dea DE 0.16 0.17 0.22 0.27
Hessen de7 DE 0.16 0.16 0.22 0.27
Rheinland-Pfalz + Saarland deb+dec DE 0.16 0.16 0.21 0.26
Baden-Wuerttemberg de1 DE 0.17 0.17 0.22 0.26
Bayern de2 DE 0.17 0.16 0.21 0.25
North & Cumbria ukc + ukd1 UK 0.27 0.28 0.26 0.28
Yorks & Humberside uke UK 0.26 0.27 0.25 0.24
North West ukd-ukd1 UK 0.28 0.29 0.26 0.25
East Midlands ukf UK 0.28 0.29 0.26 0.24
West Midlands ukg UK 0.25 0.28 0.26 0.27
East Anglia ukh1 UK 0.25 0.26 0.24 0.26
Greater London uki UK 0.27 0.28 0.26 0.23
South East exc London ukj+ukh2+ukh3 UK 0.27 0.29 0.27 0.28
South West ukk UK 0.26 0.28 0.25 0.27
Wales ukl UK 0.27 0.28 0.27 0.28
Scotland ukm UK 0.27 0.28 0.27 0.27
Nord Ovest itc IT 0.23 0.19 0.23 0.25
Nord Est itd IT 0.20 0.16 0.20 0.23
Centro (IT) ite IT 0.19 0.15 0.20 0.22
Sud (IT) itf IT 0.20 0.16 0.20 0.21
Isole (IT) itg IT 0.24 0.22 0.26 0.25
Iˆle de France fr1 FR 0.23 0.23 0.22 0.20
Bassin Parisien fr2 FR 0.23 0.23 0.21 0.19
Nord - Pas-de-Calais fr3 FR 0.23 0.23 0.21 0.19
Est fr4 FR 0.22 0.23 0.22 0.19
Ouest fr5 FR 0.21 0.21 0.20 0.17
Sud-Ouest fr6 FR 0.22 0.22 0.21 0.18
Centre-Est fr7 FR 0.25 0.25 0.22 0.20
Me´diterrane´e fr8 FR 0.24 0.23 0.21 0.20
Flandern be2 BE 0.47 0.49
Wallonia be3 BE 0.45 0.47
Brussel be1 BE 0.48 0.50
Noroeste es1 ES 0.23 0.28
Noreste es2 ES 0.25 0.30
Comunidad de Madrid es3 ES 0.26 0.31
Centro (ES) es4 ES 0.21 0.26
Este es5 ES 0.23 0.28
Sur es6 ES 0.20 0.25
Canarias (ES) es7 ES 0.23 0.28
Voreia Ellada gr1 GR 0.21 0.23
Kentriki Ellada gr2 GR 0.22 0.25
Attiki gr3 GR 0.25 0.29
Nisia Aigaiou, Kriti gr4 GR 0.21 0.24
Finland Fi FI 0.29 0.30
Denmark Den DEN 0.36 0.38
Luxembourg Lux LU 0.46 0.47
Ireland Ir IE 0.65
Austria Ost Aus1 AT 0.38 0.43
Austria Sd Aus2 AT 0.36 0.44
Austria West Aus3 AT 0.37 0.43
Sweden Swe SE 0.33 0.35
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern de8 DE 0.20 0.23
Brandenburg de4 DE 0.22 0.25
Sachsen-Anhalt dee DE 0.21 0.25
Thu¨ringen deg DE 0.20 0.25
Sachsen ded DE 0.22 0.26
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